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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation consists of three papers; 'Asset Prices and Real Exchange Rates
with Deep Habits', 'Financial Market Completeness in Multi-Good Economies' and
'Correlations'. The rest of the section is organized as follows. I ﬁrst discuss the
common feature of the papers, namely agent heterogeneity and multiple risky assets.
I then brieﬂy discuss the main results in each of the papers.
One of the main topics in ﬁnance is to understand the behavior of asset prices.
Important questions are how the equilibrium compensation for risk is determined,
what the important risk factors are and how these evolve over time. A key concept
is that in any equilibrium, prices should be free of arbitrage. However, in most in-
stances one can not directly use the concept of arbitrage and one must turn to other
equilibrium concepts. This involves modeling the demand and supply of risky asset
in a general equilibrium framework. This will in turn link equilibrium stock prices
to consumption of individuals. Early work on consumption based equilibrium asset
pricing models (CCAPM) linked the equilibrium excess return (the return on the
asset minus the return on a risk-free bond) to the covariance between consumption
growth and stock returns ([Breeden 1979],[Lucas 1978], [Cox et al. 1985]). Under-
lying these models is the assumption that the there is a representative agent that
maximize expected utility of lifetime consumption. The agent is assumed to dislike
risk (risk averse) and prefer consumption today over consumption tomorrow (impa-
tient). I depart from the standard consumption based asset pricing in two ways.
Firstly, I consider economies with multiple risky assets in positive net supply. Sec-
ondly, I model multiple agents that are heterogeneous. I will now elaborate on these
two departures from the basic model.
1.1 Multiple Risky Asset
In the standard consumption based model the aggregate stock market is modeled
as a claim to the aggregate consumption.1 This gives important insights into the
1The basic model is a pure exchange economy with no investments or labor in-
come. In this setup consumption and dividends are equated.
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behavior of the returns on the market, but is not very informative on the cross-
section of returns. Extending the model to allow for multiple risky asset allows for
the study of the cross-section of returns. Each risky asset is a claim to a risky out-
put stream.2 Models with multiple dividend streams (Lucas trees) can be divided
into two groups. The ﬁrst group consists of models where the cash ﬂows are perfect
substitutes ([Cochrane et al. 2008], [Santos & Veronesi 2006], [Menzly et al. 2004],
[Bansal et al. 2005]). The second group considers models where the Lucas trees
are less than perfect substitutes ([Cole & Obstfeld 1991],[Cass & Pavlova 2004],
[Zapatero 1995], [Pavlova & Rigobon 2007], [Serrat 2001]). I will refer to the lat-
ter case as economies with multiple goods.3 In general, models with multiple risky
assets give raise to diﬀerent dynamics of the market price of risk, both at the ag-
gregate level and at the individual security level. In a pure exchange economy with
inelastic supply of risky assets, the required return for holding a particular asset will
in general depend on the output share of the asset. This is the argument put forward
by [Cochrane et al. 2008].
1.2 Heterogeneous agents
I depart from the representative agent setup and allow for heterogeneity. Hetero-
geneity can take many forms (information, beliefs, risk aversion, taste, idiosyncratic
income shocks, time preferences etc.). I will focus on heterogeneity in risk aversion
and taste. Heterogeneity in risk aversion will imply that as agents optimally share
consumption risk, the dominating agent will be diﬀerent in diﬀerent states of the
world. The less risk averse agents will optimally choose a more volatile consumption
proﬁle than the more risk averse. Heterogeneity in taste is related to situations in
which there are diﬀerent consumption goods that are less than perfect substitutes.
In such situations agents might have diﬀerent preferences over the goods. Similarly
as the case with heterogeneity in risk aversion, heterogeneity in taste will give raise
to trade in the goods to optimally share the risk.
1.3 Asset Prices and Real Exchange Rates with
Deep Habits
Real exchange rates and asset prices are too volatile compared to funda-
mentals according to standard utility functions. Moreover, if calibrated to
2I will use output and dividends interchangeably. In the pure exchange economy
these two quantities are the same.
3Strictly speaking the case of multiple goods nests both classes of models, as
perfect substitutes is only a special case.
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match the equity premium the volatility of the real exchange rate is too high.
[Campbell & Cochrane 1999] shows that a model with external habit formation can
successfully explain the equity premium and the excess volatility of stock returns.
The mechanism for generating the results is a slow moving subsistence point (ex-
ternal habit). [Ravn et al. 2006] extends the external habit formation to a multiple
good setting and label it deep habits. In this paper I consider a two country - two
good model with deep habits. Habit formation increases the volatility of the marginal
rate of substitution. This in turns leads to higher volatility of both stock returns
and the real exchange rate. I can match the equity premium, the volatility of the
real exchange rate and the failure of the uncovered interest rate parity. The equity
premium is predominately driven by the risk aversion, while the real exchange rate
is driven by the elasticity of substitution between the home country good and the
foreign country good. The failure of the uncovered interest rate parity is matched
because of the high volatility of the exchange rate risk premium and the negative
covariance between the interest rate diﬀerential and the risk premium on the real
exchange rate. In an extension of the model I consider heterogeneity of the home
country and the foreign country agents. The agents are assumed to have home bias
in consumption. I show that home bias in consumption leads to home bias in port-
folios. Just as the homogeneous agent economy, the economy with heterogeneous
agents can match the equity premium and the volatility of the real exchange rate.
1.4 Financial Market Completeness in Multi-
Good Economies
In this paper we study how market completeness depends on the utility function of
the representative agent in the economy. A market is said to be complete if any
contingent claim can be replicated by a set of basic securities. For the market to be
complete there must be a set of basic securities that spans the entire uncertainty in
the economy. A basic example is a situation where there are two states of nature
(rain and sun) and two securities. Security one pays oﬀ one if there is rain and
zero otherwise, while security two pays oﬀ one if there is sun and zero otherwise. In
this case the market is complete because any other security can be synthetically con-
structed as combinations of the two basic securities. In this paper we consider a pure
exchange economy with multiple goods. The utility function of the representative
agent is deﬁned over each good. There are as many basic securities (stocks) as the
number of goods in the economy, and each stock is a claim to future dividends in one
of the goods. The stock price processes are determined in equilibrium. We show that
even though the risky dividend stream spans the entire uncertainty, the endogenous
determined stock price processes might not, and thus rendering the market incom-
plete. Moreover, we show that the completeness of the market crucially depend
on the utility function of the representative agent. The main result establishes a
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suﬃcient condition for market completeness that only depends on the primitives of
the economy. We also establish a suﬃcient condition for market incompleteness, and
show that market completeness can depend on the choice of numeraire good. Finally
we show that in a market with heterogeneous taste the market can be complete even
though the individual utility functions are within the class that leads to incomplete
markets if that agent was the sole agent in the economy.
1.5 Correlations
One of the most fundamental concepts in ﬁnance is diversiﬁcation. If agents are risk
averse, they should diversify their risky positions. In order to make optimal portfolio
choice, understanding the dependency structure of the risky assets is essential. In
a Gaussian world, the key concept that captures the dependency is the correlations
matrix. If risky assets are less than perfectly correlated there is room for diversi-
ﬁcation beneﬁts, and the Mean-Variance analysis has thought us how to optimize
our portfolio in terms of maximizing the expected return given a certain level of
variance. However, to operationalize this one will have to estimate the correlations
between assets. One of the main issues one is facing is that the correlations might be
stochastic, and thus using the average correlation will not be satisfactory. There is
a huge empirical literature documenting several empirical stylized facts about stock
return correlations. Correlations are time varying and stochastic, and tend to be
high during recessions. Moreover, in times of high market volatility the correlation
between stock returns are typically higher than in less turbulent times. Frequent
explanations for these empirical stylized facts have been that investors are panicking
or herding, thus they behave in an irrational way. Only a few papers aim at explain-
ing the stochastic behavior of correlations using equilibrium models with rational
expectations.4 In this paper we propose an explanation for countercyclical behavior
of correlations and the relation between volatility and correlations. Moreover, we
establish a connection between trading volume, correlations and volatility. We con-
sider an economy with multiple dividend streams and agents that are heterogeneous
in risk aversion. When agents are heterogeneous in risk aversion, then the least risk
averse agent will dominate in good states while the most risk averse agent will domi-
nate in bad states. The intuition for this is that the least risk averse agent optimally
has a more volatile consumption proﬁle, and consequently both the upside and the
downside is greater than for the least risk averse agent. The optimal risk sharing of
the agents leads to a time varying risk aversion for the representative agent. In bad
states of the world the risk aversion is high and in good states it is low. In certain
parts of the state space the wealth shifts between the two agents are particularly
4 Exceptions are [Chue 2005], [Pavlova & Rigobon 2008] and
[Ribeiro & Veronesi 2002].
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volatile. The high volatility of the relative wealth of the agents leads to high volatil-
ity of the representative agents risk aversion. This in turns leads to high volatility of
the market price of risk, and consequently also high volatility of the discount rates
in the economy. This is an economy wide eﬀect that will impact the discount rates
for all risky assets. As the volatility of the discount rates are high, so is the volatility
and the correlation between stock returns. The higher correlation is a consequence
of the fact that the risk aversion is a common factor in all assets' discount rates. We
show that the model can deliver changes in correlations and average stock return
volatility over the business cycle that are in line with the data.

Chapter 2
Asset Prices and Real
Exchange Rates with Deep
Habits
Abstract
I study a two country - two good pure exchange economy with deep habits that
jointly explains the volatility of the real exchange rate, equity premiums, levels of
risk free rates and that reproduces the uncovered interest rate (UIP) puzzle. While
both the volatility of the real exchange rate and the equity premium depend on
the habit formation, the magnitudes are governed by diﬀerent parameters. The
equity premium depends mainly on the risk aversion while the real exchange rate
depends on the elasticity of substitution between the home good and the foreign
good. In an extension of the model I allow for preference heterogeneity of the home
and the foreign representative agents. I solve for optimal portfolios and show that
consumption home bias leads to portfolio home bias.
Author: Christian Heyerdahl-Larsen.1
Keywords: Asset Pricing Moments; Real Exchange Rates; Multi-Good
Economies; Deep Habits;
JEL Classiﬁcation: F31; G10
1I would like to thank Paul Ehling, Michael F. Gallmeyer, Ilan Cooper, seminar
participants at the Norwegian School of Management-BI, University of Stavanger,
Stockholm School of Economics and The Institute for Financial Research (SIFR) for
helpful comments.
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2.1 Introduction
I study the eﬀect of deep habits2 on asset prices and on exchange rates in a
[Lucas 1982] two country - two good pure exchange economy. Instead of forming
habits over an aggregate consumption basket, the representative agent forms habit
over individual good varieties. My model with deep habits replicates the volatility of
real exchange rates, the failure of the uncovered interest parity, the equity premium
and the level of the risk free rate.
With standard CRRA preferences, the risk aversion needed to match the equity
premium results in a too high volatility of the real exchange rate. [Backus et al. 2001]
show in a complete market setting, that the growth of the exchange rate equals the
diﬀerence between the log stochastic discount factor in the foreign country and the
home country. To be consistent with the observed exchange rate volatility, the
stochastic discount factors in the home and the foreign country must be highly
correlated ([Brandt et al. 2006]).
I match the volatility of real exchange rates by using habit formation at the
country good level combined with a non separable utility function over the home and
the foreign good. A non separable utility function allows for separating the elasticity
of substitution between the home and the foreign good from the risk aversion. Habit
formation increases the volatility of the marginal rate of substitution between home
and foreign goods, and thus the volatility of the real exchange rate. Habit formation
also increases the volatility of the stochastic discount factor, and allows for matching
the expected excess return on the stock market. However, while the equity premium
mainly depends on risk aversion, the volatility of the real exchange rate depends on
the elasticity of substitution between home good and the foreign good.
The uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) states that the expected change in
exchange rates equals the interest rate diﬀerential. Hence, countries with high in-
terest rates are expected to experience depreciating exchanges rates relative to low
interest rate countries.3 However, empirical evidence shows that high interest rate
countries experience appreciating rather than a depreciating exchange rates (see
[Hansen & Hodrick 1980], [Fama 1984], [Backus et al. 2001]). To reproduce the fail-
ure of UIP under rational expectations, the risk premium for holding exchange rate
risk must be negatively correlated with the interest diﬀerential and exhibit higher
variance. In my model with deep habits the market price of risk is countercyclical.
2[Ravn et al. 2006] are the ﬁrst to study deep habits in a macro setting.
3According to the UIP a regression of interest diﬀerentials on the exchange rate
changes should yield a slope coeﬃcient of one.
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In times when the surplus consumption ratio4 in the home good is lower than the
foreign good, the representative agent is reluctant to scale back on consumption of
domestic goods, and therefore requires a positive premium on the exchange rate.
The risk free rates depend on the time discount factor, an intertemporal smoothing
motive and a precautionary savings motive. The intertemporal smoothing motive is
high in times when consumption is close to the habit level. In times when consump-
tion is close to the habit level the volatility of the habit adjusted consumption is high
and so is the precautionary savings motive. The interest rate diﬀerential is the dif-
ference between the intertemporal smoothing motive and the precautionary savings
motive in the home and the foreign good. The diﬀerence between the intertemporal
smoothing motive depends on the elasticity of substitution between the home good
and the foreign good, while the diﬀerence between the precautionary savings motive
depends on both the elasticity of substitution and the risk aversion. If risk aversion
is high compared to the elasticity of substitution, then the interest rate diﬀerential
will be low in times when the surplus consumption ratio in the home good is lower
than the surplus consumption ratio in the foreign good. The interest rate diﬀerential
will then move in the opposite direction as the exchange rate risk premium. Since
the latter is more volatile than the former, the model reproduces the UIP puzzle.
My model is related to several recent papers that study the joint behavior of ex-
change rates and asset prices. [Colacito & Croce 2008] study a two-country version
of the long run risk model of [Bansal & Yaron 2004]. When the long-run component
in consumption growth is perfectly correlated across the home country and the for-
eign country, then the volatility of the real exchange rate and the equity premium
is matched simultaneously. Their model, however, cannot match the failure of the
UIP as it generates constant market price of risk. [Bansal & Shaliastovich 2008] also
study a two-country long-run risk model. When the home country and foreign coun-
try consumption volatility is stochastic, then the model reproduces the failure of
the expectation hypothesis in both the bond market and the exchange rate market.
[Verdelhan 2008] uses the model of [Campbell & Cochrane 1999] to study the failure
of the UIP. The model replicates the failure of the UIP, the equity premium and the
risk free rate, although at the expense of too high real exchange rate volatility.5
Common to the models by [Colacito & Croce 2008], [Bansal & Shaliastovich 2008],
and [Verdelhan 2008] is that they all specify a separate pure exchange economy for
the home country and the foreign country. Consumption in the two countries is ex-
ogenously speciﬁed. In a closed pure exchange economy, the required assumption for
4The surplus consumption ratio is given by the consumption in excess of the habit
level divided by consumption (see [Campbell & Cochrane 1999]).
5In the base case model the volatility of the real exchange rate is 42% but the
data shows only an average exchange rate volatility of about 12%. [Verdelhan 2008]
shows that including trade costs can reduce the volatility of the real exchange rate.
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such a consumption allocation to hold is that the consumption good is non tradable
or that there is complete home bias. In my model the countries produce diﬀerent
goods that are less than perfect substitutes. Home and Foreign goods are tradable,
and preferences are homogeneous.
My model is also related to [Moore & Roche 2008]. They consider a [Lucas 1982]
economy with separable power utility for the foreign and the home consumption
good. They only examine the properties of the exchange rate, and do not take into
account how the model fairs on asset pricing moments. Their model matches several
features of the real exchange rate, but cannot jointly match the equity premium and
the exchange rate volatility due to the assumption of separable power utility. The
models of [Moore & Roche 2008] and [Verdelhan 2008] yield the same properties
for the real exchange rate and for asset pricing moments. In Verdelhan (2008),
the assumption is that the representative agent in each country only cares about
domestic consumption (complete home bias with standard habit formation). In
contrast, the model of [Moore & Roche 2008] assumes that all goods are traded and
that preferences are homogeneous.6
In the ﬁnal section of the paper I depart from the representative agent setup and
allow for heterogeneity of the home and the foreign agents. The agents are assumed
to have home bias for their domestically produced consumption good. Home bias
in consumption causes the agents to optimally hold diﬀerent portfolios. In terms of
the asset pricing moments and the real exchange rate volatility the model delivers
similar results as the homogeneous agent economy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the model
and the equilibrium. Section 2.3 numerically examines the properties of equilibrium,
and illustrates how the model matches the volatility of the real exchange rates, the
equity premium, the risk free rate and the failure of the UIP. In section 2.4 I extend
the basic model to include heterogeneous agents. Section 2.5 concludes. Appendix
A.1 derives the equilibrium for the homogeneous agent economy, while Appendix
A.2 derives the equilibrium in the heterogeneous agent economy. Appendix A.3
and A.4 deals with the Malliavin derivatives. Appendix A.5 presents the numerical
method used to solve for equilibrium. Finally, Appendix A.6 discuss how the choice
of numaraire impacts the equilibrium.
6My model nests [Moore & Roche 2008] and [Verdelhan 2008] on the preference
side. If the elasticity of substitution between the home good and the foreign good
is the reciprocal of the risk aversion then my model collapses to a separable power
utility over the two goods. The economic interpretation of my model is closer to
[Moore & Roche 2008] as they also consider a multiple good setting with deep habits.
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2.2 The Model
My model is an extension of the [Lucas 1982] two country model to include deep
habits. I only focus on real quantities and therefore do not include nominal quanti-
ties.7
2.2.1 The Economy
I consider a continuous time pure exchange economy over the time span [0, T ]. The
uncertainty is represented by a ﬁltered probability space (Ω,=, {=t} , P ), on which
is deﬁned a two-dimensional Brownian motion B = (B1, B2). In the following all
stochastic processes are assumed to be progressively measurable and all equalities are
assumed to hold a.s. Stochastic diﬀerential equations are assumed to have solutions
without stating the regularity conditions.
There are two countries in the world economy. Each country produces its own
perishable consumption good. Output of each good follow
dCi(t)
Ci(t)
= µCi(t)dt+ σ
>
CidB(t) (2.1)
where
dµCi(t) = αi
(
µCi − µδi(t)
)
dt+ ν>i dB(t) (2.2)
for i = (H,F ) . Here H denotes the home country and F denotes the foreign country.
The diﬀusion coeﬃcients are two-dimensional vectors. In this way I allow output in
countries to be correlated. The expected growth rate is a mean reverting process
possibly correlated with output.
A representative agent maximizes lifetime expected utility over consumption of
the two goods8
E
[∫ T
0
u (CH(t), CF (t), XH(t), XF (t), t) dt
]
7As my goal is to study the real exchange rate I do not employ cash in advance
as in [Lucas 1982]. The real exchange rate would not change if I include cash in
advance.
8In the original setup of [Lucas 1982] there is a representative agent in both
the home country and the foreign country with equal endowments. This results
in a perfect pooling equilibrium, where each representative agent consumes half
the aggregate output of the two goods. I directly model the preferences of the
representative agent. The resulting equilibrium is the same as the perfect pooling in
[Lucas 1982].
12 Chapter 2. Deep Habits
where
u (CH(t), CF (t), XH(t), XF (t), t) =
e−ρt
1− γ Z (CH(t), CF (t), XH(t), XF (t))
1−γ (2.3)
and where
Z (CH(t), CF (t), XH(t), XF (t)) =
(
(CH(t)−XH(t))β + (CF (t)−XF (t))β
) 1
β
.
(2.4)
The above utility function is motivated by [Ravn et al. 2006], where Ci is the opti-
mal consumption of goods from country i, and Xi is the habit level of the same good.
Instead of forming habits over an aggregate consumption bundle, the representative
agent forms habits over each country good variety. The representative agent does
not take into account the habit level in his optimization and thus the habit is ex-
ternal. Utility is deﬁned as a standard power utility function over the composite
good Z,9 with at time discount factor of ρ. Z captures the degree of substitutability
between the two goods in the economy. The functional form is a constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) aggregator over the habit adjusted consumption. When β = 1
the goods are perfect substitutes. For β = 0 the Cobb-Douglas utility function over
the habit adjusted consumption of the two goods is obtained.10
As in [Campbell & Cochrane 1999], I deﬁne the surplus consumption ratio for
good i = H,F as
si(t) =
Ci(t)−Xi(t)
Ci(t)
(2.5)
and assume that si follows
dsi(t) = φi (si − si(t)) dt+ si(t)λi (si(t))σ>CidB(t) (2.6)
where
λi (si(t)) =
√
1− si
si
√
1− si(t)
si(t)
. (2.7)
The variable si is a mean reverting process with long run mean si and speed of
mean reversion of φi. The process is locally perfectly correlated with output shocks
to good i = H,F . To understand the dynamics of the surplus consumption ratio,
consider the case when Xi(t) is an exponential weighted average of past consumption
of good i11
Xi(t) = Xi(0)e
−αt + α
∫ t
0
e−α(t−u)Ci(u)du. (2.8)
9Risk aversion in a multiple good setting with deep habits is not trivial, however
I will frequently refer to γ as the risk aversion.
10The elasticity of substitution between the home good and the foreign good, η,
is related to β by η = 1
1−β .
11[Constantinides 1990] and [Detemple & Zapatero 1991] model habits as an ex-
ponential weighted average of past consumption.
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An application of Ito's lemma on si(t) =
Ci(t)−Xi(t)
Ci(t)
yields
dsi(t) =
(
µCi(t)− α− σ>CiσCi
)( µCi(t)− σ>CiσCi
µCi(t)− α− σ>CiσCi
− si(t)
)
+ (1− si(t))σ>CidB(t). (2.9)
The surplus consumption ratio is a mean reverting process, locally perfectly corre-
lated with output shocks to good i. However, nothing prevents the process from
turning negative. To bound the surplus consumptions away from zero, I use the rep-
resentation in (2.6). The functional form of the sensitivity function, λi, diﬀers from
[Campbell & Cochrane 1999] and follows [Aydemir 2008]. The process is guaranteed
to stay within the boundaries of [0, 1] for a large set of parameters values.12
Deﬁne the habit adjusted consumption as QH and QF with
QH(t) = CH(t)sH(t) (2.10)
QF (t) = CF (t)sF (t). (2.11)
An application of Ito's lemma gives the process followed by the habit adjusted
consumption and the composite good
dQi(t) = Qi(t)
(
µQi(t)(t)dt+ σQi(t)
>dB(t)
)
(2.12)
dZ(t) = Z(t)
(
µZ(t)dt+ σZ(t)
>dB(t)
)
(2.13)
where
µQi(t) = µCi(t) + φi
(
si
si(t)
− 1
)
+ λi (si(t))σ
>
CiσCi (2.14)
σQi(t) = (1 + λi (si(t)))σCi (2.15)
and where
µz(t) = sβ(t)µQi(t) + (1− sβ(t))µQi(t)
−1
2
sβ(t) (1− sβ(t)) (1− β)(
σQH (t)
>σQH (t) + σQF (t)
>σQF (t)− 2σQH (t)>σQF (t)
)
(2.16)
σZ(t) = sβ(t)σQH (t) + (1− sβ(t))σQF (t) (2.17)
and where
sβ =
QH(t)
β
QH(t)β +QF (t)β
. (2.18)
12To guarantee that s stays within the boundaries one requires that a > 1 and
b > 1 with a =
2φis
2
i
σT
Ci
σCi (1−si)
and b = 2φisi
σT
Ci
σCi
(see [Aydemir 2008] for details).
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In times when the surplus consumption ratio is low, then the sensitivity function
λi (si(t)) is high, and so is the volatility of the habit adjusted consumption.
Investment opportunities consists of a bond in zero net supply paying out in
the home good, a bond in zero net supply paying out in the foreign good and stock
markets in the home country and the foreign country.13 Stocks are in unit supply
and represent claims to each country's respective output stream. The bond price
dynamics are given by
dBH(t) = rH(t)BH(t)dt (2.19)
dBF (t) = rF (t)BF (t)dt. (2.20)
with BH = 1 and BF = 1.
The real exchange rate follows
de(t) = e(t)
(
µe(t)dt+ σe(t)
>dB(t)
)
. (2.21)
Stock price dynamics measured in terms of the home good are given by
dSH(t) + CH(t)dt = SH(t)
(
µH(t)dt+ σH(t)
>dB(t)
)
(2.22)
dSF (t) + e(t)CF (t)dt = SF (t)
(
µF (t)dt+ σF (t)
>dB(t)
)
. (2.23)
Coeﬃcients for bond prices, stock priceses and the real exchange rate are determined
in equilibrium.
The equilibrium state price density process, ξ(t), follows
dξ(t) = ξ(t)
(
−rH(t)dt− θ(t)>dB(t)
)
(2.24)
with ξ(0) = 1 and where θ(t) denotes the market price of risk given by
θ(t) = σ(t)−1 (µ(t)− rH(t)I) (2.25)
where σ is a 4 × 4 matrix containing the stock price diﬀusion coeﬃcients, µ is a
vector of drift rates and I is a vector of ones.
13One of the two bonds are redundant since we have two sources of uncertainty
and four assets. However, to address the UIP I calculate both the home and the
foreign risk free rates.
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2.2.2 Equilibrium
To derive equilibrium, I use standard martingale techniques (see
[Cox & Huang 1989], [Karatzas et al. 1990]). In the following I will take the
view of the home country and measure all quantities in terms of the home country
good. Equilibrium is characterized by a price system (rH , rF , µH , µF , µe, σH , σF , σe)
such that the consumption proﬁle is optimal and all markets clear for t ∈ [0, T ]. All
proofs are relegated to Appendix A.1.
The ﬁrst proposition characterizes the equilibrium risk free rate in the home
country, the foreign country and the market price of risk.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium risk free rate in country i = H,F is given by
ri(t) = ρ+ (γ + β − 1)µZ(t) + (1− β)µQi(t)
−1
2
(β + γ) (γ + β − 1)σZ(t)>σZ(t)
−1
2
(β − 1) (β − 2)σQi(t)>σQi(t)
+ (γ + β − 1) (β − 1)σZ(t)>σQi(t). (2.26)
The equilibrium market price of risk is given by
θ(t) = (γ + β − 1)σZ(t) + (1− β)σQH (t). (2.27)
From (2.27) we see that the market price of risk depends on the volatility of
the composite good, Z, and the volatility of the habit adjusted consumption of the
numeraire good, QH . When the elasticity of substitution is high, the market price of
risk is mainly driven by the composite good. The next two remarks illustrates two
extremes, one in which the risk free rate and the market price of risk only depends
on the composite good and one where the risk free rate and the market price of risk
are solely driven by the numeraire good.
Remark 1. When the home good and the foreign good are perfect substitutes, the
risk free rates take the form
ri(t) = ρ+ γµZ(t)− 1
2
γ (γ + 1)σZ(t)
>σZ(t). (2.28)
The market price of risk is
θ(t) = γσZ(t). (2.29)
Remark 2. When the elasticity of substitution, η, is equal to 1
γ
, the utility function
is separable in the two goods and the risk free rates are
ri(t) = ρ+ γµQi(t)−
1
2
γ (γ + 1)σQi(t)
>σQi(t). (2.30)
The market price of risk is
θ(t) = γσQH (t). (2.31)
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Remark 1 and Remark 2 show that we obtain the standard power utility case over
the habit adjusted consumption for certain values of the elasticity of substitution.
In the general case of Proposition 1 the interest rate depends on the time preference,
the intertemporal smoothing motive and the precautionary savings motive. The
intertemporal smoothing motive for the risk free rate of country i depends on the
expected growth of the composite good Z and the growth of the habit adjusted
consumption of good i. Similarly, the precautionary savings motive for the risk
free rate of country i depends on the variance of the habit adjusted consumption
of the good of country i, the variance of the composite good Z and the covariance
between the habit adjusted consumption of good i and the composite good Z. The
intertemporal smoothing motive works in the usual way; in times when the surplus
consumption ratio is low, the expected growth of the habit adjusted consumption
is high, and the representative agent's demand for bonds is low. The precautionary
savings motive is high when surplus consumption ratios are low because the eﬀective
risk aversion is high. When utility is non separable over the home good and the
foreign good, the risk free rate in the home (foreign) country depends not only
the home (foreign) good surplus consumption ratio, but also on the foreign (home)
surplus consumption ratio. In times when the surplus consumption ratio is low
in the home country compared to the foreign country, the variance of the habit
adjusted consumption of the home good and the covariance of the home good with
the composite good are both high, and results in a higher precautionary savings
motive in the home good than for the foreign good.
The interest diﬀerential is given by
rH(t)− rF (t) = (1− β) (µQH (t)− µQF (t))
−1
2
(β − 1) (β − 2)
(
σQH (t)
>σQH (t)− σQF (t)>σQF (t)
)
+ (γ + β − 1) (β − 1)σZ(t)> (σQH (t)− σQF (t)) . (2.32)
The diﬀerence in the intertemporal smoothing motive depends on the elasticity
of substitution. The risk aversion and the drift of the composite good do not enter.
The diﬀerence between the precautionary savings motive depends on the risk aversion
via the covariance with the composite good and the elasticity of substitution.
Remark 3. If expected consumption growth in both countries is constant and the
habit formation is turned oﬀ, then the interest rate diﬀerential is
rH(t)− rF (t) = r + (γ + β − 1) (β − 1)
(sβ(t)σCH + (1− sβ(t))σCF )> (σCH − σCF ) (2.33)
where
sβ(t) =
CH(t)
β
CH(t)β + CF (t)β
(2.34)
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and where
r = (1− β)) (µCH − µCF )−
1
2
(β − 1) (β − 2)
(
σ>CHσCH − σ>CF σCF
)
(2.35)
is a constant.
In the special case of Remark 3 the interest diﬀerential will increase when there
is a positive shock to the home good and decrease when there is a positive shock to
the foreign good given that γ + β > 1. The reason for this is that the home good
has a higher covariance with the composite good after a positive shock. The only
variation in the interest diﬀerential stems from the time varying covariance between
the countries' goods and the composite good. In the case with habit formation,
the variation is no longer only driven by the diﬀerences in the precautionary savings
motives but also by the diﬀerence in the intertemporal smoothing motive. These two
move in opposite directions because of the mean reversion in the surplus consumption
ratios. In times when the surplus consumption ratio is low, the expected growth of
the habit adjusted consumption will be high. This pushes the interest rate up due
to the increased incentive to borrow. The diﬀerence in the precautionary savings
motive will behave in a similar way as in Remark 3. The reason for the increased
comovement is no longer an increase in sβ , but is due to higher volatility of the habit
adjusted consumption.
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium real exchange rate and the
dynamics of the real exchange rate.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium real exchange rate is
e(t) =
(
CH(t)
CF (t)
)1−β (
sH(t)
sF (t)
)1−β
. (2.36)
The real exchange rate follows
de(t) = e(t)
(
µe(t)dt+ σe(t)
>dB(t)
)
(2.37)
where
µe(t) = (1− β)
(
µQH (t)− µQF (t) + σQF (t)> (σQF (t)− σQH (t))
)
+
1
2
β (β − 1) (σQH (t)− σQF (t))> (σQH (t)− σQF (t)) (2.38)
and where
σe(t) = (1− β) (σQH (t)− σQF (t)) . (2.39)
Remark 4. The expected growth of the real exchange rate can be decomposed into
the interest rate diﬀerential and a risk premium. The risk premium is θ(t)>σe(t).
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Remark 5. If expected consumption growth in both countries is constant and the
habit formation is turned oﬀ, the exchange rate is
e(t) =
(
CH(t)
CF (t)
)1−β
. (2.40)
The expected growth rate µe(t) = µe is constant. The diﬀusion coeﬃcients are also
constant and given by
σe = (1− β) (σCH − σCF ) . (2.41)
From Remark 5 we see that we either need a high volatility of the consumption
of the home and the foreign good or a low elasticity of substitution to match the
observed real exchange rate volatility. Without the habit formation the real exchange
rate follows a random walk and there is no predictability. As we can see from
Proposition 2, the exchange rate volatility depends on the surplus consumption
ratios. The surplus consumption ratios are much more volatile than consumption
and thus help matching the real exchange rate volatility. Note that the volatility of
the real exchange rate is independent of the risk aversion. From Proposition 2 we
have that the market price of risk in a model with deep habits is stochastic, and
we therefore obtain a time varying exchange rate risk premium. This is necessary
to match the UIP puzzle. In parameterizations in which the risk premium and the
risk free rate diﬀerential are negatively correlated and the volatility of the former is
higher, I can match the UIP puzzle. Note that in the case of Remark 3 and Remark
5 the interest rate diﬀerential is stochastic while the expected exchange rate growth
in constant. This implies that changes in the interest diﬀerential are perfectly oﬀset
by changes in the risk premium. This case results in a slope coeﬃcient of zero for
an UIP regression.
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium stock price diﬀusion matrix. I
follow [Gallmeyer 2002] and apply the Clark-Ocone formula from Malliavin Calculus
to obtain explicit formulas for the stock price diﬀusion coeﬃcients.
Proposition 3. The equilibrium stock return diﬀusion coeﬃcients are given by
σH(t) = θ(t) +
Et
[∫ T
t
ξ(s)CH(s) (Dt ln ξ(s) +Dt lnCH(s)) ds
]
Et
[∫ T
t
ξ(s)CH(s)ds
] (2.42)
and
σF (t) = θ(t) +
Et
[∫ T
t
ξ(s)e(s)CF (s) (Dt ln ξ(s) +Dt ln e(s) +Dt lnCF (s)) ds
]
Et
[∫ T
t
ξ(s)CF (s)ds
] .
(2.43)
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In Proposition 3, Dt refers to the Malliavin derivative. The stock price diﬀusion
matrix for the home country depends on the market price of risk and a ratio of
expectations involving Malliavin derivatives. Consider the Malliavin derivative in
the integrand
ξ(s)CH(s) (Dt ln ξ(s) +Dt lnCH(s)) . (2.44)
This Malliavin derivative captures the response to a small change at time t to
the state price density and the output of the home good at future time s > t. For
the foreign stock price diﬀusion coeﬃcient we must also consider the response of the
real exchange rate at time s to a change at times t < s. Given the risk-free rate
and the market price of risk from Proposition 1 and the diﬀusion coeﬃcients from
Proposition 3 we can calculate the drift rates of the stock price processes as follows
µ(t) = rH(t)I + σ(t)θ(t). (2.45)
This completes the description of the stock price process in the home and the foreign
market.
2.3 Analysis and Numerical Results
In this section I numerically study the properties of the equilibrium. The base case
scenario is an economy with a time horizon of 50 years. I calibrate the model to US
and UK data.14 Table 2.1 summarizes the model parameters. For the risk aversion I
use a coeﬃcient of ﬁve. This is higher than in the standard external habit literature
where the typical value is two, but equal to the value used by [van Binsbergen 2007].
I set the steady state value of the habit level to 0.15 and the persistence of the habit
level to 0.05. Time discount factor is 0.135 and chosen to match the level of the risk
free rate. For the parameters of the consumption processes I calibrate my model to
the average of the US and UK GDP data. The output processes have an expected
growth rate of 2.4% and a standard deviation of 2.3%. For the expected growth
of consumption I use a speed of mean reversion of 0.1 and a standard deviation
of 0.00115. The persistence of the expected growth is less than what is typically
used in the long run literature. I assume that the correlation between the expected
consumption growth of the US and UK goods is zero. This contrast with Bansal and
Shaliastovich (2007) and with Colcaito and Croce (2007) who use a nearly perfect
correlation between expected consumption growth in the two countries.
Table 2.2 summarize the key moments in the baseline calibration. The model
excess returns are 5.1% in the US and 5.7% in the UK.15 The corresponding values
14The data is from Datastream and covers the period 1970-2008. For the ﬁnancial
data I use the total return index from Datastream.
15The returns are measured in US dollar.
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Table 2.1: Model Parameters  Baseline Calibration. The table
summarizes the model parameters for the baseline calibration. The
calibration is symmetric in terms of the home good and the foreign
good.
Parameter Value
Risk aversion 5
Elasticity of substitution  1.33
Time preference 0.135
Steady state habit level 0.15
Speed of mean reversion habit growth 0.05
Average consumption growth 0.024
Standard error of consumption growth 0.023
Cross-country correlation of consumption growth 0.24
Speed of mean reversion for consumption growth 0.1
Volatility of expected consumption growth 0.00115
Correlation between US and UK expected consumption growth 0
 
in the data are 5.9% and 6.9% respectively. The model implied risk free rate is 1.6%
in both countries compared to 1.3% for US and 1.7% for the UK data. As we can
see, the model is able to resolve the risk free rate puzzle. The standard deviation
of the risk free rate is somewhat high compared to the data. This feature is typical
for habit formation models. The model implied correlation between US and UK
returns is 0.78 compared to 0.56 in the data. The standard deviation of the real
exchange rate is 0.142 compared to 0.104 in the data. The autocorrelation of the
model implied exchange rate is close to what we see in the data.
2.3.1 The volatility of the real exchange rate
Figure 2.1 shows the volatility of the real exchange rate in the baseline calibration
as we change the surplus consumption ratio in the home good and the foreign good.
There is a literature documenting stochastic volatility in exchange rates,16 and we
can see that the model is able to generate this feature endogenously. To understand
the dynamics of the exchange rate volatility consider the diﬀusion coeﬃcients
σe(t) = (1− β) ((1 + λ (sH(t)))σCH − (1 + λ (sF (t)))σCF ) . (2.46)
From the above expression we see that the variance of the exchange rate depends
16see [Poon & Granger 2003] for a review.
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Figure 2.1: Standard Deviation of the Real Exchange Rate. The
ﬁgure shows the standard deviation of the real exchange rate as a func-
tion of the surplus consumption ratio in the home good and the foreign
good. The economy is parameterized as in the baseline calibration (see
Table 2.1).
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Table 2.2: Key Moments  Baseline Calibration. The table
shows the calibrated moments and the corresponding values in the data.          
 Data Model 
  US  UK US UK 
Excess return 0.059 0.069 0.051 0.057 
Average risk free rate 0.013 0.017 0.016 0.016 
Standard deviation market 0.154 0.197 0.085 0.144 
Standard deviation risk free rate 0.011 0.021 0.034 0.034 
Correlation US and UK market 0.560 0.780 
Standard deviation real exchange rate 0.104 0.142 
Autocorrelation real exchange rate growth 0.091 0.123 
 
on the volatility of the home and the foreign good, the elasticity of substitution and
the sensitivity function for the habit level in the home and the foreign good. Consider
the case when the current consumption of the home good is close to the habit level.
In this case, the representative agent is very reluctant to scale back on consumption
of the home good. This makes the eﬀective elasticity of substitution between the
home good and the foreign good volatile. Small changes to output of any of the two
goods results in large changes to the relative price (exchange rate).
Table 2.3 shows a GARCH(1,1) model for the dollar-pound monthly exchange
rate series. To compare this to my model, I simulate 5000 months of exchange rate
data. As we can see from the table, both the data and the model produce highly
persistent exchange rate volatility. The persistence is captured by the sum of the
ARCH(1) and the GARCH(1) term. For the data this is 0.975 and for the model it
is 0.993.
To shed further light on the relation between the surplus consumption ratios and
the volatility of the real exchange rate I back out the surplus consumption ratios
from the data. I assume that both the US and UK surplus consumption ratios
are in their steady states at the beginning of the sample (1970 Q1). I then use
the dynamics of the surplus consumption ratios and the realized shocks to GDP
to back out the values of the surplus consumption ratios. Figure 2.2 shows the
implied surplus consumption ratios and the time series of standard deviations of
the real exchange rate estimated from the GARCH(1,1). As we can see from the
ﬁgure the low volatility in the beginning and end of the sample are accompanied by
high surplus consumption ratios and the high volatility in the early eighties and mid
nineties are accompanied by low surplus consumption ratios as the model predicts.
Figure 2.3 plots the model implied real exchange rate and the realized real exchange
rate volatilities. As we can see from the plot, the model implied and the realized
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Table 2.3: GARCH(1,1). The table shows the coeﬃcients and the
t-values for the GARCH(1,1) estimation. The data column is estimated
using monthly real exchange rate data. The model column is estimated
on 5000 months of simulated data using parameters from the baseline
calibration.
       
              
  Data  Model 
Variable   coef t-value   coef t-value 
C  3.27E-05 2.9413  8.77E-06 3.0937 
ARCH(1)  0.128412 4.0224  0.024146 6.0023 
GARCH(1)   0.846658 23.6986   0.968866 187.4996 
       
       
 exchange rate volatility are similar except for the late eighties, where the model
underestimates the real exchange rate volatility. The correlation between the two
series is 0.45. Note that only real GDP is used in order to calculate the real exchange
rate volatility.
2.3.2 The uncovered interest rate parity puzzle
Figure 2.4 shows the interest rates, the interest rate diﬀerential and the excess re-
turn on the real exchange rate. For the baseline calibration the interest rate is
high in times when the surplus consumption ratios are low. This contrasts with
[Verdelhan 2008] where pro-cyclical interest rates are necessary for matching the
UIP puzzle. The precautionary savings motive reacts less than the intertemporal
smoothing motive to shocks to the surplus consumption ratios. The interest diﬀer-
ential is increasing in foreign surplus consumption ratio and decreasing in the home
surplus consumption ratio. The interest rate diﬀerential is therefore pro-cyclical in
the diﬀerence between the home and the foreign surplus consumption ratio. The
counter-cyclical interest rate combined with pro-cyclical interest rate diﬀerential is
driven by the diﬀerence between the elasticity of substitution and the risk aversion.
While the risk aversion is important for the intertemporal smoothing motive for the
interest rate, it does not aﬀect the diﬀerence in the intertemporal smoothing motive
between the home country and the foreign country. The excess return on the real
exchange rate is decreasing in the home surplus consumption ratio and increasing
in the foreign surplus consumption ratio. In times when the home good is close the
habit level the representative agent is very risk averse to shocks to the home good.
The exchange rate is highly correlated with shocks to the home good, and conse-
quently the representative agent requires a large risk premium for holding exchange
rate risk. Comparing the ﬁgure of the interest diﬀerential and the excess return
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Figure 2.2: Implied Surplus Consumption Ratios and the Re-
alized Real Exchange Rate. The ﬁgure shows the implied surplus
consumption ratios calculated using GDP data and the realized real
exchange rate volatility estimated with GARCH(1,1).
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Figure 2.3: Model Implied and Realized Real Exchange Rate
Volatility. The ﬁgure shows the model implied and the realized real
exchange rate volatility. The model implied real exchange rate volatility
is estimated using the formula for the real exchange rate volatility and
the estimated surplus consumption ratios.
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on the exchange rate, we see that they move in opposite directions. The negative
correlation between the interest diﬀerential and the excess return on real exchange
rate is necessary to match the failure of the UIP. To reproduce the empirical stylized
fact that high interest rate countries exhibit appreciating currencies, the volatility
of the excess real exchange rate return must be higher than the interest rate diﬀer-
ential. From the ﬁgure we can see that the baseline calibration is able to generate
this feature. The range of the interest diﬀerential is small compared to the range of
the exchange rate premium.
2.4 Extension to Heterogeneous Agents
In this section I extend the basic model to include heterogeneous agents. The home
and the foreign representative agent have home bias for their own domestically pro-
duced consumption good. The agents solve
max
C
j
H
,C
j
F
,pij ,ϕj
E
[∫ T
0
uj
(
CjH(t), C
j
F (t), X
j
H(t), X
j
F (t), t
)
dt
]
(2.47)
where
uj
(
CjH(t), C
j
F (t), X
j
H(t), X
j
F (t), t
)
=
e−ρt
1− γ Zj
(
CjH(t), C
j
F (t), X
j
H(t), X
j
F (t)
)1−γ
(2.48)
and
Zj
(
CjH(t), C
j
F (t), X
j
H(t), X
j
F (t)
)
=
(
λ1−βj
(
CjH(t)−XjH(t)
)β
(1− λj)1−β
(
CjF (t)−XjF (t)
)β
) 1
β
.(2.49)
subject to
dW j(t) = ϕjH(t)
dBH(t)
BH(t)
+ ϕjF (t)
dBF (t)
BF (t)
+ pijH(t)
dSH(t) + CH(t)dt
SH(t)
(2.50)
+pijF (t)
dSF (t) + PF (t)CF (t)dt
SF (t)
− P (T )>Cj(t)dt (2.51)
for j = H,F , where pij(t) =
(
pijH(t), pi
j
F (t)
)
is the vector of amounts held in the
stocks by agent j. W j(0) > 0 with W j(0) = pij(0)>1, i.e, the agents are endowed
with initial shares in the stocks. P (t) = (PH(t), PF (t))
> is the vector of the country
speciﬁc good prices. Note that I use the home country as numeraire good so that
PH(t) = 1 for all t. ϕ
j
i denotes the amount invested by agent j in the bond of
country i. ϕj denotes the vector of bond positions for agent j. There is home bias
if λH > λF . Next I deﬁne equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1. Equilibrium is a collection of allocations
(
CjH , C
j
F , ϕ
j
H , ϕ
j
F , pi
j
H , pi
j
F
)
for j = H,F , and a price system (µ, µPF , σ, σPF , rH , rF ), such that
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Figure 2.4: The Risk Free Rates, Interest Rate Diﬀerential and
the Excess Return on the Real Exchange Rate. The ﬁgure shows
the risk free rate in the home country, the foreign country, the interest
diﬀerential and the excess return on the real exchange rate as a function
of the surplus consumption ratio in the home good and the foreign good.
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(
CjH , C
j
F , ϕ
j
H , ϕ
j
F , pi
j
H , pi
j
F
)
are optimal solutions to agent j's optimization problem
and good and ﬁnancial markets clear
CHH (t) + C
F
H(t) = CH(t) (2.52)
CHF (t) + C
F
F (t) = CF (t) (2.53)
piHH (t) + pi
F
H(t) = SH(t) (2.54)
piHF (t) + pi
F
F (t) = SF (t) (2.55)
ϕHH(t) + ϕ
F
H(t) = 0 (2.56)
ϕHF (t) + ϕ
F
F (t) = 0 (2.57)
for t ∈ [0, T ].
Under complete markets17 we can solve the corresponding social planner problem
state by state and time by time
U (CH(t), CF (t), XH(t), XF (t)) = max
CHH (t), C
F
H(t)
CHF (t), C
F
F (t){
auH
(
CHH (t), C
H
F (t), X
H
H (t), X
H
F (t), t
)
+
(1− a)uF
(
CFH(t), C
F
F (t), X
F
H(t), X
F
F (t), t
) }
s.t
CHH (t) + C
F
H(t) = CH(t)
CHF (t) + C
F
F (t) = CF (t)
where a is the weight in the social planner problem with a one-to-one mapping with
initial wealth distribution. By the implicit function theorem it can be shown that the
habit adjusted consumption of the two goods for the home country representative
agent are given by
QHH(t) = C
H
H (t)−XHH (t)
= gHH (CH(t)−XH(t), CF (t)−XF (t)) (2.58)
QHF (t) = C
H
F (t)−XHF (t)
= gHF (CH(t)−XH(t), CF (t)−XF (t)) . (2.59)
Note that the utility function of the representative agent only depends on aggregate
habits for each good. We can therefore model the surplus consumption ratios as in
17There are four securities and two Brownian motions, consequently the market
is potentially complete. However, as market completeness depends on the endoge-
nous stock price diﬀusion coeﬃcients the market completeness must be veriﬁed after
calculating the stock price diﬀusion matrix.
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the case with only a representative agent. To determine the optimal consumption
proﬁles I need to make assumptions about the individual habit levels. I set the habit
levels such that
XHH (t) = wHXH(t) (2.60)
XFH(t) = (1− wH)XH(t) (2.61)
XHF (t) = wFXF (t) (2.62)
XFF (t) = (1− wF )XF (t) (2.63)
for some constants wH , wF ∈ (0, 1). The optimal consumption allocations are given
by
CHH (t) = Q
H
H(t) + wHXH(t) (2.64)
CFH(t) = CH(t)− CHH (t) (2.65)
CFH(t) = Q
F
H(t) + wFXF (t) (2.66)
CFF (t) = CH(t)− CHF (t) (2.67)
Note that Qij(t) only depends on the aggregate habit level. From the above we can
see that the consumption for the home agent in the home (foreign) good is increasing
(decreasing) in wH . This introduces another potential channel for home bias. wi
works as a level factor for the subsistence point. It is important to note that wi does
not impact the equilibrium state price density or the equilibrium real exchange rate,
as the marginal utility only depends on the habit adjusted consumption. However,
this form of home bias diﬀers from the home bias introduced by λi.
In a complete market setup the marginal utilities of the two agents are co-linear.
We can therefore use the marginal utility of the home country agent evaluated at
optimal consumption as the state price density. The equilibrium relative price of the
foreign good measured in terms of the home good is
PF (t) =
∂ui(CHH (t),C
H
F (t),X
H
H (t),X
H
F (t),t)
∂CH
F
(t)
∂ui(CHH (t),C
H
F
(t),XH
H
(t),XH
F
(t),t)
∂CH
H
(t)
=
(
1− λj
λj
)1−β (
gHH (CH(t)−XH(t), CF (t)−XF (t))
gHF (CH(t)−XH(t), CF (t)−XF (t))
)1−β
=
(
1− λj
λj
)1−β (
QHH(t)
QHF (t)
)1−β
. (2.68)
An application of Ito's lemma yields
dPF (t)
PF (t)
= µPF (t)dt+ σPF (t)
>dB(t) (2.69)
30 Chapter 2. Deep Habits
where the expressions for µPF (t) and σPF (t) can be found in Appendix A.2. To
derive the real exchange rate I need to deﬁne the price index in the home and the
foreign country. I use the consumption based price index consistent with constant
elasticity of substitution utility function (see [Obstfeld & Rogoﬀ 1996])
PH(t) =
(
λH + (1− λH)PF (t)β
) 1
β
(2.70)
PF (t) =
(
λF + (1− λF )PF (t)β
) 1
β
. (2.71)
The next proposition describes the process followed by the price indexes.18
Proposition 4. If equilibrium exists, then the price index in the home country and
the foreign country follow
dPH(t) = PH(t)
(
µPH (t)dt+ σPH (t)
>dB(t)
)
(2.72)
dPF (t) = PF (t)
(
µPF (t)dt+ σPF (t)
>dB(t)
)
(2.73)
where
µPH (t) = (1− λH)
(
PF (t)
PH(t)
)
µPF (t) (2.74)
+
1
2
(1− β) (1− λH)
(
PF (t)
PH(t)
)((
PF (t)
PH(t)
)
(1− λH)− 1
)
σPF (t)
>σPF (t)
µPF (t) = (1− λF )
(
PF (t)
PF (t)
)
µPF (t) (2.75)
+
1
2
(1− β) (1− λF )
(
PF (t)
PF (t)
)((
PF (t)
PF (t)
)
(1− λF )− 1
)
σPF (t)
>σPF (t)
and
σPH (t) = (1− λH)
(
PF (t)
PH(t)
)
σPF (t) (2.76)
σPF (t) = (1− λH)
(
PF (t)
PF (t)
)
σPF (t). (2.77)
The real exchange rate is given by the ratio of the foreign consumption price
18I use subscripts for prices that are good related and superscripts for countries
price indexes.
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index to the home consumption price index
e(t) =
PF (t)
PH(t)
=
(
λF + (1− λF )PF (t)β
λH + (1− λH)PF (t)β
) 1
β
. (2.78)
The next proposition describes the process followed by the real exchange rate.
Proposition 5. If equilibrium exists, then the real exchange rate follows
de(t)
e(t)
= µe(t)dt+ σe(t)
>dB(t) (2.79)
where
µe(t) = µPF (t)− µPH (t)− σPH (t)>σe(t) (2.80)
and
σe(t) = σPF (t)− σPH (t). (2.81)
The stock prices and the individual wealth of the home and the foreign agent
are19
SH(t) = Et
[∫ T
t
ξ(u)
ξ(t)
CH(u)du
]
(2.82)
SF (t) = Et
[∫ T
t
ξ(u)
ξ(t)
PF (u)CF (u)du
]
(2.83)
WH(t) = Et
[∫ T
t
ξ(u)
ξ(t)
(
CHH (u) + PF (u)C
H
F (u)
)
du
]
(2.84)
WF (t) = Et
[∫ T
t
ξ(u)
ξ(t)
(
CFH(u) + PF (u)C
F
F (u)
)
du
]
(2.85)
The stock price diﬀusion coeﬃcients can be found by application of the Clark-Ocone
theorem.
Proposition 6. If equilibrium exits, then the stock price diﬀusion coeﬃcients are
19The stock prices are valued in terms of the home country good.
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given by
σH(t) = θ(t) +
Et
[∫ T
t
ξ(u)CH(u) (Dt ln ξ(u) +Dt lnCH(u))
]
Et
[∫ T
t
ξ(u)CH(u)du
] (2.86)
σF (t) = θ(t) +
Et
[∫ T
t
ξ(u)PF (u)CF (u) (Dt ln ξ(u))
]
Et
[∫ T
t
ξ(u)PF (u)CF (u)du
] +
Et
[∫ T
t
ξ(u)PF (u)CF (u) (Dt lnPF (u) +Dt lnCF (u))
]
Et
[∫ T
t
ξ(u)PF (u)CF (u)du
] . (2.87)
The next proposition characterizes the optimal portfolio of agent j = H,F .
Proposition 7. If equilibrium exists, then the optimal portfolio policies are given
by
piH(t) =
(
σ(t)>
)−1(
WH(t)θ(t) +
ΨH(t)
ξ(t)
)
(2.88)
piF (t) =
(
σ(t)>
)−1(
WF (t)θ(t) +
ΨF (t)
ξ(t)
)
(2.89)
where
ΨH(t) = Et
[∫ T
t
Dt
(
ξ(u)
(
CHH (u) + PF (u)C
H
F (u)
))
du
]
(2.90)
ΨF (t) = Et
[∫ T
t
Dt
(
ξ(u)
(
CFH(u) + PF (u)C
F
F (u)
))
du
]
. (2.91)
2.4.1 Calibration and Analysis
In this section I calibrate the model with heterogeneous agents. Instead of using
the home good as numeraire I will use the composite basket corresponding to the
home country's price index. Appendix A.6 illustrates how the equilibrium quantities
change as I change the numeraire.
Table 2.4 summarizes the model parameters. I set the risk aversion to four. The
reason for the lower risk aversion compared to the homogeneous agent case is the
volatility induced by the heterogeneity of the agents. The elasticity of substitution
between the home good and the foreign good is two. The time preference parameter
is set to 0.105 to match the level of the risk-free rate. λi and ωi are calibrated so
that Importi/GDPi = 0.15 for i = H,F . This is motivated by [Backus et al. 1994].
Note that the interpretation of the parameter is diﬀerent since the utility function
is deﬁned over the habit adjusted consumption. The steady state habit level is 0.15
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for both the home good and the foreign good. Similarly, the speed of mean reversion
of the surplus consumption ratio is 0.0525 for both goods. The output processes are
calibrated as in the homogeneous agent except that the volatility of the expected
growth is zero.
Table 2.4: Model Parameters  Heterogeneous Agent Econ-
omy. The table summarizes the model parameters for the heteroge-
neous agent economy. The calibration is symmetric in terms of goods
and agents.
Parameter Value
Risk aversion 4
Elasticity of substitution  2
Time preference 0.105
Home Bias in Utility (Lambda) 0.85
Home Bias in Habit (Omega) 0.85
Steady state habit level 0.15
Speed of mean reversion habit growth 0.0525
Average consumption growth 0.024
Standard error of consumption growth 0.025
Cross-country correlation of consumption growth 0.24
Speed of mean reversion for consumption growth 0
Volatility of expected consumption growth 0
Correlation between US and UK expected consumption growth 0
 
Table 2.5 reports the main characteristics of the asset pricing moments. The
model implies excess return is 5.3% for the US and 5.9% for the UK. The risk-free
rate is 1.6% in both countries. Note that the volatility of the risk-free rate is lower
in the heterogeneous agent economy than in the homogeneous agent economy. The
correlation between returns is 0.74 compared to 0.56 in the data. Finally, we see that
the standard deviation of the real exchange rate in the model is 11.6% compared to
10.4% in the data. The optimal portfolios are symmetric in the steady state. The
home (foreign) agent holds 0.89 (0.11) of the home (foreign) stock market. For US
investors the fraction is 0.883 in the data.20 As we can see the model replicates the
home bias in portfolios.
20See [Obstfeld & Rogoﬀ 2000].
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Table 2.5: Key Moments  Heterogeneous Agent Economy.
The table shows the calibrated moments and the corresponding values
in the data.          
 Data Model 
  US  UK US UK 
Excess return 0.059 0.069 0.053 0.059 
Average risk free rate 0.013 0.017 0.016 0.016 
Standard deviation market 0.154 0.197 0.11 0.155 
Standard deviation risk free rate 0.011 0.021 0.02 0.02 
Correlation US and UK market 0.560 0.740 
Standard deviation real exchange rate 0.104 0.116 
Autocorrelation real exchange rate growth 0.091 0.123 
 
2.5 Conclusion
I study the eﬀect of deep habits in a two country-two good pure exchange econ-
omy. Deep habits allow for jointly matching the real exchange rate volatility, the
equity premium, the risk free rate and the failure of the uncovered interest rate par-
ity. Habit formation makes the eﬀective elasticity of substitution between the home
country good and the foreign country good stochastic. In times when the current
consumption is close to the habit level, the volatility of eﬀective elasticity of substi-
tution is high and consequently the volatility of the real exchange rate is high. The
uncovered interest rate puzzle is reproduced because of the highly volatile exchange
rate premium. In an extension of the model I illustrate that when agents have home
bias in consumption, then the agents have home bias in the portfolios.
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Abstract
In this paper, we study ﬁnancial market completeness and incompleteness in
economies with multiple goods. We provide, in the form of a non-linear partial
diﬀerential equation, suﬃcient conditions for completeness of the ﬁnancial market.
Completeness requires invertibility of the commodity diﬀusion matrix, which we as-
sume, and invertibility of a matrix containing non-linear functions of marginal rates
of substitutions at one point in time. We also provide, in the form of a linear partial
diﬀerential equation, suﬃcient conditions for incompleteness of the ﬁnancial market.
This partial diﬀerential equation is linear in marginal utilities. We emphasize that
ﬁnancial market completeness depends on the choice of numeraire. Heterogeneity
in taste restores completeness of ﬁnancial markets when individual preferences ex-
hibit unit elasticity of substitution i.e., when preferences satisfy our proposition
except when preferences are log-linear.
Authors: Paul Ehling1 and Christian Heyerdahl-Larsen.2
Keywords: Financial Market Completeness; Financial Market Incompleteness;
1BI Norwegian School of Management
2This paper has grown out of a conversation of the ﬁrst author with Urban
Jermann. We are grateful to Knut Kristian Aase, Robert Anderson, Jérôme Detem-
ple, Giulia Di Nunno, Mike Gallmeyer, Trond Stølen Gustavsen, Tom Lindstrøm,
Marcel Rindisbacher, Bernt Øksendal, and participants at the Workshop on Risk
Measures and Stochastic Games with Applications to Finance and Economics at the
Department of Mathematics of the University of Oslo, the EFA 2008 meetings and
the European Meeting of the Econometric Society 2008 for helpful comments and
suggestions.
36 Chapter 3. Multi-Good
Multi-Good Economies; Non-Separable Utility Functions; Unit Elasticity of Substi-
tution
JEL Classiﬁcation: G10; G11
3.1 Introduction
In this paper, we investigate the determinants of ﬁnancial market completeness in
potentially complete economies with multiple goods. We use the term potentially
complete as implying the invertibility of the output diﬀusion matrix. Our main
theorem provides, in the form of a non-linear partial diﬀerential equation, suﬃ-
cient conditions for completeness of the ﬁnancial market in a setting similar to
[Anderson & Raimondo 2008a], i.e., output at the terminal date are lumps and an-
alyticity a function locally given by a convergent power series of the primitive
functions of the economy. Financial market completeness requires invertibility of
the commodity diﬀusion matrix and invertibility of a matrix containing non-linear
functions of marginal rates of substitutions at one point in time. If the partial dif-
ferential equation does not hold, then the matrix containing non-linear functions of
marginal rates of substitutions can be inverted.
In addition, we provide suﬃcient conditions in the form of a proposition for
incompleteness of the ﬁnancial market with multiple goods in a general setting with
non-negative Ito processes. This partial diﬀerential equation is linear in marginal
utilities. In the two good case, the partial diﬀerential equation implies unit elasticity
of substitution. A recent work closely related to this paper is [Berrada et al. 2007].
They study Pareto eﬃcient no-trade equilibria and also discuss settings with incom-
plete ﬁnancial markets. Their Proposition 2, which deals with the implementation of
portfolio autarky in no-trade equilibria, includes the two-good version of our propo-
sition.
Importantly, market completeness depends on the choice of numeraire as chang-
ing the numeraire implies that the original risk-free asset is non-tradable under the
new numeraire. Therefore, changing the numeraire may move an economy from
complete to incomplete. Even if the theorem and the proposition are not satisﬁed
under two numeraires, one of the numeraires may imply complete ﬁnancial markets
while the other numeraire may imply incomplete ﬁnancial markets. When the ﬁnan-
cial market is incomplete because the linear partial diﬀerential equation in marginal
utilities is satisﬁed, numeraire invariance holds.3
3We use the term numeraire invariance to mean that the market does not go
from complete to incomplete when changing the numeraire.
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Financial market completeness matters only if agents are heterogeneous. Our
approach, ﬁrst studying the contingent market economy and then deriving from
equilibrium price processes conditions for dynamic completeness, naturally extends
to economies with heterogeneous agents as it is always possible to construct a rep-
resentative agent in complete markets. This is crucial as our theorem helps to avoid
ﬁnancial market incompleteness.
An interesting question is whether heterogeneity can restore completeness of
ﬁnancial markets when individual preferences exhibit unit elasticity of substitution,
i.e., preferences satisfy our proposition. As for economies with aggregate agents, risk
aversion and beliefs do not matter for ﬁnancial market completeness and, thus, belief
heterogeneity, or heterogeneity in risk aversion, do not matter, either, if agents have
homogeneous taste. Therefore, learning is also irrelevant for completeness if agents
have homogeneous taste. However, if agents have diﬀerent taste, then allocations are
eﬃcient and ﬁnancial markets are complete, except with log-linear preferences. This
result extends the model of [Cass & Pavlova 2004] with multiple trees and log-linear
preferences. They show that allocations are Pareto eﬃcient although the ﬁnancial
market is incomplete.
Our paper is motivated by [Serrat 2001], who employs a non-separable utility
function to study portfolio choice in an international setting with traded and non-
traded goods. [Kollmann 2006], however, proves that the asset price variance matrix
in [Serrat 2001] cannot be inverted. Hence, equity prices are colinear and portfolio
policies are indeterminate. The result in [Kollmann 2006] emerges naturally from our
proposition. Preferences in the model by [Serrat 2001] are such that a composition
of the goods shows unit elasticity of substitution and, thus, ﬁnancial markets are
incomplete.
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 3.2 presents a stylized exam-
ple with Cobb-Douglas preferences resulting in colinear stock prices. Section 4.2
describes the economic environment. Section 3.4 contains our main theorem and
further results on ﬁnancial market incompleteness as well as numeraire invariance.
Agent heterogeneity is addressed in Section 3.5. Section 4.5 sets forth our conclu-
sions. Appendix B.1 contains various examples, including [Serrat 2001], that lead
to incomplete ﬁnancial markets. Appendix B.2 contains Malliavin derivatives used
throughout the paper.
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3.2 An Example with Cobb-Douglas Prefer-
ences
Consider a representative agent with non-separable Cobb-Douglas utility function
U(X1, X2) = X
α
1 X
β
2 (3.1)
with α + β < 1, deﬁned over terminal wealth, X. Assume that output follows
Geometric Brownian motion, that is,
dδi(t) = δi(t)(γidt+ λidWi(t)) (3.2)
with δi(0) > 0 for i = 1, 2. The drift rates and diﬀusion coeﬃcients are given
and assume positive values. The 2−dimensional Brownian motion, W , satisﬁes the
usual assumptions. We also assume invertibility of λ ∈ R2×2. Hence, the market
is potentially complete. The maximization problem of the representative agent is
given by
max
X1,X2
E
[
Xα1 (T )X
β
2 (T )
]
(3.3)
s.t.
E [ξ(T )(X1(T ) + P (T )X2(T ))] ≤ X1(0) + P (0)X2(0)
where ξ represents the state price density and P denotes the price of the second
consumption good (in units of the ﬁrst consumption good). First order conditions
(FOC) are given by
αX1(T )
α−1X2(T )
β = ξ(T ) (3.4)
βX1(T )
αX2(T )
β−1 = ξ(T )P (T ).
From the FOCs, we see that in equilibrium, the relative price of commodity 1
and commodity 2 at T is given by
P (T ) =
β
α
[
δ1(T )
δ2(T )
]
. (3.5)
Hence, the nominal value of output 2 at T is given by
P (T )δ2(T ) =
β
α
[
δ1(T )
δ2(T )
]
δ2(T ) =
β
α
δ1(T ). (3.6)
This conﬁrms our intuition that in equilibrium, nominal proportions between output
(consumption) goods are constant.
Market clearing and the above ﬁrst order conditions imply the following expres-
sions for stock prices
S1(t) = α
Et
[
δ1(T )
αδ2(T )
β
]
Et [δ1(T )α−1δ2(T )β ]
(3.7)
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and
S2(t) =
β
α
S1(t). (3.8)
As S2(t) is given by a constant times S1(t), the market is incomplete. The example
above highlights, that preferences for instance the Cobb-Douglas utility which
have received great attention not only in the economics literature, but also in the
ﬁnance literature, somewhat surprisingly imply incompleteness of the ﬁnancial mar-
ket. It is, therefore, important to investigate conditions yielding complete ﬁnancial
markets in economies with multi-goods.
3.3 The Economy
This section presents the economic environment. We consider a pure exchange
economy over a ﬁnite time span [0, T ] equipped with a measure ν. As in
[Anderson & Raimondo 2008a], consumption and output on [0, T ) are ﬂows; con-
sumption and output at T are lumps. The measure ν agrees with Lebesgue measure
on [0, T ) with ν(T ) = 1. The uncertainty is represented by a ﬁltered probability
space
(
Ω,=, P, {=t}t≥0
)
, on which is deﬁned a N−dimensional Brownian motion
W = (W1, ...,WN ). In the following, all stochastic processes are assumed to be pro-
gressively measurable and all equalities are assumed to hold a.s. Further, stochastic
diﬀerential equations are assumed to have solutions without stating the regularity
conditions. DtF = (D1tF,D2tF, ...,DNtF )
> denotes the Malliavin derivative4 of
the random variable F . The explicit calculation of the Malliavin derivatives can be
found in Appendix B.2.
Output follows
dδi(t) = δi(t)(γidt+ λidWi(t)) (3.9)
where δi (0) > 0 are given, for i = 1, 2, ..., N . Here, γi and λi denote growth rates
and diﬀusion coeﬃcients in R and RN , respectively. We assume that λ ∈ RN×N
is invertible. This implies that the market is potentially complete. Output at T
follows exactly the same dynamics as stated in Equation (3.9).5 In the Subsection
3.4.2, we relax the assumptions on the constant coeﬃcients of the output process.
The economy is populated by an aggregate agent with utility function deﬁned
over the N goods. The maximization problem of the agent is given by
max
C
E
[∫ T
0
e−ρsu(C(s))ds+ e−ρTu(C(T ))
]
(3.10)
s.t.
4For details on Malliavin derivatives, see [Detemple & Zapatero 1991],
[Detemple et al. 2003a], [Nualart 1995a], and the references therein.
5[Anderson & Raimondo 2008a] allow for diﬀerent dynamics of output at inter-
mediate dates and at terminal date.
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E
[∫ T
0
ξ(s)P (s)>C(s)ds+ ξ(T )P (T )>C(T )
]
≤ X(0)
where ρ > 0, u is a classical time-additive VNM utility function, ξ stands for the
state price density, P denotes the vector of prices, C = {c1, c2, ..., cN} denotes the
vector containing the N consumption goods, and X represents wealth. Above, it
is assumed that the utility function satisﬁes the standard assumptions. It is also
assumed that the utility function for intertemporal consumption is identical to the
utility function at terminal date.6 Unless otherwise stated, consumption good one
is used as numeraire and the price of the ﬁrst consumption good is normalized to
one, i.e., P1(t) = 1 for all t.
Deﬁnition 2. A function is real analytic if, at every point in its domain, there
exists a power series which converges to the function on an open set containing the
point.
The primitives of the economy are assumed to be real analytic functions of time
and the current value of the Brownian motion for t ∈ [0, T ].7 This means that the
utility function in Equation (3.10) is real analytic. Note that most conventional
utility functions and all utility functions considered in this work are real analytic,
see [Anderson & Raimondo 2008a].
Deﬁnition 3. We deﬁne I to be the N × N identity matrix. For a vector x, with
x ∈ RN , we deﬁne Ix to represent a N ×N dimensional matrix with xi as element
(i, i) and zero elsewhere.
The endogenous commodity price evolves according to
dP (t) = IP (t) (µP (t)dt+ σP (t)dW (t)) (3.11)
where µP and σP denote growth rates and diﬀusion coeﬃcients in R
N and RN×N ,
respectively.
Deﬁnition 4. We deﬁne the N-dimensional nominal output process as
δ˜(t) = IP (t)δ(t). (3.12)
6[Anderson & Raimondo 2008a] allow for diﬀerent utility functions for intertem-
poral consumption and for terminal consumption.
7The assumption that δi is a geometric Brownian motion ensures analyticity. We
can generalize this by assuming that instead of following the process in Equation
(3.9) the output is a real analytic function of time and the Brownian motions, i.e,
δi : [0, T ]×RN → R is real analytic on [0, T ]×RN .
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There are N stocks, each representing a claim to its respective output process.
In equilibrium, stock prices are given by
Si(t) =
1
ξ(t)
Et
[∫ T
t
ξ(s)Pi(s)δi(s)ds+ ξ(T )Pi(T )δi(T )
]
(3.13)
for i = 1, 2, ..., N . Consequently, stock price dynamics follow
dG(t) = dS(t) + Iδ˜(t)dt = IS(t) (µ(t)dt+ σ(t)dW (t)) . (3.14)
The diﬀusion term σ(t) denotes a N ×N matrix with the i′th row given by σi(t)>.
Both the drift rates and the diﬀusion terms in Equation (3.14) represent endogenous
quantities.
The aggregate agent also has access to a locally risk-free asset in zero net supply
paying out in the ﬁrst good, with dynamics
dB(t) = r(t)B(t)dt (3.15)
with B(0) = 1. The risk-free rate, r also represents an endogenous quantity.
The equilibrium state price density process, ξ(t), follows
dξ(t) = ξ(t)
(
−r(t)dt− θ(t)>dW (t)
)
(3.16)
where ξ(0) = 1 and where θ(t) denotes the market price of risk.
Now, for the market to be complete the following equation must have a unique
solution
σ(t)θ(t) = µ(t)− r(t) (3.17)
θ(t) = σ(t)−1(µ(t)− r(t)).
This means that σ(t) must be invertible.
Remark 6. For the market to be arbitrage free, σ(t)θ(t) = µ(t)− r(t) must have a
solution. However, it is not required that the solution be unique.
Remark 7. We deﬁne ﬁnancial market completeness as a case when σ(t) is invert-
ible for almost all (a.a.) (t, ω) in [0, T ]× Ω.
Now we are ready to raise the main research question: When will σ(t) be in-
vertible? We cannot, however, answer this important question by directly analyzing
conditions on σ(t) as this requires a functional for the asset price. Therefore, we
follow [Anderson & Raimondo 2008a] and derive conditions on the primitives of the
economy that guarantee invertibility of σ(t) for a.a. (t, ω) in [0, T ]× Ω.
Next we deﬁne equilibrium, when it exists, to study the contingent market econ-
omy, and then to derive from equilibrium price processes the conditions for dynamic
completeness.
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Deﬁnition 5. Equilibrium is a price system (µ, µP , σ, σP , r), such that (C, pi) rep-
resents the optimal solution to the optimization problem of the aggregate agent plus
good as well as ﬁnancial markets clear
C(t) = δ(t) (3.18)
pi(t) = S(t) (3.19)
pi0(t) = 0 (3.20)
for t ∈ [0, T ] where pi(t) = (pi1(t), ..., piN (t)) is the vector of amounts held in the
stocks and pi0(t) is the amount held in the bond market.
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium state price density and the
commodity price vector.
Proposition 8. The equilibrium state price density is
ξ(t)
ξ(0)
= e−ρt
∂u(δ(t))
∂δ1(t)
∂u(δ(0))
∂δ1(t)
. (3.21)
Moreover, the equilibrium commodity price vector is
P (t) =
∇u(δ(t))
∂u(δ(t))
∂δ1(t)
. (3.22)
The following two propositions represent important building blocks in the sequel.
The ﬁrst proposition deﬁnes the commodity price diﬀusion coeﬃcient matrix. The
second proposition deﬁnes the nominal output diﬀusion coeﬃcient matrix.
Proposition 9. The commodity price diﬀusion coeﬃcients, σP , are given by
σP (t) = ε(t)λ (3.23)
where ε(t) is a N ×N matrix with element (i, j) given by
εi,j(t) = δj(t)
∂ lnMRSi,1(t)
∂δj
(3.24)
where MRSi,1(t) =
∂u(δ(t))
∂δi
∂u(δ(t))
∂δ1
is the marginal rate of substitution. Moreover, the
price diﬀusion coeﬃcients are analytic functions of time and the Brownian motion
processes on [0, T ]×RN .
Proof. In equilibrium, the commodity price vector P (t) is given by
P (t) =
∇u(δ(t))
∂u(δ(t))
∂δ1(t)
= [MRS1,1(t), ...,MRSN,1(t)]
> . (3.25)
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Applying Ito's lemma to P (t) yields the proposition. Recall that the marginal utility
of good i is an analytic function of time and the N -dimensional Brownian motion.
Since the marginal utility is bounded away from zero and the ratio of two ana-
lytic functions is analytic, the price vector is also an analytic function. Further,
the derivative of an analytic function is analytic so the commodity price diﬀusion
coeﬃcients are analytic.
Proposition 10. The diﬀusion coeﬃcients of nominal output are given by
σδ˜(t) = λ+ σP (t). (3.26)
Moreover, the nominal consumption diﬀusion coeﬃcients are analytic functions of
time and the Brownian motion at time t in [0, T ]×RN .
Proof. The proposition follows directly from applying Ito's lemma to the nominal
consumption process. Analyticity follows from the fact that consumption and com-
modity prices are both analytic functions. Nominal consumption is the product of
the two, and thus analytic. Moreover, the derivative of the nominal consumption is
analytic.
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium market price of risk and the
risk free rate.
Proposition 11. The equilibrium market price of risk, θ(t), is
θ(t) = −
N∑
i=1
∂2u(δ(t))
∂δ1∂δi
∂u(δ(t))
∂δ1
δi(t)λi (3.27)
The equilibrium risk free rate, r(t), is
r(t) = ρ−
N∑
i=1
∂2u(δ(t))
∂δ1∂δi
∂u(δ(t))
∂δ1
δi(t)γi − 1
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
∂3u(δ(t))
∂δ1∂δi∂δj
∂u(δ(t))
∂δ1
δi(t)δj(t)λ
>
i λj (3.28)
Proof. This follows from applying Ito's lemma to (3.21) and from matching the drift
and diﬀusion terms with (3.16).
Proposition 12. The stock price diﬀusion coeﬃcients, σ(t), are given by
σij(t) = θj(t) +
Et
[∫ T
0
ξ(s)Pi(s)δi(s)χij(t, s)ds
]
Et
[∫ T
t
ξ(s)Pi(s)δi(s)ds+ ξ(T )Pi(T )δi(T )
]
+
Et [ξ(T )Pi(T )δi(T )χij(t, T )]
Et
[∫ T
t
ξ(s)Pi(s)δi(s)ds+ ξ(T )Pi(T )δi(T )
] (3.29)
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where
χij(t, u) = Djt ln ξ(u) +Djt lnPi(u) +Djt ln δi(u) (3.30)
for i, j = 1, 2, ..., N
Proof. In equilibrium,
ξ(t)Gi(t) = Et
[∫ T
0
ξ(s)Pi(s)δi(s)ds+ ξ(T )Pi(T )δi(T )
]
. (3.31)
We note that the above represents a martingale. After applying Ito's lemma on the
left hand side and the Clark-Ocone theorem on the right hand side, we obtain the
following expression for the diﬀusion terms
σij(t) = θj(t) +
Et
[∫ T
t
Djt (ξ(s)Pi(s)δi(s)) ds+Djt (ξ(T )Pi(T )δi(T ))
]
Et
[∫ T
t
ξ(s)Pi(s)δi(s)ds+ ξ(T )Pi(T )δi(T )
] . (3.32)
Solving for the Malliavin derivatives explicitly leads to the expression in the propo-
sition.
The drift of the stock prices can be found by solving (3.17) for µ(t). This
completes the description of equilibrium.
3.4 On the Invertibility and on the Non-
Invertibility of the Asset Return Diﬀusion
Matrix
This section ﬁrst extends the results on market completeness in
[Anderson & Raimondo 2008a] to the multi-good case. Next, we extend the
results on market incompleteness in [Berrada et al. 2007] from the 2-good case to
the N -good case. Further, we show that numeraire invariance does not hold; that
is, a market can be complete under one numeraire and incomplete under another
numeraire.
3.4.1 Complete Financial Markets
Theorem 1. The market will be complete if
I + ε(T, ω) (3.33)
is invertible for some ω ∈ Ω.
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Proof. According to [Anderson & Raimondo 2008a] the market will be complete if
there exists an ω ∈ Ω such that the output diﬀusion matrix is invertible. In our
multi-good setting, we must consider the nominal output diﬀusion matrix
(I + ε(T, ω))λ. (3.34)
By deﬁnition, λ is invertible, and thus the nominal diﬀusion matrix will be invert-
ible if I + ε(T, ω) is invertible. The determinant is a product of the elements of
(I + ε(T, ω))λ and is therefore analytic. This implies that if there is an ω ∈ Ω
such that the determinant is non-zero, then the determinant attains zero only on a
measure zero.
The key to the proof lies in the non-zero measure on the terminal date combined
with analyticity. Since an analytic function is either always zero or zero on a measure
zero it is suﬃcient to ﬁnd a single point where the determinant of the nominal
consumption diﬀusion matrix is non-zero.
Remark 8. Note that I + ε(T, ω) is completely determined by exogenous quantities.
We have thus reduced the problem of determining whether the endogenous stock price
diﬀusion matrix is invertible to a condition only depending on the primitives in the
economy.
Remark 9. The fact that market completeness is guaranteed if I+ε(T ) is invertible
at one point makes the veriﬁcation of completeness easy even in a situation where the
utility of the representative agent is not known in closed form. This might happen
in economies with multiple agents with heterogeneous preferences (see Section 3.5).
Using standard aggregation techniques, one can easily check if the resulting market
is complete by numerically solving for the utility function of the representative agent
and applying the theorem.
Corollary 1. In the two good case, the market will be complete if the utility function
does not satisfy the following partial diﬀerential equation (PDE)
δ2(t)
∂ lnMRS2,1(t)
∂δ2
+ 1 = 0. (3.35)
Proof. This follows from applying the theorem to the two good case.
Remark 10. The N-good case can also be stated as a PDE. A suﬃcient condition
for market completeness is that det (I + ε(T )) = 0 does not have a solution.
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3.4.2 Incomplete Financial Markets
Here, the n-dimensional output processes is assumed to be a nonnegative Ito process.
We continue to assume that λ ∈ RN×N is invertible, but drop the requirements
that consumption and output at T are lumps and that primitive functions are real
analytic.
The following two propositions extend the 2-good case in [Berrada et al. 2007]
to the N -good case. The ﬁrst proposition provides suﬃcient conditions for non-
invertible σ(t). We include between the two propositions a deﬁnition of utility
functions. The second proposition states that any utility function satisfying the
deﬁnition also satisﬁes the ﬁrst proposition.
Proposition 13. The diﬀusion matrix σ(t) is non-invertible if there exists a non-
trivial solution a ∈ RN to
a1
∂u (δ(t))
∂δ1
δ1(t) + a2
∂u (δ(t))
∂δ2
δ2(t) + ...+ aN
∂u (δ(t))
∂δN
δN (t) = 0 (3.36)
for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. Assume that there exists a solution to the following equation
a1
∂u (δ(t))
∂δ1
δ1(t) + a2
∂u (δ(t))
∂δ2
δ2(t) + ...+ aN
∂u (δ(t))
∂δN
δN (t) = 0. (3.37)
Integrate from 0 to T to get∫ T
0
(a1
∂u (δ(s))
∂δ1
δ1(s) + a2
∂u (δ(s))
∂δ2
δ2(s) + ...+ aN
∂u (δ(s))
∂δN
δN (s))ds = 0. (3.38)
Take conditional expectation on both sides
Et
∫ T
0
(a1
∂u (δ(s))
∂δ1
δ1(s)+a2
∂u (δ(s))
∂δ2
δ2(s)+ ...+aN
∂u (δ(s))
∂δN
δN (s))ds = 0. (3.39)
By dividing by ξ(t) and comparing with the pricing formula in Equation (3.13), we
can infer that the following equation is satisﬁed
a1G1(t) + a2G2(t) + ...+ aNGN (t) = 0 (3.40)
for all t. Hence, the gain processes are linearly dependent and the ﬁnancial market
is incomplete.
Remark 11. For the two good case, Proposition (13) corresponds to a constraint
on the elasticity of substitution. If the elasticity of substitution equals one, then the
market is incomplete. This is the argument put forward in [Berrada et al. 2007]. In
the N-good case, a suﬃcient condition for market incompleteness is that there are at
least two composite goods that have unit elasticity of substitution. Note that actual
composition of composite goods can take complicated forms, which we clarify in the
deﬁnition below.
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Deﬁnition 6. A utility function u : RN → R will be deﬁned to be in UKIC , where
IC stands for incompleteness, if it has a representation
u(x1, ..., xN ) = ϕ(Z) (3.41)
where ϕ : RK → R, K < N , Z = (Z1, Z2, ..., ZK) with
Zi =
(
N∑
j=1
d1jix
b1i
j
)a1i
×
(
N∑
j=1
d2jix
b2i
j
)a2i
× ...×
(
N∑
j=1
dNjix
bNi
j
)aNi
(3.42)
with ai, bi, dji ∈ RN , where i = 1, ..., N and where j = 1, ..., N .
Proposition 14. If u ∈ UNIC , σ(t) is non-invertible.
Proof. Any utility function u ∈ UKIC satisﬁes the partial diﬀerential equation in
Proposition 13.
To sum up, Proposition 13 provides suﬃcient conditions for the ﬁ-
nancial market to be incomplete in a setting more general than that of
[Anderson & Raimondo 2008a].
3.4.3 Numeraire Invariance
In this subsection, we show that the choice of numeraire good might matter for
ﬁnancial market completeness and for incompleteness. Numeraire invariance fails
since choosing a diﬀerent good as numeraire also changes the assets available to the
investors. The risk-free asset under one numeraire is a non-tradable asset under
another numeraire. The next proposition states how changing the numeraire alters
equilibrium.
Proposition 15. The relation between equilibrium Sharp ratios under two diﬀerent
numeraires (A and B) is given by
θB(t) = θA(t)− σpA(t). (3.43)
Furthermore, the relation between risk free rates is given by
rB(t) = rA(t)− µpA(t) + θTA(t)σpA(t). (3.44)
Stock price diﬀusion coeﬃcients under two numeraires relate via
σB(t) = σA(t)− σpA(t) (3.45)
where the subscript A (B) denotes equilibrium quantities in the economy with A (B)
as numeraire.
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Proof. Stochastic discount factors in economy A and in economy B relate via com-
modity prices as follows
ξB(t) = PA(t)ξA(t). (3.46)
ξA(t), ξB(t) and PA(t) evolve accordingly to
dξA(t) = ξA(t)
(
−rA(t)dt− θA(t)>dW (t)
)
(3.47)
dξB(t) = ξB(t)
(
−rB(t)dt− θB(t)>dW (t)
)
(3.48)
dPA(t) = PA(t)
(
µPA(t)dt+ σPA(t)
>dW (t)
)
. (3.49)
Applying Ito's lemma to the right hand side of Equation (3.46) leads to
dPA(t)ξA(t)
PA(t)ξA(t)
= µPAξAdt− σ>PAξAdW (t). (3.50)
where
µPAξA(t) = −rA(t) + µPA(t)− θA(t)>σPA(t) (3.51)
and
σPAξA(t) = θA(t)− σPA(t). (3.52)
Matching drift and diﬀusion terms yields
θB(t) = θA(t)− σPA(t) (3.53)
rB(t) = rA(t)− µPA(t) + θA(t)>σPA(t). (3.54)
To prove that the relation between the stock price diﬀusion coeﬃcients is as in (3.45)
note that the only term that changes when changing the numeraire is the Sharp ratio.
Using the relation between the Sharp ratios proves the relation.
Proposition 16. If the utility function satisﬁes Proposition 13, then the market is
incomplete under all numeraires.
Proof. This follows directly from noting that the PDE in Proposition 13 does not
depend on the choice of numeraire.
Proposition 17. Consider the case of two goods. Then the following conditions are
equivalent
1. The utility function satisﬁes Proposition 13.
2. The utility function does not satisfy Theorem 1 under any of the two nu-
meraires.
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Proof. We ﬁrst show that (1) implies (2). We then show that (2) implies (1). First,
note that by deﬁnition MRS2,1 =
1
MRS1,2
holds. Now, assume that the utility
function satisﬁes Proposition 13, which then implies
a
∂u(δ(t))
∂δ1
δ1(t) +
∂u(δ(t))
∂δ2
δ2(t) = 0. (3.55)
Rearranging the above yields
MRS2,1(t) = b
(
δ1(t)
δ2(t)
)
. (3.56)
After taking the log of the MRS above, we obtain
lnMRS2,1(t) = ln b+ ln δ1(t)− ln δ2(t). (3.57)
Applying Corollary 1 leads to
∂ lnMRS2,1(t)
∂δ2
δ2(t) = − 1
δ2
δ2(t) = −1. (3.58)
Now we perform the above steps once more for the case when good two serves as
numeraire
lnMRS1,2(t) = − ln b+ ln δ2(t)− ln δ1(t) (3.59)
∂ lnMRS1,2(t)
∂δ1
δ1(t) = − 1
δ1(t)
δ1(t) = −1. (3.60)
This proves that (1) implies (2). Now assume that the utility function does not
satisfy Corollary 1 under any of the two numeraires. When good one serves as
numeraire, we have
∂ lnMRS2,1
∂δ2
= − 1
δ2
. (3.61)
Solving the above PDE yields
lnMRS2,1 = ln f1(δ1)− ln δ2 (3.62)
which we rewrite as follows
MRS2,1 =
f1(δ1)
δ2
. (3.63)
Next, consider the case when we choose the second good as numeraire. We then
have
∂ lnMRS1,2
∂δ1
= − 1
δ1
. (3.64)
Solving the above PDE results in
lnMRS1,2 = ln f2(δ2)− ln δ1 (3.65)
or, alternatively, in
MRS1,2 =
f2(δ2)
δ1
. (3.66)
50 Chapter 3. Multi-Good
Using Equation (3.63) and Equation (3.66) implies that f1(x) = bx and that f2(x) =
1
b
x. Thus we have
MRS2,1 = b
(
δ1(t)
δ2(t)
)
. (3.67)
Rearranging yields,
a
∂u(δ(t))
∂δ1
δ1(t) +
∂u(δ(t))
∂δ2
δ2(t) = 0 (3.68)
which satisﬁes Proposition 13. This concludes the proof.
The next two examples further illustrate how numeraire invariance fails with
multi-goods. In the ﬁrst example, the utility function includes a subsistence point.
This is similar to the setup in [Ait-Sahalia et al. 2004] with a negative subsistence
point for luxury goods. The second example includes preference shocks in the spirit
of [Pavlova & Rigobon 2007].
3.4.3.1 Subsistence Point
Consider the following utility function deﬁned over the two goods c1 and c2
u (c1, c2) = log (c1 + b) + log (c2) (3.69)
where b > 0.
First, consider the case in which the ﬁrst good serves as numeraire. The relative
price of the second good in terms of the ﬁrst good is given by
P (t) =
δ1(t) + b
δ2(t)
. (3.70)
Applying Corollary 1, we have
δ2(t)
∂ lnMRS2,1(t)
∂δ2
+ 1 = −δ2(t)
δ2(t)
+ 1 = 0. (3.71)
Hence, the market is not guaranteed to be complete when the ﬁrst good is the
numeraire. In fact, if δ1 and δ2 evolve as uncorrelated geometric Brownian motions,
we then obtain the following expressions for stock prices
S1(t) = (δ1(t) + b)Et
[∫ T
t
δ1(u)
δ1(u) + b
du+
δ1(T )
δ1(T ) + b
]
(3.72)
and
S2(t) = (δ1(t) + b) . (3.73)
As δ1 is only driven by one of the two Brownian motions, the market must be
incomplete. Next consider the case in which the second good is the numeraire. The
relative price of the ﬁrst good in terms of the second good is given by
P (t) =
δ2(t)
δ1(t) + b
. (3.74)
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Again applying Corollary 1, we have
δ1(t)
∂ lnMRS1,2(t)
∂δ1
+ 1 = − δ1(t)
δ1(t) + b
+ 1 6= 0. (3.75)
Here the utility function does not satisfy the partial diﬀerential equation. Thus the
market is complete.
The above example also illustrates that unit elasticity of substitution is only
a suﬃcient condition for market incompleteness. When the ﬁrst good is used a
numeraire, the market might be incomplete even though the elasticity of substitution
diﬀers from one.
3.4.3.2 Preference Shocks
Consider the following utility function deﬁned over the two goods c1 and c2
u (c1, c2) = ln c1(t) + η(t) ln c2(t). (3.76)
Above η(t) serves as a preference shock. The preference shock is an analytic
function of time and the Brownian motions.8 Moreover, we assume that the pref-
erence shock is perfectly correlated with the output of consumption good 2 and
that
η(0) = 1 (3.77)
and
Et [η(s)] = η(t) (3.78)
for s > t. To simplify expositions further, we assume that output of the two goods
are uncorrelated. Note that with preference shocks we cannot directly use Corollary
1 as it does not allow for preference shocks.9 Let us employ good one as numeraire.
Calculating stock prices leads to
S1(t) = δ1(t)Et
[∫ T
t
δ1(s)
δ1(s)
ds+
δ1(T )
δ1(T )
]
= δ1(t) (3.79)
8In the setup in Section 3.4.1, we do not allow for preference shocks. However,
Theorem 1 can easily be extended to allow for preference shocks as long as the
preference shocks are analytic functions of the current value of the Brownian motions
and time. [Anderson & Raimondo 2008a] allows for such state dependencies.
9Corollary 1 may be modiﬁed to incorporate preference shocks. For this, one must
verify that the nominal dividend diﬀusion matrix is invertible as the relative price
depends on the preference shock. In the example, we obtain closed form solutions
for stock prices, and thus choose not to provide a modiﬁed version of Corollary 1.
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and to
S2(t) = δ1(t)Et
[∫ T
t
η(s)
δ2(s)
δ2(s)
ds+ η(T )
δ2(T )
δ2(T )
]
= δ1(t)η(t) (1 + T − t) . (3.80)
Using the fact that the two output processes are uncorrelated and that the preference
shock is perfectly correlated with the output of good 2, we can conclude that ﬁnancial
markets are complete. Next, assume that good 2 serves as the numeraire. Calculating
the stock prices we get
S1(t) =
δ2(t)
η(t)
Et
[∫ T
t
δ1(s)
δ1(s)
ds+
δ1(T )
δ1(T )
]
=
δ2(t)
η(t)
(3.81)
and
S2(t) =
δ2(t)
η(t)
Et
[∫ T
t
η(s)
δ2(s)
δ2(s)
ds+ η(T )
δ2(T )
δ2(T )
]
= δ2(t) (1 + T − t) .
From the correlation structure, we notice that the market is incomplete when good
2 is the numeraire.
3.5 Heterogeneous Agents
In this section, we consider an economy with J agents, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J}. As in Section
3.3, we assume that there are N goods and that agent j has VNM utility function
uj : R
N
++ → R. The utility function is assumed to be real analytic, ∇uj ∈ RN++ and
∇2uj is negative deﬁnite.10 Moreover, we assume that the multi-dimensional Inada
conditions hold. These conditions ensure that there exists a solution to the central
planner problem and that the solution is unique.
Agent j's maximization problem is
max
Cj ,pij
E
[∫ T
0
e−ρsuj(C
j(s))ds+ e−ρTuj(C
j(T ))
]
(3.82)
s.t.
dXj(t) = Xj(t)r(t)dt−P (T )>Cj(T )dt+ pij(t)> (µ(t)− r(t)1) dt+ pij(t)>σ(t)dW (t)
where pij(t) =
(
pij1(t), pi
j
2(t), ..., pi
j
N (t)
)
is the vector of amounts held in the stocks by
agent j. Xj(0) > 0 with Xj(0) = pij(0)>1, i.e, the agents are endowed with initial
shares in the stocks.
10∇ denotes the gradient and ∇2 denotes the Hessian.
3.5. Heterogeneous Agents 53
Deﬁnition 7. Equilibrium is a collection of allocations
(
Cj , pij
)
for j = 1, 2, ..., J ,
and a price system (µ, µP , σ, σP , r), such that
(
Cj , pij
)
are optimal solutions to agent
j's optimization problem and good and ﬁnancial markets clear∑
j
Cj(t) = δ(t) (3.83)
∑
j
pij(t) = S(t) (3.84)
∑
j
pij0 = 0 (3.85)
for t ∈ [0, T ] where pij0(t) is the amount held in the bond market.
Deﬁne the representative agents utility function as
u(δ; a) = max∑
j
Cj=δ
∑
j
ajuj(C
j). (3.86)
In Equation (3.86) the utility weights, a are solutions to
E
[∫ T
0
ξ(s; a)P (s; a)>Cj(s; a)ds+ ξ(T ; a)P>(T ; a)Cj(T ; a)
]
= Xj(0) (3.87)
where the above is evaluated at the optimal solution for j = 1, ..., J . According to the
analytic implicit function theorem (see [Anderson & Raimondo 2008a]), the utility
function of the representative agent is real analytic. To ensure that the market is
complete, the utility function of the representative agent must satisfy Theorem 1.
Instead of considering the dynamics optimization in Equation (3.82), we can solve
the static optimization of the representative agent
max
C
E
[∫ T
0
e−ρsu(C(s); a)ds+ e−ρTu(C(T ); a)
]
(3.88)
s.t.
E
[∫ T
0
ξ(s)P (s)>C(s)ds+ ξ(T )P (T )>C(T )
]
≤ X(0).
Note that this is equivalent to the optimization in Equation (3.10), but with the
utility derived from Equation (3.86). Given that the utility function in Equation
(3.86) satisﬁes Theorem 1, the equilibrium characterization follows from Section 4.2.
The optimal consumption proﬁles for agent j = 1, ..., J are found via the op-
timization in Equation (3.86). Since markets are complete, the optimal portfolios
can be found by using the approach in [Cox & Huang 1989]. The next proposition
characterizes the optimal portfolio policies.
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Proposition 18. The optimal portfolio policy of agent j, pij, is given by
pij(t) =
(
σ(t)T
)−1(
Xj(t)θ(t) +
ψj(t)
ξ(t)
)
(3.89)
where
ψj(t) =
(
ψj1(t), ψ
j
2(t), ..., ψ
j
N (t)
)>
(3.90)
with
ψji (t) = Et
[∫ T
t
N∑
k=1
(
ξ(s)Pk(s)c
j
k(s)Πijk(t, s)
)
ds
]
+Et
[
N∑
k=1
(
ξ(T )Pk(T )c
j
k(T )Πijk(t, T )
)]
(3.91)
where
Πijk(t, u) = Dit ln ξ(u) +Dit lnPk(u) +Dit ln c
j
k(u) (3.92)
for j = 1, .., J and i = 1, 2, ..., N .
Proof. According to [Cox & Huang 1989] the optimal portfolio policy is given by
pij(t) =
(
σ(t)T
)−1(
Xj(t)θ(t) +
ψj(t)
ξ(t)
)
(3.93)
where ψj(t) is the diﬀusion coeﬃcient of ξ(t)Xi(t) =
Et
[∫ T
0
ξ(s)P (s)>Cj(s)ds+ ξ(T )P (T )>Cj(T )
]
. Applying the Clark-Ocone theorem
and solving for the Malliavin derivatives explicitly yields the expression above.
3.5.1 Unit Elasticity of Substitution Preferences
In this subsection, we restrict our attention to the case with only two types of agents.
To simplify the exposition further, we consider the case of two goods. Agents have
utility functions with heterogeneity in taste given by
uj(c
j
1, c
j
2) = ϕj
(
cj1
(
cj2
)αj)
. (3.94)
We choose αj and ϕj (·) such that uj satisﬁes the conditions in Section 3.5. Note
that the utility function in Equation (3.94) exhibits unit elasticity of substitution.
3.5.1.1 Portfolio Policies
Assume that α1 6= α2 and that ϕj (x) 6= ln (x). Before we provide a proposition for
optimal portfolios, we introduce several auxiliary results. Assume that the utility of
the representative agent is non-separable in δ1 and δ2. This can be expressed as
∂2u(δ(t); a)
∂δ1∂δ2
6= 0. (3.95)
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Let the optimal consumption proﬁles of agent 1 and agent 2 be given by
c11(t) = f
1
1 (δ1(t), δ2(t)) (3.96)
c21(t) = δ1(t)− f11 (δ1(t), δ2(t)) (3.97)
c12(t) = f
1
2 (δ1(t), δ2(t)) (3.98)
c22(t) = δ2(t)− f12 (δ1(t), δ2(t)) (3.99)
where f is a functional mapping of aggregate dividends onto optimal consumption.
The sharing rule above is separable if
c11(t) = f
1
1 (δ1(t)) (3.100)
c12(t) = f
1
2 (δ2(t)) (3.101)
i.e., optimal consumption of the ﬁrst agent of the ﬁrst good (second good) is only a
function of aggregate output of the ﬁrst good (second good). From the FOCs, we
see that
∂u(δ(t); a)
∂δ1
= a1
∂u1(c
1(t))
∂c11
. (3.102)
Assume that the sharing rule is separable. We then obtain the following result (see
[Hara 2006])
Proposition 19. If the representative agent's utility function is non-separable and
the sharing rules are separable, then
f11 (δ1) = Aδ1 (3.103)
f12 (δ2) = Aδ2 (3.104)
for A ∈ R++.
Proof. The FOCs imply the following
∂u(δ(t); a)
∂δ1
= a1
∂u1(c
1(t))
∂c11
(3.105)
∂u(δ(t); a)
∂δ2
= a1
∂u1(c
1(t))
∂c12
. (3.106)
Diﬀerentiate the above with respect to δ2 (δ1) under the assumption of separable
sharing rules thus
∂2u(δ(t); a)
∂δ1∂δ2
= a1
∂u1(c
1(t))
∂c11∂c
1
2
d
dδ1
f11 (δ1) (3.107)
∂2u(δ(t); a)
∂δ2∂δ1
= a1
∂u1(c
1(t))
∂c12∂c
1
1
d
dδ2
f12 (δ2). (3.108)
As ∂
2u(δ(t);a)
∂δ1∂δ2
= ∂
2u(δ(t);a)
∂δ2∂δ1
6= 0 and ∂u1(c1(t))
∂c11∂c
1
2
= ∂u1(c
1(t))
∂c12∂c
1
1
6= 0, which together
with non-separability of the representative agent's utility function implies that
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d
dδ1
f11 (δ1) =
d
dδ2
f12 (δ2). As this must hold for all δ1 and δ2, we obtain the following
result
f11 (δ1) = Aδ1 (3.109)
f12 (δ2) = Aδ2. (3.110)
This ends the proof.
The next proposition shows that the utility function of the representative agent
is non-separable.
Proposition 20. Consider the utility function in Equation (3.94) with α1 6= α2
and with ϕj (x) 6= ln (x); then the utility function of the representative agent is
non-separable in δ1 and δ2.
Proof. A necessary condition for the utility function of the representative agent to
be separable is
∂u (δ(t))
∂δ1
= g(δ1(t)) (3.111)
for some function g, i.e., the partial derivative with respect to the ﬁrst good only
depends on the ﬁrst good. In equilibrium, the following relation holds
∂u (δ(t))
∂δ1
= a1
∂u1
(
c1(t)
)
∂c11
. (3.112)
Using the sharing rules and the utility function in (3.94), we obtain
∂u (δ(t))
∂δ1
= ϕ1
(
f11 (δ1(t), δ2(t))f
1
2 (δ1(t), δ2(t))
α1
)
f12 (δ1(t), δ2(t))
α1 . (3.113)
This above function depends only on δ1 if ϕ1 is given by ϕ1(x) = ln(x).
The next proposition deals with linear sharing rules.
Proposition 21. If α1 6= α2 and if ϕj (x) 6= ln (x), then equilibrium cannot be
implemented by linear sharing rules.
Proof. Consider that sharing rules are linear; then the following holds
a1ϕ1 (Aδ1(t)(Bδ2(t))
α1)) (Bδ2(t))
α1 = a1ϕ1 ((1−A)δ1(t)((1−B)δ2(t))α2)
((1−B)δ2(t))α2 (3.114)
for some positive constants A and B. Since dividends are less than perfectly cor-
related, the above cannot hold unless agents have log-linear preferences or homoge-
neous taste.
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Proposition 22. The optimal portfolio of agent 1 is given by
pi11(t) =
1−B2
B1 −B2 S1(t) (3.115)
pi12(t) = − B2
B1 −B2 S2(t) (3.116)
with Bi =
1
(1+αi)
.
Proof. The strategy of the proof is as follows
1. Prove that
∣∣corrt (X1(t), X2(t))∣∣ < 1.
2. Prove that portfolio policies takes the form as in Proposition 22.
3. Prove that this implies that |corrt (S1(t), S2(t))| < 1.
To prove (1): From the FOC it follows that
P (t) = α1
(
c11
c12
)
(3.117)
and that
α1
(
c11
c12
)
= α2
(
c21
c22
)
. (3.118)
The wealth of agent 1 is given by
X1(t) =
Et
[∫ T
0
(
ξ(s)c11(s) + ξ(s)P (s)c
1
2(s)
)
ds+ ξ(T )c11(T ) + ξ(T )P (T )c
1
2(T )
]
ξ(t)
.
(3.119)
Using Equation (3.117), we can rewrite wealth as
X1(t) =
A1Et
[∫ T
0
ξ(s)c11(s)ds+ ξ(T )c
1
1(T )
]
ξ(t)
(3.120)
with A1 = (1 + α1). Similarly, we can write the wealth of agent 2 as
X2(t) =
A2Et
[∫ T
0
ξ(s)c21(s)ds+ ξ(T )c
2
1(T )
]
ξ(t)
(3.121)
with A2 = (1 + α2). Next, we show that X
1 and X2 are linearly independent. To
this end we use the [Anderson & Raimondo 2008a] technique. Let
dc11(t) = φ1(t)dt+ Σ1(t)
T dW (t) (3.122)
dc21(t) = φ2(t)dt+ Σ2(t)
T dW (t) (3.123)
and
Σ(t) =
[
Σ1(t)
T
Σ1(t)
T
]
=
[
Σ11(t) Σ12(t)
Σ21(t) Σ22(t)
]
. (3.124)
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If there exists an ω ∈ Ω such that det (Σ(T, ω)) 6= 0, then X1(t) and X2(t) are
linearly independent a.a. (t, ω). Calculating Σ(t) by Ito's lemma, we have
Σ(t) = J(c1(t))Iδ(t)λ (3.125)
where J(c1(t)) denotes the Jacobian of c1(t) =
(
c11(t), c
2
1(t)
)
and is given by
J(c1(t)) =
[
∂c11(t)
∂δ1
∂c11(t)
∂δ2
∂c21(t)
∂δ1
∂c21(t)
∂δ2
]
. (3.126)
Note that det (Σ(T )) = det (J(c1(T ))) det
(
Iδ(T )
)
det (λ) . By deﬁnition det
(
Iδ(T )
) 6=
0 and det (λ) 6= 0, implying that det (Σ(T )) 6= 0 if and only if det (J(c1(T ))) 6= 0.
From the clearing of the commodity market, we obtain
c11(t) + c
2
1(t) = δ1(t). (3.127)
Taking the derivative with respect to δ2, we get
∂c11(t)
∂δ2
= −∂c
2
1(t)
∂δ2
. (3.128)
We need to show that (3.128) is non zero. To this end, note that by Proposition
21 we have that the sharing rule is non-linear. Moreover, by Proposition 20 we
know that the utility function of the representative agent is non-separable in δ1
and δ2. By Proposition 19 we know that separable sharing rules and non-separable
utility functions are only consistent with linear sharing rules. As we do not have
linear sharing rules, this implies that the sharing rule must be non-separable. Non-
separable sharing rules guarantees that (3.128) is non-zero and that
det (J(c1(T ))) = J11J22 − J12J21 6= 0 (3.129)
since J11J22 < 0 and J12J21 > 0 or J11J22 > 0 and J12J21 < 0 where Jij denotes
element (ij) of J(c1(T )). This proves 1.
To prove (2): Combining Equation (3.120) with Equation(3.121) yields
B1X
1(t) +B2X
2(t) = S1(t) (3.130)
with Bj = 1/Aj . In equilibrium, total wealth must be equal to the value of the stock
market, i.e.,
X1(t) +X2(t) = S1(t) + S2(t). (3.131)
Using Equation (3.130) and Equation (3.131), we obtain[
B1 B2
1 1
] [
X1(t)
X2(t)
]
=
[
S1(t)
S1(t) + S2(t)
]
. (3.132)
This has a unique solution if B1 6= B2, which holds whenever α1 6= α2. This proves
2.
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To prove (3): Subtracting Equation (3.120) from Equation (3.121) leads to
(1−B1)X1(t) + (1−B2)X2(t) = S2(t). (3.133)
We have now expressed stock prices as linear combinations of the wealth of agent 1
and agent 2 (see Equation (3.120) and Equation (3.133)). Let wealth of the agents
evolve accordingly to
dX1(t) = µX1(t)dt+ σX1(t)
T dW (t) (3.134)
dX2(t) = µX2(t)dt+ σX2(t)
T dW (t) (3.135)
which implies[
B1 B2
1−B1 1−B2
] [
σX11
(t) σX12
(t)
σX21
(t) σX22
(t)
]
=
[
S1(t)σ11(t) S1(t)σ12(t)
S2(t)σ21(t) S2(t)σ22(t)
]
.
(3.136)
As
[
σX11
(t) σX12
(t)
σX21
(t) σX22
(t)
]
is invertible,
[
S1(t)σ11(t) S1(t)σ12(t)
S2(t)σ21(t) S2(t)σ22(t)
]
is invertible if[
B1 B2
1−B1 1−B2
]
is invertible. Finally,
[
B1 B2
1−B1 1−B2
]
is invertible if α1 6=
α2. This ends the proof.
Remark 12. Note that the only requirement for the proof above to work is less than
perfect correlation between the wealth of agent one and agent two. In fact, we could
solve the optimal portfolio even if the market was intrinsically incomplete, i.e., with
more than two Brownian motions.
Remark 13. The above proof also relies on the number of goods and agents. We
have two goods and two agents. This allows us to write down a system with two
equations in two unknowns. If there where more goods than agents, we would not be
able to identity all of the stock price processes from the above method.
3.5.1.2 Taste
We construct an aggregate agent from the two agents populating the economy, which
results in the following utility function
u(δ1, δ2) = max
c11 + c
2
1 = δ1
c12 + c
2
2 = δ2
aϕ1
(
c11
(
c12
)α1)
+ (1− a)ϕ2
(
c21
(
c22
)α2)
. (3.137)
Proposition 23. The market is incomplete if α1 = α2.
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Proof. Assume that α1 = α2 = α. From the ﬁrst order conditions, we obtain the
following relation
c11
c12
=
c21
c22
= y2
αy1
where y1 and y2 are the Lagrange multipliers from
the optimization in (3.137). The relation, in turn, suggests that the sharing rule
must take the following form(
c11
)∗
= A(δ1, δ2)δ1 (3.138)(
c12
)∗
= A(δ1, δ2)δ2(
c21
)∗
= (1−A(δ1, δ2))δ1(
c22
)∗
= (1−A(δ1, δ2))δ2
where (.)∗ denotes optimality. The marginal utility of the representative agent must
be proportional to the marginal utility of agent 1 (and agent 2) evaluated at the
optimal consumption choice. Using the marginal utility of agent 1, we see that
∂u1
((
c11
)∗
,
(
c12
)∗)
∂c11
δ1 = α
∂u1
((
c11
)∗
,
(
c12
)∗)
∂c12
δ2 (3.139)
which then, by using Proposition 13, implies that the market is incomplete.
The proposition states that when agents have identical taste and unit elasticity
of substitution, then the market is incomplete. Note that the above easily extends
to the case of n − agent economies. If all the agents have same taste, the market
will be incomplete. This follows from the fact that each agent consumes the same
fraction of total output of each good. The approach discussed above already allows
for heterogeneity in risk aversion, see Equation (3.94). This, then, implies that only
heterogeneity in taste, but not heterogeneity in risk aversion, might help to restore
the completeness of the ﬁnancial market.
3.5.1.3 Heterogeneity in Beliefs
Now, we consider an economy with incomplete information.11 Here, agents do not
know the expected growth of output and thus need to infer it from the data. The
question we are interested in is the following: Will heterogeneity in beliefs resolve
the incompleteness problem?
We assume that the subjective probability measure of agent j = 1, 2 is equivalent
to the objective probability measure.
The program which agents will need to solve takes the following form
max
c1,c2
Ej
[∫ T
0
e−ρsuj(c
j
1(s), c
j
2(s))ds+ e
−ρTuj(c
j
1(T ), c
j
2(T ))
]
(3.140)
11The setting and notation below borrows from [Detemple & Murthy 1994].
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s.t.
Ej
[∫ T
0
ξj(s)P (s)
>C(s)jds+ ξj(T )P (T )
>C(T )j
]
≤ Xj(0).
Here, expectations are deﬁned on agent j's probability measure. The process ξj
denotes agent j's state price density.
Proposition 24. If α1 = α2, σ(t) is non-invertible.
Proof. From the ﬁrst order condition of the maximization problem, we know that
the sharing rule must be of the form(
c11(t)
)∗
= A(δ1(t), δ2(t), η(t))δ1(t) (3.141)(
c12(t)
)∗
= A(δ1(t), δ2(t), η(t))δ2(t) (3.142)
where
η(t) =
ξ2(t)
ξ1(t)
. (3.143)
We already know from the case with heterogeneous taste (and risk aversion) that
such a sharing rule implies non-invertibility of σ.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the determinants of ﬁnancial market completeness in
potentially complete economies with multiple goods. Our main theorem shows that
completeness depends on invertibility of a matrix containing non-linear functions of
marginal rates of substitutions at one point in time.
Financial market completeness also depends on the choice of numeraire. Even if
our theorem and our proposition are not satisﬁed under two numeraires, one of the
numeraires may imply complete ﬁnancial markets while the other numeraire may
imply incomplete ﬁnancial markets. Numeraire invariance holds with certainty only
if the ﬁnancial market is incomplete because the partial diﬀerential equation in our
proposition holds.
Importantly, many popular utility functions such as Cobb-Douglas and logarith-
mic utility cannot be employed in multi-good economies when studying complete
ﬁnancial markets because they may imply colinear prices. Colinear prices cause,
then, incompleteness of the ﬁnancial market side of the economy. Although this
may have no consequences for Pareto eﬃciency, as in [Cass & Pavlova 2004], it cur-
tails the ability to study optimal portfolio choice, whether in a national setting or
in an international setting such as in [Serrat 2001].
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We do provide good news: Heterogeneity in taste can restore completeness of
ﬁnancial markets even if individual preferences exhibit unit elasticity of substitution.
Taste heterogeneity leads to eﬃcient allocations and to complete ﬁnancial markets
except with log-linear preferences.
Chapter 4
Correlations
Abstract
We link stock market correlations in an equilibrium model to the level of risk aver-
sion, time variation in aggregate risk aversion, and other fundamentals. Preference
heterogeneity induces endogenous variations in equilibrium quantities that is re-
ﬂected in aggregate risk aversion and in portfolio trade. Correlations increase in the
level of risk aversion as well as in the diﬀerence in risk aversions. The model implies
countercyclical stock market correlations, expected returns, and standard deviations
and countercyclical quadratic variations of portfolio policies. Calibrations of the
model match average industry correlations and changes of average industry correla-
tions from business cycles peaks to troughs. Finally, we examine changes in industry
stock market correlations, returns, and standard deviations and in quadratic varia-
tions of industry turnover and ﬁnd, as the model predicts, positive relations.
Authors: Paul Ehling1 and Christian Heyerdahl-Larsen.2
Keywords: Equity Return Correlations; Quadratic Variation of Portfolios; Het-
erogeneous Investors;
1BI Norwegian School of Management
2We would like to thank Knut Kristian Aase, Ilan Cooper, Stephan Dieckmann,
Giulia Di Nunno, Mike Gallmeyer, Trond Stølen Gustavsen, Philipp Illeditsch, Tom
Lindstrøm, Richard Priestley, Bernt Øksendal, and seminar, symposium, and work-
shop participants at BI, the Workshop on Risk Measures and Stochastic Games with
Applications to Finance and Economics at the Department of Mathematics of the
University of Oslo, the Arne Ryde Workshop in Financial Economics at Lund Uni-
versity, the NHH-UiO Macro workshop, Nordic Finance Network (NFN) Workshop,
SIFR, Texas A&M, Fourth Annual Empirical Asset Pricing Retreat at the Uni-
versity of Amsterdam, Symposium on Stochastic Dynamic Models in Finance and
Economics at the University of Southern Denmark, and participants at EFA 2007
meetings and the European Meeting of the Econometric Society 2008 for helpful
comments and suggestions.
64 Chapter 4. Correlations
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4.1 Introduction
We study the economic mechanism underlying the variations of stock market cor-
relations in an equilibrium model. We ﬁnd that correlations rise with the level of
risk aversion. The central ingredient of the model is endogenous variation in equi-
librium quantities, which we obtain by introducing investors with heterogeneous
risk aversion. Hence aggregate marginal utility varies due to changes in aggregate
consumption and due to changes in consumption shares, or wealth shares. When
consumption declines in a business cycle trough, aggregate risk aversion increases,
which then increases correlations. The endogenous variation in the stochastic dis-
count factor further increases correlations. The model generates countercyclical
stock market correlations, expected returns, and standard deviations and counter-
cyclical quadratic variations of portfolio trade among investors. Calibrations of the
model match average industry correlations and changes of average industry correla-
tions from business cycles peaks to troughs.
Why do stock market correlations increase in risk aversion? Consider a setting
with uncorrelated dividends. When one asset receives a positive dividend shock, the
net eﬀect of this shock on the price and thus on the return is strictly positive. The
positive net return has two components, the positive dividend eﬀect and a negative
discounting eﬀect, i.e., the discount factor increases. The discounting eﬀect is nega-
tive because of an increase in the market price of risk related to the dividend shock
of the asset. The market price of risk increases as a consequence of the increased
dividend risk, i.e., consumption risk, relative to other dividend streams. For another
asset the discounting eﬀect on the return is strictly positive as its market price of
risk falls. Hence all assets experience positive returns after a positive dividend shock
to one of the assets. [Cochrane et al. 2008] study this market clearing mechanism
with a logarithmic representative investor. Importantly, we show that the impact of
the discounting eﬀect on all assets due to one dividend shock to one of the assets
increases in risk aversion. Implying that the larger the risk aversion the smaller is
the net return on the asset that experiences the positive dividend shock and that
the larger is the return on all other assets. Therefore, the higher is the risk aversion
the higher is the correlation between assets returns.
Why do stock market correlations increase in the diﬀerence of risk aversion
among investors? When consumption declines, investors with high risk aversion hold
a larger fraction of the economy, i.e., investors with low risk aversion delevarage.3
Hence aggregate risk aversion increases, which then increases correlations due to
3[Cochrane 2008] argues for a risk aversion story, as evidenced by the amount of
deleveraging and forced selling taking place within capital markets, behind the daily
volatility of 75 percent in October 2008.
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the risk aversion level eﬀect. Although aggregate risk aversion is bounded from
above by the largest risk aversion in the economy, the correlations in an economy
with heterogeneous investors is signiﬁcantly larger than the correlation obtained in
a homogeneous investor economy populated by the investor with the largest risk
aversion. This eﬀect on correlations, and other endogenous quantities, arises due to
the non-linearity of the consumption, or wealth, sharing rule among investors, see
[Dumas 1989]. The non-linearity is related to the slope of the sharing rule. Increasing
the steepness of the sharing rule by increasing the diﬀerence in risk aversion among
investors also increases endogenous variations in the stochastic discount factor which
then increases correlations and other endogenous quantities. When the sharing rule
is steep, then the risk aversion of the representative agent is volatile. High volatility
of the risk aversion leads to high volatility of the discount rates and consequently
high stock retun volatility. The correlation between stock returns increase due to
the fact that risk aversion is a common component in all assets' discount rates, and
when the sharing rule is steep the volatility is mainly driven by the changes in risk
aversion.
We want to emphasize the magnitude of the sharing rule eﬀect on correlations
and standard deviations. Even the basic power utility function allows for a match of
the level of correlations and standard deviations, although we cannot replicate the
level of the risk free rate and the aggregate mean excess return. In our model, unlike
in many habit models as for example in [Campbell & Cochrane 1999], time variation
in risk aversion is endogenous. Further, risk sharing is implemented by trade in the
stock market and a riskless security. Importantly, trade in securities constitutes an
observable economic channel that provides information about investor heterogeneity.
Models with a representative investor can, at best, capture time variation due to
investor heterogeneity in reduced form. Admittedly, analyzing trading activity in
models, but also in the data, is challenging. Even so, we solve for the quadratic
variation, or volatility, of portfolio policies as measure of trading intensity and put
the business cycle implications on trade to the test. The endogenous variation in
risk aversion and the trading implications set apart our work from studies such as
[Chue 2005] and [Aydemir 2008], who employ habit models with a representative
investor and thus exogenously specify an increase in risk aversion and in correlations
in business cycle troughs.4
4[Aydemir 2008], [Ribeiro & Veronesi 2002], and [Pavlova & Rigobon 2008]
model comovements in international stock market returns. [Aydemir 2008] extends
the model in [Chue 2005] to an international setting and studies correlations with
perfect and imperfect risk sharing across countries. [Ribeiro & Veronesi 2002] an-
alyze fundamental country processes that are jointly aﬀected by an unobservable
global business cycle factor. Time variation in correlations of asset returns arise
from the learning activity of the representative investor. [Pavlova & Rigobon 2008]
study stock prices, exchange rates and the correlations of stock prices with multi-
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We employ preference heterogeneity and catching up with the Joneses prefer-
ences, or ratio habit preferences, see [Chan & Kogan 2002].5 As with standard power
utility, countercyclical variations of endogenous quantities with the ratio habit pref-
erences result from preference heterogeneity. One useful byproduct of ratio habits
comes in the form of providing a good replication of the level of the risk free rate, the
aggregate stock market mean excess return, and the aggregate stock market return
standard deviation and this, in particular, relative to [Campbell & Cochrane 1999].6
There are, however, two other more important reasons why we use ratio habit prefer-
ences. First, [Chan & Kogan 2002] preferences allow us to utilize relative consump-
tion, consumption in excess of habit, as a stationary state variable. Second, since
relative consumption is procyclical it may be interpreted as a business cycle indicator
that deﬁnes booms and recessions.
The model captures only a portion of all potential diﬀerences among investors.
For example, investors trade only in the market portfolio but do not trade in indi-
vidual securities or in industry portfolios. Two implications arise from this. Firstly,
stock market correlations in the model can diﬀer only due to exogenous diﬀerences
in dividend correlations since endogenous variation is a pure market eﬀect. We,
therefore, focus in our calibrations on average industry stock market correlations.
Secondly, because our model has no cross-sectional implications, such as the inﬂu-
ence of heterogeneous beliefs or of heterogeneous overconﬁdence in stock picking on
correlations, this should bias against model calibrations as well as against empirical
tests even at business cycle frequencies.
Parametrized examples of our model with ten industries explain conditional
stock market return correlations.7 Correlations are asymmetric, increasing during
bad states of the economy but remaining low and stable during good states of nature.
This feature of the model is consistent with [Longin & Solnik 2001], who argue that
correlations increase in bear markets, but not in bull markets. Further, conditional
stock market return correlations and return standard deviations move together, along
with aggregate risk aversion, over the business cycle. This is an important matter
goods. In their model, spill-over eﬀects arise because of binding portfolio constraints.
5Notable papers addressing asset pricing with preference heterogeneity include
[Dumas 1989] and [Wang 1996].
6The micro evidence on asset allocations suggests that investors have constant
relative risk aversion preferences, see [Brunnermeier & Nagel 2008]. The ratio habit
preferences in [Abel 1990], [Chan & Kogan 2002], and in our model, unlike other
habit models including [Campbell & Cochrane 1999], imply constant relative risk
aversion preferences.
7See [Bollerslev et al. 1988] and [Moskowitz 2003] for evidence on time varia-
tion in return correlations and especially for correlations moving over the busi-
ness cycle. Other recent work on correlations include [Ang & Chen 2001] and
[Dumas et al. 2003].
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since the empirical literature on correlations argues for correlations and standard
deviations moving together, [Longin & Solnik 1995] and [Karolyi & Stulz 1996], but
also produces evidence consistent with the argument that these results in the liter-
ature can be spurious, [Longin & Solnik 2001]. Our calibrations match the change
in correlations from boom to recession. They also match the variations in the stan-
dard deviation of the market return and in average industry standard deviations.
Importantly, our calibration results are almost unchanged whether one uses volatile
industry dividends and repurchases as aggregate consumption or industry dividends
including repurchases and another large and smooth claim, which helps to replicate
the time-series properties of aggregate consumption. Further, our calibration results
are also almost unchanged whether one identiﬁes booms and recessions via realized
consumption growth or via relative consumption.
Figure 4.1 shows plots of average pairwise industry correlations, annualized 3-
year ahead continuously compounded average market excess returns, average in-
dustry standard deviations and average quadratic variation of HP-ﬁltered industry
turnover with gray shaded areas denoting NBER recessions. We can see from the
plots signiﬁcant increases of the time series in recessions or sometimes around re-
cession periods. Industry stock market correlations, market excess returns (industry
excess returns), and standard deviations and quadratic variations of turnover show
positive relations, correlation coeﬃcients, with the NBER recession indicator.
4.2 The Economy
This section introduces a continuous-time exchange economy deﬁned on the ﬁnite
time span [0, T ], in which N risky securities and one riskless security are traded.
Preferences are described by heterogeneous constant curvature of the utility func-
tion and linear process for the standard of living, catching up with the Joneses
preferences, as in [Chan & Kogan 2002].
The dividend processes are assumed to have the following dynamics
dδi(t) = δi(t)
(
µδidt+ σ
>
δidW (t)
)
(4.1)
where δi(0) > 0 and where > denotes the transpose with i = 1, ..., N . To sim-
plify matters, we assume that the drift rates of the dividends µδi and the diﬀusion
coeﬃcients σδi ∈ RN are constants with σδ positive deﬁnite. The N -dimensional
Brownian motion, W , is deﬁned on a ﬁltered probability space (Ω,F , P, {Ft}).8
8The probability space is deﬁned over the ﬁnite time horizon [0, T ], where Ω is
the state space, F denotes the σ-algebra, P represents the probability measure, and
the information structure F(.) is generated by observations of the dividend processes
with FT = F .
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Figure 4.1: Correlations, Returns, Standard Deviations, and
Quadratic Variation of Turnover. The ﬁgure shows plots of aver-
age pairwise industry correlations, annualized 3-year ahead continuously
compounded market excess returns, average industry standard devia-
tions and average quadratic variation of HP-ﬁltered industry turnover
for the sample period 1927 to 2008. Industry return data is from Ken-
neth French's webpage. Turnover is the sum of industry turnover (using
Kenneth French's industry classiﬁcation) for ﬁrms appearing jointly in
Compustat and CRSP.
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Aggregate consumption is the sum of the N dividend streams, i.e.,
C(t) =
N∑
i=1
δi(t). (4.2)
The dynamics of aggregate consumption are given by
dC(t) = C(t)
(
µC(t)dt+ σC(t)
>dW (t)
)
(4.3)
where
µC(t) = sδ(t)
>µδ
σC(t) = sδ(t)
>σδ, (4.4)
by deﬁnition dividend shares are given by
sδ(t) = (sδ1(t), sδ2(t), ..., sδN (t))
> =
(
δ1(t)
C(t)
,
δ2(t)
C(t)
, ...,
δN (t)
C(t)
)>
(4.5)
where
µδ = (µδ1 , µδ2 , ..., µδN )
>
σδ = (σδ1 , σδ2 , ..., σδN )
> . (4.6)
Dividend share processes follow
dsδi(t) = sδi(t)
((
µsi(t)− σsi(t)TσC(t)
)
dt+ σsi(t)
T dW (t)
)
(4.7)
where
µsi(t) = µδi − sδ(t)Tµδ
σsi(t) = σδi − σTδ sδ(t). (4.8)
4.2.1 Financial Markets
There are N stocks, with stock i representing the claim to dividend i. Stock price
processes show the following dynamics
dSi(t) + δi(t)dt = Si(t)
(
µi(t)dt+ σi(t)
>dW (t)
)
(4.9)
with boundary conditions Si(T ) = 0, where µi(t) and σi(t) as well as Si(0) represent
equilibrium quantities. The locally risk free asset, B(t), generates an instantaneous
rate of return equal to r(t). Price dynamics are
dB(t) = r(t)B(t)dt (4.10)
with B(0) = 1. The equilibrium quantity r(t) clears the bond market if the bond is
in zero net supply.
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4.2.2 Investors
We consider two classes of investors consuming continuously over time. The func-
tional form of investors' utility, see [Chan & Kogan 2002], is given by
Uj (C,X) = E0
[∫ T
0
e−ρtuj(Cj(t), X(t))dt
]
(4.11)
where ρ > 0, u represents the instantaneous utility function, C stands for the con-
sumption rate, and X is the external economy wide living standard with j = 1, 2.
Above Et [.] denotes the Ft-conditional expectation with respect to the probability
measure P .
The instantaneous utility function is given by
uj (Cj(t), X(t)) =
1
1− γj
(
Cj(t)
X(t)
)1−γj
(4.12)
where γ measures the local curvature of the utility function. We follow
[Chan & Kogan 2002] in interpreting γ as the relative risk aversion parameter. The
average historical standard of living evolves accordingly to
x(t) = x(0)e−λt + λ
∫ t
0
e−λ(t−u)c(u)du (4.13)
where x(t) = log(X(t)) and c(t) = log(C(t)). The parameter λ governs the depen-
dency of the living standard, x(t), on past aggregate consumption experiences.
Relative consumption, w(t) = c(t) − x(t), instead of aggregate consumption
serves as state variable and follows a mean-reverting process
dw(t) = λ (w(t)− w(t)) dt+ σC(t)>dW (t) (4.14)
with long-run mean
w(t) =
µC(t)− 12σC(t)>σC(t)
λ
. (4.15)
When consumption in the economy is high then w(t) is also high. Hence, we interpret
w(t) as a business cycle indicator.
4.2.3 Equilibrium
Conditional on endowments and preferences, equilibrium is a collection of allocations
and prices such that individuals' consumption proﬁles are optimal, also requiring the
clearing of the commodity market, stock markets and bond market. Equilibrium is
also concerned with portfolio policies that ﬁnance optimal consumption. We assume
that equilibrium exists.9 Construction of equilibrium (when it exists) and proposi-
tions appear in the Appendix C.1.
9See [Anderson & Raimondo 2008b] for results on existence of equilibrium. Their
results, however, can be applied to our model (with minor changes) only if we turn
oﬀ the external standard of living.
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4.2.4 Correlations, Returns, Volatility, and the
Quadratic Variation of Portfolio Policies
The instantaneous equity returns, dR(t), evolve accordingly to
dRi(t) = µi(t)dt+ σi(t)
>dW (t). (4.16)
The conditional variance, with respect to the probability measure P , of stock i's
instantaneous return is deﬁned as follows
V art(dRi(t)) = ‖σi(t)‖2 dt (4.17)
where
‖σi(t)‖ =
√
σi(t)>σi(t). (4.18)
The conditional covariance between asset i and k, with k = 1, .., N , is given by
Covt (dRi(t), dRk(t)) = σi(t)
>σk(t)dt. (4.19)
Then, we calculate the conditional correlation10 between asset i and asset k as
Corrt (dRi(t), dRk(t)) =
σi(t)
>σk(t)
‖σi(t)‖ ‖σk(t)‖ . (4.20)
The trading activity of investors separates our economy from other economies that
model stock market return correlations with a representative investor. As trading
volume or turnover in continuous-time economies is not well deﬁned, i.e., it is inﬁ-
nite, we instead employ the quadratic variation, or volatility, of portfolio policies as
measure of trading intensity.11 The quadratic variation, QV , of optimal portfolio
policies is by deﬁnition
d [pij(t)] = QVj(t)dt (4.21)
where pi denotes investors portfolio policies, Equations C.10-C.11, with j = 1, 2.
Since Equation 4.21 is tedious we refer the reader to the Appendix C.3.
4.3 Correlations with Two Stocks
In this section, we provide numerical examples of the eﬀects of risk aversion and
preference heterogeneity (in risk aversion) on correlations in two-stock economies.
Further, we elaborate brieﬂy on the inﬂuence of other fundamentals on correlations.
10In the remainder of the paper, we use the terms 'conditional correlation' and
'correlation' interchangeably.
11[?] and [Longstaﬀ & Wang 2008], among others, also employ the quadratic vari-
ation of portfolio policies to measure trading intensity.
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We solve the economies through Monte Carlo simulations. Technical details of
the simulations are in Appendix C.4. Our plots show correlations as a function of
the consumption share of the most risk averse investor and the share of the ﬁrst
dividend process with turned oﬀ habit process. The investor with high risk aversion
consumes a larger share of aggregate consumption when consumption is low and vice
versa, see [Dumas 1989] and [Wang 1996] among others. With [Chan & Kogan 2002]
preferences the plots show correlations as function of relative consumption, w, and
the share of the ﬁrst dividend process. Relative consumption is path dependent
and not identical to the consumption share of the most risk averse investor, albeit
correlated with it, with turned on habit process. Overall, the shape of the correlation
functions are not sensitive to the identiﬁcation of the state of the economy, via
habit or via aggregate consumption. Figures with correlations as a function of the
consumption share of the most risk averse investor and the share of the ﬁrst dividend
process with [Chan & Kogan 2002] preferences are available from the authors.
The economy contains two independent and identically distributed dividend
(i.i.d.) processes. The dividend drift coeﬃcients µδ are set at 0.02, and the div-
idend diﬀusion coeﬃcients σδ are set at 0.05. We set the starting values for the
dividends to 1 and the maturity of the economy to 50 years. The utility weight
in the social planner problem is 0.5. The discount rate for time preference of both
investors is set to 1% and while the habit persistence, λ, is set at 0.1. The param-
eters are motivated by model calibrations except the i.i.d. feature of dividends, the
starting values for dividends, the maturity of the economy and the endowments.
4.3.1 Homogeneous Preferences
The economy is populated by (i) two homogeneous investors with logarithmic utility,
(ii) two homogeneous investors with power utility with a risk aversion coeﬃcient of 3,
or (iii) two homogeneous investors with power utility with a risk aversion coeﬃcient
of 10. For each of these economies we consider two cases: habit process turned oﬀ
and habit process, as in Equation 4.13, turned on.
The three top plots in Figure 4.2 show the correlation function with homogeneous
investors and turned oﬀ habit process. In the top left plot, the representative investor
is of a logarithmic type. Although the dividend processes are uncorrelated, stock
returns are positively correlated with correlations up to 0.029. Apparently, the
correlation function reaches its maximum when the dividend processes contribute
50% to aggregate consumption.
The top middle and right plots highlight the eﬀect of risk aversion on correla-
tions with risk aversion coeﬃcients of 3 and 10, respectively. Holding everything
else constant, the correlation functions are increasing in risk aversion. Correlations
reach 0.05 in the economy with a risk aversion coeﬃcient of 3, and 0.086 in the econ-
omy with a risk aversion of 10. The top right plot in Figure 4.2 suggests that the
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correlation function peaks twice, once before the 50% share of the dividends, or the
diagonal of the two Brownian motions, and once after the 50% share. This feature
of the correlation function is not due to the heightened risk aversion. The two other
versions of the economy also exhibit this feature, although we cannot detect this in
the plots because the dip in correlations is too small.12
The bottom plots of Figure 4.2 show correlation functions when the habit pro-
cess is turned on. As the Malliavin derivative in Equation C.15 for the logarithmic
case is independent of the external standard of living the diﬀusion coeﬃcient do not
depend on the Malliavin derivative. Therefore, the correlation function is identical to
the correlation function with logarithmic investor and turned oﬀ habit process, bot-
tom left plot versus top left plot. The top middle and right plots highlight the eﬀect
of the habit process with homogeneous investors. The procyclical variation in the
correlations, low correlations when the habit level is low and vice versa, contradicts
[Bollerslev et al. 1988], [Moskowitz 2003], and [Longin & Solnik 2001]. This result
is related to the procyclical variation in expected stock returns and volatility, also
inconsistent with the data, with homogeneous risk aversion in [Chan & Kogan 2002].
We are therefore led to conclude that the ratio habit preferences in our model econ-
omy cannot match countercyclical variations in asset pricing moments. Nevertheless,
as without ratio habits, correlations increase in the level of risk aversion. Impor-
tantly, habit persistence signiﬁcantly increases correlations, bottom middle and left
plot. One last observation we make is that correlations reach a local minimum when
the dividend share of dividend one equals 0.5.
Why does the correlation function peak twice? The shape of the correlation
function in top plots of Figure 4.2 are entirely determined by stock price diﬀusion
coeﬃcients. The diﬀusion terms, for the economies (i) to (iii), are depicted in top
plots and bottom left plot of Figure 4.3 and document two important features of the
model diﬀusion terms. First, own dividend shocks produce larger diﬀusion terms,
σ11 and σ22, than dividend shocks of other dividend streams, σ12 and σ21. Second,
diﬀusion terms of one stock are partially oﬀsetting, that is when σ11 is high (dividend
one is high) then σ12 is low and vice versa. Note that this relation holds for both
stocks. The diﬀusion term σ11 peaks when the share of dividend one is between 0.5
and 1 and reaches a minimum when the share of dividend one is between 0 and 0.5.
Consumption risk reaches a minimum when the share of dividend one equals 0.5 and
12[Cochrane et al. 2008] consider a two stock economy with a logarithmic investor.
Their Figure 7 is analogous to the three plots in the top row of Figure 4.2, and
identical to the top left plot in Figure 4.2 of this paper. Note that the correlation
function in the top left plot is smaller, 0.025 instead of 0.3, than that found in Figure
7 in [Cochrane et al. 2008]. This is because we use a dividend volatility of 0.05 while
[Cochrane et al. 2008] use a dividend volatility of 0.2.
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Figure 4.2: Correlations with Homogeneous Preferences. The
ﬁgure shows the conditional return correlation between stock 1 and
stock 2 as a function of dividend share, δ1(0)/ (δ1(0) + δ2(0)), or as a
function of dividend share and relative consumption, Equation 4.13.
The ﬁgure contains six plots with the following risk aversion, γ, for the
ﬁrst and second investor, respectively: Log - Log, 3 - 3, 10 - 10 (top
row plots) with standard power preferences and Log - Log, 3 - 3, 10 - 10
with [Chan & Kogan 2002] preferences (bottom row plots). Investors
time preference, ρ, is set at 0.01. Habit persistence, λ, is set at 0.1.
Both stocks have identical dividend drift and diﬀusion coeﬃcients. The
drift is set at 0.02 while the diﬀusion coeﬃcient is 0.05. Dividends are
uncorrelated. The horizon of the economy, T , is set at 50 years.
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Figure 4.3: Correlations and Diﬀusion Terms. The ﬁgure shows
equity diﬀusion terms of three economies, Log - Log, 3 - 3, 10 - 10, as a
function of dividend share, δ1(0)/ (δ1(0) + δ2(0)), in a stylized economy
with two stocks. The sum of the diﬀusion term products in the bottom
middle and left plots corresponds to the covariance between stock 1 and
stock 2. Investors time preference, ρ, is set at 0.01. Both stocks have
identical dividend drift and diﬀusion coeﬃcients. The drift is set at 0.02
while the diﬀusion coeﬃcient is 0.05. Dividends are uncorrelated. The
horizon of the economy, T , is set at 50 years.
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reaches maximum at dividend one shares of 0 and 1. The bottom middle and bottom
right plots show the products of σ11×σ21 and σ12×σ22 and these functions resemble
the shapes of σ11 and σ22. The sum of the two products yields the covariance between
stock one and stock two. The overall conclusion that we draw from bottom middle
and bottom right plots of Figure 4.3 is that the covariance between stock one and
stock two peaks twice simply because of the peak in σ11 and in σ22. As correlations
are nothing but a normalization of covariances it is also the case that correlations
peak twice due to the peak in σ11 and in σ22.
4.3.2 Risk Aversion Level Eﬀect
The three top plots in Figure 4.2 show that correlations increase in risk aversion.
We now develop the intuition for this result. Consider a setting with two or many
uncorrelated dividends. When one dividend experiences a positive Brownian shock,
the net eﬀect of this shock on the price and the return of the stock associated with the
dividend stream must be positive. The positive net return has two components. A
positive dividend eﬀect and a negative discounting eﬀect. The negative discounting
eﬀect is caused by an increase in the market price of risk related to the positive
dividend shock of the asset. The market price of risk increases as a consequence of
the increased dividend risk, i.e., consumption risk, relative to second dividend stream
or other dividend streams. For the second asset or other assets the discounting eﬀect
on the return is strictly positive as its or their market price of risk falls. Hence all
assets experience positive returns after a positive dividend shock to one of the assets.
Importantly, Figure 4.4 shows that the impact of the discounting eﬀect on all assets
due to one dividend shock to one of the assets increases in risk aversion. Hence, the
larger the risk aversion, the larger is the negative discounting eﬀect and the smaller
is the net return on the asset that experiences the positive dividend shock. Further,
the larger the risk aversion, the larger is the positive discounting eﬀect and the larger
is the return on the second asset or all other assets. Therefore, the higher is the
risk aversion the higher is the correlation between assets returns. We conjecture,
as highlighted in Figure 4.4, that correlations converge to one when risk aversion
approaches inﬁnity. Numerical examples support this conjecture. However, proving
the conjecture goes beyond the goals of this paper.
4.3.3 Heterogeneous Preferences
We now introduce heterogeneity in risk aversion. We consider the following risk
aversion pairs: 3 − log and 10 − log. All other parameters are kept constant. The
two top plots in Figure 4.5 show the correlation function with turned oﬀ habit
process while the bottom plots show the correlation function when the habit process
is turned on.
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Figure 4.4: Correlations and Risk Aversion. The ﬁgure shows eq-
uity returns due to a positive dividend shock to dividend one in a styl-
ized economy with two stocks. The return of stock one gray shaded
area increases in (the own) positive dividend shock, dividend eﬀect,
but decreases in the discounting eﬀect white area due to a two trees
eﬀect, see [Cochrane et al. 2008]. R1 denotes the net eﬀect. The dis-
counting eﬀect R2 on the second stock, discounting cross-eﬀect, is
positive. The dividend eﬀect and the discounting cross-eﬀect cause pos-
itive correlation. The correlation, via the discounting eﬀects, increases
in risk aversion.
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Introducing heterogeneity in risk aversion, top plots of Figure 4.5, has a strong
and interesting impact on the correlation function. Correlations are increasing in the
bad state of nature, that is, correlations are the larger the lower is the realization of
aggregate dividends. Importantly, from the top left plot we learn that the correlation
function increases in the diﬀerence in risk aversion. This sharing rule eﬀect on
correlations and other quantities is large as correlations in the 3 − log economy
range from 0.05 to slightly above 0.2 while in the 10 − log economy correlations
reach almost 0.8.
With [Chan & Kogan 2002] preferences, bottom plots of Figure 4.5, correlations
range from slightly below 0.4 to approximately 0.6 in the 3− log economy and range
from 0.5 to almost 1.0 in the 10 − log economy. Hence, we conclude again that
habit persistence signiﬁcantly increases correlations. As without habit persistence
correlations increase in the bad state of nature, low ω. Because with habit persistence
and homogeneous preferences correlations decrease in ω it must be that heterogeneity
in risk aversion drives this result.
4.3.4 Sharing Rule Eﬀect
Investors with high risk aversion hold a larger fraction of the economy after a drop
in aggregate consumption. Because aggregate risk aversion is wealth weighted it
increases after a drop in aggregate consumption. The increase in risk aversion leads
to an increase in correlations due to the risk aversion level eﬀect. This, however,
does not explain the entire increase in correlations. For instance, correlations in
top middle plot of Figure 4.2 with aggregate risk aversion set at 3 reach 0.05 while
correlations in top left plot of Figure 4.5 with risk aversion pair set at 3− log reach
0.2. Because aggregate risk aversion is bounded from above at 3 the level of risk
aversion cannot explain the equilibrium correlations in Figure 4.5.
Why are correlations signiﬁcantly larger in an economy with heterogeneous in-
vestors than the correlations obtained in homogeneous investor economies populated
by the investor with the largest risk aversion from the heterogeneous investor econ-
omy? In the model with heterogeneous investors the marginal utility of the aggregate
investor varies due to changes in aggregate consumption and due to changes in con-
sumption shares, or wealth shares, of individual investors. When small changes in
consumption imply large changes in relative wealth then endogenous variations, in-
cluding correlations, are high.4.6 plots the consumption share of the most risk averse,
the slope of the consumption share, the quadratic variation, the correlation and the
volatility of the market. It is evident that in the model, all these quantities are highly
correlated. When the slope of the sharing rule is steep, then the risk aversion of the
representative agent is highly volatile. The volatility of the risk aversion implies
volatile market price of risk. Since all risk factors depend on the risk aversion of the
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Figure 4.5: Correlations with Heterogeneous Preferences. The
ﬁgure shows the conditional return correlation between stock 1 and
stock 2 as a function of dividend share, δ1(0)/ (δ1(0) + δ2(0)), and con-
sumption share of the most risk averse investor, Equation C.2, or as
a function of dividend share and relative consumption, Equation 4.13.
The ﬁgure contains four plots with the following risk aversion, γ, for
the ﬁrst and second investor, respectively: 3 - Log and 10 - Log (top
row plots) with standard power preferences and 3 - Log and 10 - Log
with [Chan & Kogan 2002] preferences (bottom row plots). Investors
time preference, ρ, is set at 0.01. Habit persistence, λ, is set at 0.1. The
weight on investors is 0.5. Both stocks have identical dividend drift and
diﬀusion coeﬃcients. The drift is set at 0.02 while the diﬀusion coeﬃ-
cient is 0.05. Dividends are uncorrelated. The horizon of the economy,
T , is set at 50 years.
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representative agent, this eﬀect has an economy wide impact on all discount rates.
The highly volatile market price of risk translates into highly volatile discount rates,
which in turn leads to increased stock return volatility. The correlations increase
because of the fact that risk aversion is common for all risk factors, and when the
sharing rule is steep most of the volatility is induced via the volatility of the risk
aversion. The quadratic variation is high because the least risk averse agent must
deleverage. However, in order to deleverage his position he must sell to the more
risk averse agent. In oder for the more risk averse agent to take a larger position in
the stock market, the price of risk must increase, and thus stock prices fall. The top
left plot of Figure 4.7 shows the conditional return correlations between stock 1 and
stock 2 obtained in an economy with risk aversion pairs 3−Log. The plot also shows
the conditional return correlations between stock 1 and stock 2 obtained in an econ-
omy with homogeneous risk aversion in which aggregate risk aversion corresponds
to aggregate risk aversion in the heterogeneous investor economy. The diﬀerence in
correlations between the homogeneous economy and the heterogeneous economy is
entirely due to endogenous variations. The top right plot shows the slope of the
consumption or wealth sharing rule between the agents. We can see that the shape
of the slope of the sharing rule and the diﬀerence between homogeneous and hetero-
geneous correlations are identical. Endogenous variation in equilibrium quantities,
which one can obtain by introducing heterogeneous investors, lead to the increase in
correlations above the correlation in a corresponding homogeneous investor economy.
The bottom left plot of Figure 4.7 shows the conditional return correlations
between stock 1 and stock 2 obtained in an economy with risk aversion pairs 30−Log
as well as the conditional return correlations between stock 1 and stock 2 obtained in
a corresponding economy with homogeneous risk aversion. We learn from the plots
that correlations increase in the diﬀerence in risk aversion between investors.
Lastly, note that when aggregate consumption declines to very low levels then
and only then correlations drop in the bad state of nature. It is, therefore, an
important calibration question whether a fall in correlations in the bad state of
nature may be observed for realizations of the model economy.
4.3.5 Empirical Predictions
Empirical literature on correlations, on the one hand, argues for correlations and
standard deviations moving hand in hand over the business cycle.13 On the other
13[Longin & Solnik 1995] ﬁnd that correlations rise in periods of high volatility.
[Hamilton & Lin 1996] argue that stock market volatility and the business cycle co-
move.
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Figure 4.6: Sharing Rule. The ﬁgure shows the fraction of consump-
tion consumed by the most risk avers agent (sharing rule), the slope of
the sharing rule, the quadratic variation, return correlations between
stock 1 and stock 2 and the stock market volatility as a function of
aggregate consumption. The risk aversion pair is 3 − Log where the
weight on investors is 0.5. Both stocks have identical dividend drift and
diﬀusion coeﬃcients. The drift is set at 0.02 while the diﬀusion coeﬃ-
cient is 0.05. Dividends are uncorrelated. The horizon of the economy,
T , is set at 50 years.
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Figure 4.7: Sharing Rule Eﬀect. The ﬁgure shows the conditional
return correlations between stock 1 and stock 2 as a function of aggre-
gate dividends, C(0), and slopes of the sharing rule as a function of
aggregate dividends. Plots show correlations of economies with hetero-
geneous risk aversion, γ, for the ﬁrst and second investor, respectively:
3 - Log and 30 - Log as well as homogeneous risk aversion in which
aggregate risk aversion corresponds to aggregate risk aversion in the
heterogeneous investor economy. Investors time preference, ρ, is set at
0.01. Habit persistence, λ, is set at 0.1. The weight on investors is 0.5.
Both stocks have identical dividend drift and diﬀusion coeﬃcients. The
drift is set at 0.02 while the diﬀusion coeﬃcient is 0.05. Dividends are
uncorrelated. The horizon of the economy, T , is set at 50 years.
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hand, [Longin & Solnik 2001] argue that these results in the literature can be spuri-
ous. Therefore, it is natural to ask for relevant empirical implications of our model
for correlations and standard deviations.
The plots in Figure 4.8 show the fraction of total wealth held by the most
risk averse investor in the two stocks, the quadratic variation of the most risk averse
investors' portfolio, the correlation between stock one and stock two and the standard
deviation of the market. We see from the plots that all quantities increase in the
bad state of nature. Therefore, our model suggests that the ﬁndings in the empirical
literature regarding heightened correlations and heightened standard deviations in
bad times may not be spurious. The plots in Figure 4.9 show the same relations
with [Chan & Kogan 2002] preferences and the same conclusion applies.
One way to test the countercyclical relation between correlations, returns, stan-
dard deviations and variance of portfolio policies is to employ a business indicator.
Further, this opens the door for a principle component analysis. To our best knowl-
edge such a relation between these four time series has not been studied in the
empirical literature.14
4.3.6 The Inﬂuence of Fundamentals other than Prefer-
ences on Correlations
For brevity, we do not report additional ﬁgures for the model correlations, but the
ﬁgures are available from the authors. First, return correlations are increasing in the
dividend growth. Second, studying the inﬂuence of the dividend volatility on corre-
lations we ﬁnd that return correlations are increasing in dividend volatility. Third,
we introduce correlation at the dividend level. We gain the following insights from
this exercise: Return correlations increase compared to the baseline case, and en-
dogenous correlation still play an important role since correlations are always above
the dividend correlation, except when dividend correlation approaches one, and en-
dogenously generated correlation is smaller when dividends are already correlated.
Forth, we analyze economies with diﬀerent time horizons: 20 years and 100 years and
learn that the shape of the correlation function is slightly increasing in the horizon.15
14[Lamoureux & Lastrapes 1990] argue that volume explains standard deviations.
[Gallant et al. 1992] show that trading volume has positive relation with absolute
volatility changes. [Longin & Solnik 1995] argue that correlations and standard de-
viations move together.
15In an earlier version of this paper, we also considered economies with hetero-
geneous time preferences and heterogeneous beliefs (with and without learning).
Calibrations and plots of these economies are available upon request.
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Figure 4.8: Wealth Share, Quadratic Variation of Portfolio,
Correlations and Standard Deviations with Heterogeneous
Preferences. The Figure in the top left corner shows total wealth
of the most risk averse investor to total wealth. The ﬁgure in the top
right corner shows the quadratic variation of equity of the most risk
averse investor. The bottom left corner shows the correlation between
stock one and stock two. The bottom right corner shows the standard
deviation of the market portfolio. Risk aversion coeﬃcients, γ, are: 3
- Log. Investors time preference, ρ, is set at 0.1. Habit persistence, λ,
is set at 0.1. The weight on investors is 0.5. Dividend speciﬁcations
are as in Figure 4.2. The horizon of the economy, T , is set at 50 years.
Consumption share is consumption of investor 1, Equation (C.2).
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Figure 4.9: Wealth Share, Quadratic Variation of
Portfolio, Correlations and Standard Deviations with
[Chan & Kogan 2002] Preferences. The Figure in the top
left corner shows the fraction of the total wealth of the most risk averse
investor in the market portfolio. The ﬁgure in the top right corner
shows the quadratic variation of equity of the most risk averse investor.
The bottom left corner shows the correlation between stock one and
stock two. The bottom right corner shows the standard deviation of the
market portfolio. Risk aversion coeﬃcients, γ, are: 3 - Log. Investors
time preference, ρ, is set at 0.1. Habit persistence, λ, is set at 0.1. The
weight on investors is 0.5. Dividend speciﬁcations are as in Figure 4.2.
The horizon of the economy, T , is set at 50 years. Consumption share
is consumption of investor 1, Equation C.2, while habit level is deﬁned
in Equation 4.13.
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We also considered economies with up to one hundred investors with heteroge-
neous risk aversion. We found that the shape and level of the correlation function
depends largely on the diﬀerence in risk aversion between two consecutive investors.
With Normally distributed risk aversion and with uniformly distributed risk aversion
the correlation function decreases in aggregate consumption except for very low re-
alizations. Overall, two heterogeneous investors capture the impact of heterogeneity
in risk aversion on correlations well, although the distribution of investors may be
important for correlations.
4.4 Calibration
This section extends the model to ten stocks indexes to address empirically
three questions: Can our model match the average level of correlations? And, more
importantly,16 can our model match the change in correlations as well as the change
in other equilibrium quantities over the business cycle?
We gather monthly dividends, stock market returns, repurchases and market
capitalization from CRSP, for the sample period, 1951 to 2005. From the monthly
data, we aggregate dividends to yearly data. The data is grouped into 10 industries
using Kenneth French's industry classiﬁcation. We then split the sample into periods
of boom and recession using the NBER business cycle indicator. The summary
statistics for dividends with and without repurchases as well as stock market returns
can be found in Table 4.1 while correlations statistics are in Table 4.2.
Next, the dividend processes in our model are calibrated to the data using the
average growth and the average variance. Since our theoretical model assumes that
the dividend volatility and dividend correlation are constants, we do not make a
separate calibration for the booms and recessions. Furthermore, prior research [see
[Ribeiro & Veronesi 2002]] has shown that correlations of the fundamentals are more
stable than the correlations of returns over the business cycle. However, note that
the volatility of dividends is increasing slightly in recessions and this clearly works
against our calibrated models. For a second calibration we employ an another large
and smooth claim, which helps to replicate the time-series properties of aggregate
consumption.
In the data we calculate the probability of being in recession by taking the
average of the BCI. We then simulate the distribution of ω and ﬁnd the ω that
corresponds to the probability of being in a recession.
Table 4.3 reports moments from the data and from two calibrations. The ﬁrst
calibration is a 20 − log economy in which aggregate consumption equals the div-
16[Dumas et al. 2003] study correlations in an international context and using a
representative agent framework, ﬁnd that the level of correlations can be matched,
and so there is no excess correlation puzzle. However, they do not address the
time-variation in correlations.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics  Dividends & Returns. The
table summarizes descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation
(STD)) of industry dividends, industry dividends & repurchases, indus-
try returns (booms and recessions), and the market portfolio (Market)
using Kenneth French's industry classiﬁcation. Booms and recessions
are identiﬁed using the NBER business cycle indicator. Industries are
Consumer NonDurables (NoDur), Consumer Durables (Durbl), Manu-
facturing (Manuf), Energy (Enrgy), Business Equipment (HiTec), Tele-
phone and Television Transmission (Telcm), Shops, Health (Hlth), Util-
ities (Utils), and Other. The sample consists of all ﬁrms appearing
jointly in Compustat and CRSP, for the sample period 1950 to 2007.
Returns are annualized from monthly observations.
 Dividends (inflation and population growth adjusted) 
 NoDur Durbl Manuf Enrgy HiTec Telcm Shops Hlth Utils Other Market 
Mean 0.03374 0.00119 0.01438 0.03322 0.05172 0.04484 0.02661 0.06957 0.02365 0.06821 0.03992 
STD 0.10380 0.17692 0.08184 0.07842 0.20302 0.09152 0.07070 0.05584 0.05022 0.08145 0.05507 
            
 Dividends & Repurchases (inflation and population growth adjusted) 
 NoDur Durbl Manuf Enrgy HiTec Telcm Shops Hlth Utils Other Market 
Mean 0.04920 0.01950 0.03491 0.05487 0.11195 0.05227 0.06098 0.08514 0.02886 0.08625 0.05437 
STD 0.17797 0.22857 0.15574 0.15930 0.26700 0.18397 0.20313 0.16393 0.09411 0.15619 0.09369 
            
 Returns (inflation adjusted) - Full sample 
 NoDur Durbl Manuf Enrgy HiTec Telcm Shops Hlth Utils Other Market 
Mean 0.09036 0.09773 0.08635 0.10709 0.10254 0.07758 0.08910 0.10658 0.07529 0.09073 0.08640 
STD 0.14375 0.18406 0.16346 0.17519 0.21902 0.15598 0.17177 0.17415 0.13224 0.16298 0.14546 
            
 Returns (inflation adjusted) - Boom 
 NoDur Durbl Manuf Enrgy HiTec Telcm Shops Hlth Utils Other Market 
Mean 0.09105 0.12148 0.10354 0.12954 0.11771 0.08691 0.09236 0.11129 0.07741 0.11224 0.10078 
STD 0.13432 0.17395 0.15258 0.16364 0.20774 0.15409 0.15730 0.16498 0.12338 0.14971 0.13396 
            
 Returns (inflation adjusted) - Recession 
 NoDur Durbl Manuf Enrgy HiTec Telcm Shops Hlth Utils Other Market 
Mean 0.08634 -0.03989 -0.01326 -0.02301 0.01466 0.02354 0.07021 0.07933 0.06299 -0.03389 0.00309 
STD 0.19023 0.23130 0.21467 0.22846 0.27528 0.16643 0.23996 0.22072 0.17571 0.22258 0.19867 
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics  Dividend & Repurchase Cor-
relations. The table summarizes pair-wise correlations of industry
portfolio dividends and of industry portfolio dividends & repurchases
using Kenneth French's industry classiﬁcation. Industries are Con-
sumer NonDurables (NoDur), Consumer Durables (Durbl), Manufac-
turing (Manuf), Energy (Enrgy), Business Equipment (HiTec), Tele-
phone and Television Transmission (Telcm), Shops, Health (Hlth), Util-
ities (Utils), and Other. The sample consists of all ﬁrms appearing
jointly in Compustat and CRSP, for the sample period 1950 to 2007.
 Dividend Correlations 
 NoDur Durbl Manuf Enrgy HiTec Telcm Shops Hlth Utils Other 
NoDur 1.00000          
Durbl 0.18342 1.00000         
Manuf 0.06677 0.43621 1.00000        
Enrgy 0.03797 0.21397 0.38493 1.00000       
HiTec 0.03439 0.16496 0.00611 0.09691 1.00000      
Telcm 0.23522 0.14905 0.30288 0.17856 -0.10590 1.00000     
Shops 0.02765 0.42752 0.42482 0.43905 0.03053 0.30916 1.00000    
Hlth 0.04576 0.22559 0.05440 0.28761 0.10486 -0.14368 0.32285 1.00000   
Utils 0.16513 0.26534 0.25284 0.18794 0.10587 0.36858 0.41965 0.02327 1.00000  
Other 0.21226 0.34789 0.36654 0.37266 0.14497 0.19315 0.42656 0.04092 0.08717 1.00000 
Average 0.19827          
           
 Dividend & Repurchase Correlations 
 NoDur Durbl Manuf Enrgy HiTec Telcm Shops Hlth Utils Other 
NoDur 1.00000          
Durbl 0.43813 1.00000         
Manuf 0.32118 0.41952 1.00000        
Enrgy 0.24487 0.36414 0.40745 1.00000       
HiTec 0.02949 0.19177 0.47249 0.19020 1.00000      
Telcm -0.10497 0.20925 0.07696 0.20349 0.03350 1.00000     
Shops 0.25547 0.27865 0.38651 -0.01269 0.18353 0.07082 1.00000    
Hlth 0.16818 0.08646 0.06828 -0.12243 -0.26574 -0.04993 0.16271 1.00000   
Utils 0.13811 0.11247 0.04789 -0.12235 0.10224 0.28798 0.10467 -0.04603 1.00000  
Other 0.28184 0.34657 0.38163 0.30779 0.32310 0.19839 0.36734 0.04747 0.29393 1.00000 
Average 0.17512          
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idends and repurchases from the 10 industries. The second calibration is 30 − log
economy in which aggregate consumption equals the dividends and repurchases from
the 10 industries plus another large and smooth claim. The table also reports the
parameters used to calibrate the economy.
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics  Calibrations. The table sum-
marizes stock market moments (Mean, Boom, Recession) and corre-
sponding moments from two calibrations as well as model parameters
employed in the calibrations. In the model with risk aversion coeﬃcients
20 - Log industry dividends represent aggregate dividends while in the
model with risk aversion coeﬃcients 30 - Log an unpriced industry is
introduced such that aggregate consumption in the model matches the
data.
        
  Data Model - 20-Log Model - 30-Log 
Excess Return Market 6.3 % 5.0 % 5.1 % 
Stdev Market 15.0 % 20.5 % 17.9 % 
Risk-free Rate 0.9 % 1.6 % 1.3 % 
Average Correlation 0.63 0.66 0.60 
Average Stdev 17.0 % 24.2 % 22.4 % 
Correlation - Recession 0.72 0.77 0.71 
Stdev Market - Recession 19.7 % 27.0 % 22.7 % 
Risk Aversion - High - 20 30 
Risk Aversion - Low - 1 1 
Utility Weight on Most Risk Averse - 0.75 0.99982 
Time Discount Factor - 0.01 0.01 
Delta - 0.11 0.1 
    
 
Two insights emerge from Table 4.3: First, both models match the mean correla-
tion from the data and the correlation in the recession fairly well. Second, the models
also match the other moments. Because the second calibration matches moments of
aggregate consumption the model requires a higher risk aversion for the ﬁrst agent
to match moments. Overall, our match is comparable to [Chan & Kogan 2002]
To see the impact of the business cycle on model correlations and other quanti-
ties, Figures 4.10-4.10 show the distribution of ω, expected market return, average
correlations and market standard deviation as a function of ω. The results make
clear that our model explains correlations the other matched quantities over the
business cycle.
The most important implication from Figures 4.10-4.10 is that neither correla-
tions nor other equilibrium quantities are expected to fall in recessions because these
90 Chapter 4. Correlations
Figure 4.10: Calibration I. The Figure shows ω, stock market ex-
pected returns, correlations and standard deviations. Risk aversion co-
eﬃcients, γ, are: 20 - Log. All other parameters are as in Table 4.3.
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Figure 4.11: Calibration II. The Figure shows ω, stock market ex-
pected returns, correlations and standard deviations. Risk aversion co-
eﬃcients, γ, are: 30 - Log. All other parameters are as in Table 4.3.
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states have zero measure.
4.5 Conclusions
We study equity return correlations in multi-stock economies with heterogeneous
agents. We identify two endogenous eﬀects on correlations: First, correlations are
increasing in risk aversion. Second, heterogeneity in risk aversion produces excess
correlation via increased variability in the state price density.
Calibrations of the model match average industry correlations and changes of
average industry correlations from business cycles peaks to troughs. To further
support our point that heterogeneity in risk aversion is a major driver of correla-
tions, standard deviations, returns and quadratic variations of portfolios we examine
changes in industry stock market correlations, returns, and standard deviations and
in quadratic variations of industry turnover and ﬁnd positive relations. We also
conduct a principle component analysis and ﬁnd evidence that supports our model.
Appendix A
Asset Prices and Real
Exchange Rates with Deep
Habits
A.1 Derivation of Equilibrium
In this section I derive equilibrium by using standard Martingale methods (see
[Cox & Huang 1989], [Karatzas et al. 1990]). The ﬁrst order conditions for the max-
imization problem are given by
∂u (CH(t), CF (t), XH(t), XF (t), t)
∂CH
= yξ(t) (A.1)
∂u (CH(t), CF (t), XH(t), XF (t), t)
∂CF
= ye(t)ξ(t). (A.2)
In the following it will be convenient to deﬁne the quantities
Qi(t) = Ci(t)si(t)
sβ(t) =
QH(t)
β
QH(t)β +QF (t)β
To calculate the real exchange rate and the state price density we need the partial
derivatives
∂Z
∂QH
= ZsβQ
−1
H (A.3)
∂Z
∂QF
= Z (1− sβ)Q−1F (A.4)
∂2Z
∂Q2H
= − (1− β)Zsβ (1− sβ)Q−2H (A.5)
∂2Z
∂Q2F
= − (1− β)Zsβ (1− sβ)Q−2F (A.6)
∂2Z
∂QF ∂QH
= (1− β)Zsβ (1− sβ)Q−1H Q−1F . (A.7)
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Using the partial derivatives we get that the equilibrium state price density, ξ, and
the real exchange rate e are given by
ξ(t) =
1
y
e−ρtZ(t)1−β−γQβ−1H (A.8)
e(t) =
(
QH
QF
)1−β
. (A.9)
To derive the risk-free rate, the market price of risk and the real exchange rate
dynamics we need the processes for Qi and Z. By Ito's lemma we have that
dQi(t) = Qi(t)
(
µQi(t)dt+ σQi(t)
>dB(t)
)
(A.10)
where
µQi(t) = µCi(t) + φi
(
si
si(t)
− 1
)
+ λi (si(t))σ
>
CiσCi (A.11)
σQi(t) = (1 + λi (si(t)))σCi . (A.12)
Applying Ito's lemma to Z we get
dZ(t) = Z(t)
(
µz(t)dt+ σZ(t)
>dB(t)
)
(A.13)
where
µz(t) = sβ(t)µQi(t) + (1− sβ(t))µQi(t)
−1
2
sβ(t) (1− sβ(t)) (1− β) (A.14)(
σQH (t)
>σQH (t) + σQF (t)
>σQF (t)− 2σQH (t)>σQF (t)
)
(A.15)
and
σZ(t) = sβ(t)σQH (t) + (1− sβ(t))σQF (t). (A.16)
We have that
d
(
Z(t)1−β−γ
)
= Z(t)1−β−γ
 ( (1− β − γ)µZ(t)+1
2
(β + γ) (β + γ − 1)σZ(t)>σZ(t)
)
dt
+ (1− β − γ)σZ(t)>dB(t)

(A.17)
and
d
(
QH(t)
β−1
)
= QH(t)
β−1
 ( (β − 1)µQH (t)+1
2
(β − 1) (β − 2)σQH (t)>σQH (t)
)
dt
+ (β − 1)σQH (t)>dB(t)
 .
(A.18)
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Applying Ito's lemma to 1
y
e−ρtZ(t)1−β−γQβ−1H we get:
d
(
1
y
e−ρtZ(t)1−β−γQβ−1H
)
1
y
e−ρtZ(t)1−β−γQβ−1H
=

−

ρ+ (γ + β − 1)µZ(t)
+ (1− β)µQH (t)
− 1
2
(β + γ) (γ + β − 1)σZ(t)>σZ(t)
− 1
2
(β − 1) (β − 2)σQH (t)>σQH (t)
+ (γ + β − 1) (β − 1)σZ(t)>σQH (t)
 dt
− ((γ + β − 1)σZ(t) + (1− β)σQH (t))> dB(t)
 .
(A.19)
Comparing with the process for ξ we see that
rH(t) = ρ+ (γ + β − 1)µZ(t) + (1− β)µQH (t)
−1
2
(β + γ) (γ + β − 1)σZ(t)>σZ(t)
−1
2
(β − 1) (β − 2)σQH (t)>σQH (t)
+ (γ + β − 1) (β − 1)σZ(t)>σQH (t) (A.20)
and
θ(t) = (γ + β − 1)σZ(t) + (1− β)σQH (t). (A.21)
The dynamics of the real exchange rate is given by
de(t) = d
((
QH
QF
)1−β)
= e(t)
(
µe(t)dt+ σe(t)
>dB(t)
)
(A.22)
where
µe(t) = (1− β)
(
µQH (t)− µQF (t) + σQF (t)> (σQF (t)− σQH (t))
)
+
1
2
β (β − 1) (σQH (t)− σQF (t))T (σQH (t)− σQF (t)) (A.23)
and
σe(t) = (1− β) (σQH (t)− σQF (t)) (A.24)
To derive the stock price diﬀusion matrix note that we have
ξ(t)SH(t) = Et
[∫ T
t
ξ(s)CH(s)ds
]
(A.25)
ξ(t)SF (t) = Et
[∫ T
t
ξ(s)e(s)CF (s)ds
]
. (A.26)
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By applying Ito's lemma to the left hand side and Clark-Ocone's Theorem to the
right hand side, and then matching the diﬀusion terms we get
σH(t) = θ(t) +
Et
[∫ T
t
ξ(s)CH(s) (Dt ln ξ(s) +Dt lnCH(s)) ds
]
Et
[∫ T
t
ξ(s)CH(s)ds
] (A.27)
σF (t) = θ(t) +
Et
[∫ T
t
ξ(s)e(s)CF (s) (Dt ln ξ(s) +Dt ln e(s)) ds
]
Et
[∫ T
t
ξ(s)CF (s)ds
]
+
Et
[∫ T
t
ξ(s)e(s)CF (s)DtF (s)ds
]
Et
[∫ T
t
ξ(s)CF (s)ds
]
(A.29)
A.2 Derivation of Equilibrium - Heterogeneous
Agent Economy
In this section I derive the equilibrium for the model with heterogeneous preferences.
I use the martingale method (see [Cox & Huang 1989], [Karatzas et al. 1990]). From
the solution to central planner problem we have that the marginal utility of the
representative agent is proportional to the home agent's marginal utility evaluated
at his optimal consumption, i.e.,
∇u(CH(t), CF (t), XH(t), XH(t)) = a∇uH(CHH (t), CHF (t), XHH (t), XHF (t)). (A.30)
As a consequence we can use the marginal utility of the home agent as the pricing
kernel. Deﬁne the following quantity
sλβ(t) =
λ1−βH Q
H
H(t)
β
λ1−βH Q
H
H(t)
β + (1− λH)1−β QHF (t)β
. (A.31)
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The following partial derivatives will be useful
∂ZH
∂QHH
= ZHs
λ
β
(
QHH
)−1
(A.32)
∂ZH
∂QHF
= ZH
(
1− sλβ
)(
QHF
)−1
(A.33)
∂2ZH
∂ (QHH)
2 = −ZH (1− β) sλβ
(
1− sλβ
)(
QHH
)−2
(A.34)
∂2ZH
∂ (QHF )
2 = −ZH (1− β) sλβ
(
1− sλβ
)(
QHF
)−2
(A.35)
∂2ZH
∂QHH∂Q
H
F
= ZH (1− β) sλβ
(
1− sλβ
)(
QHH
)−1 (
QHF
)−1
. (A.36)
By Ito's lemma we have the following
dQHH(t) = Q
H
H(t)
(
µQH
H
(t)dt+ σQH
H
(t)>dB(t)
)
(A.37)
dQHF (t) = Q
H
F (t)
(
µQH
F
(t)dt+ σQH
F
(t)>dB(t)
)
(A.38)
where
QHH(t)µQH
H
(t) =
∂gHH
∂QH
QH(t)µQH (t) +
∂gHH
∂QF
QF (t)µQF (t) (A.39)
+
1
2
∂2gHH
∂ (QH)
2QH(t)
2σQH (t)
>σQH (t)
+
1
2
∂2gHH
∂ (QF )
2QF (t)
2σQF (t)
>σQF (t)
+
∂2gHH
∂QH∂QF
QH(t)QF (t)σQH (t)
>σQF (t)
QHF (t)µQH
F
(t) =
∂gHF
∂QH
QH(t)µQH (t) +
∂gHF
∂QF
QF (t)µQF (t) (A.40)
+
1
2
∂2gHF
∂ (QH)
2QH(t)
2σQH (t)
>σQH (t)
+
1
2
∂2gHF
∂ (QF )
2QF (t)
2σQF (t)
>σQF (t)
+
∂2gHF
∂QH∂QF
QH(t)QF (t)σQH (t)
>σQF (t)
and
QHH(t)σQH
H
(t) =
∂gHH
∂QH
QH(t)σQH (t) +
∂gHH
∂QF
QF (t)σQF (t) (A.41)
QHF (t)σQH
F
(t) =
∂gHF
∂QH
QH(t)σQH (t) +
∂gHF
∂QF
QF (t)σQF (t). (A.42)
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Moreover, ZH follows
dZH(t) = ZH(t)
(
µZH (t)dt+ σZH (t)
>dB(t)
)
(A.43)
where
µZH (t) = s
λ
β(t)µQH
H
(t) +
(
1− sλβ(t)
)
µQH
F
(t) (A.44)
−1
2
(1− β) sλβ(t)
(
1− sλβ(t)
)
σQH
H
(t)>σQH
H
(t)
−1
2
(1− β) sλβ(t)
(
1− sλβ(t)
)
σQH
F
(t)>σQH
F
(t)
+ (1− β) sλβ(t)
(
1− sλβ(t)
)
σQH
H
(t)>σQH
F
(t)
and
σZH (t) = s
λ
β(t)σQH
H
(t) +
(
1− sλβ(t)
)
σQH
F
(t). (A.45)
Using the partial derivatives we have that
ξ(t) =
1
y
e−ρtZH(t)
1−β−γQHH(t)
β−1. (A.46)
By Ito's lemma we have
d
(
1
y
e−ρtZH(t)1−β−γQHH(t)
β−1
)
1
y
e−ρtZH(t)1−β−γQHH(t)β−1
=

−

ρ+ (1− β − γ)µZH (t)
+(1− β)µQH
H
(t)
− 1
2
(β + γ) (β + γ − 1)
σZH (t)
>σZH (t)
− 1
2
(β − 1) (β − 2)
σQH
H
(t)>σQH
H
(t)
+ (β + γ − 1) (β − 1)
σZH (t)
>
σQH
H
(t)

dt
−
(
(β + γ − 1)σZH (t)
+(1− β)σQH
H
(t)
)>
dB(t)

.
(A.47)
Comparing with the process for ξ we have the following
rH(t) = ρ+ (1− β − γ)µZH (t) + (1− β)µQH
H
(t) (A.48)
−1
2
(β + γ) (β + γ − 1)σZH (t)>σZH (t)
−1
2
(β − 1) (β − 2)σQH
H
(t)>σQH
H
(t)
+ (β + γ − 1) (β − 1)σZH (t)>σQH
H
(t)
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and
θH(t) = (β + γ − 1)σZH (t) + (1− β)σQH
H
(t). (A.49)
In equilibrium the relative price of the foreign good in terms of the home good is
given by equation (2.68). By Ito's lemma we have
dPF (t)
PF (t)
= µPF (t)dt+ σPF (t)
>dB(t) (A.50)
where
µPF (t) = (1− β)
(
µQH
H
(t)− µQH
F
(t) + σQH
F
(t)>
(
σQH
F
(t)− σQH
H
(t)
))
(A.51)
+
1
2
β (1− β)
(
σQH
H
(t)− σQH
F
(t)
)> (
σQH
H
(t)− σQH
F
(t)
)
and
σPF (t) = (1− β)
(
σQH
H
(t)− σQH
F
(t)
)
. (A.52)
The price index in the home and the foreign country is given by (2.70) and (2.71)
respectively. Applying Ito's lemma yields
dPH(t)
PH(t)
= µPH (t)dt+ σPH (t)
>dB(t) (A.53)
dPF (t)
PF (t)
= µPF (t)dt+ σPF (t)
>dB(t) (A.54)
where
µPH (t) = (1− λH)
(
PF (t)
PH(t)
)
µPF (t) (A.55)
+
1
2
(1− β) (1− λH)
(
PF (t)
PH(t)
)((
PF (t)
PH(t)
)
(1− λH)− 1
)
σPF (t)
>σPF (t)
µPF (t) = (1− λF )
(
PF (t)
PF (t)
)
µPF (t) (A.56)
+
1
2
(1− β) (1− λF )
(
PF (t)
PF (t)
)((
PF (t)
PF (t)
)
(1− λF )− 1
)
σPF (t)
>
σPF (t)
and
σPH (t) = (1− λH)
(
PF (t)
PH(t)
)
σPF (t) (A.57)
σPF (t) = (1− λH)
(
PF (t)
PF (t)
)
σPF (t). (A.58)
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The real exchange rate is given by the ratio of the foreign price index to the home
price index. By Ito's lemma we have
de(t) = e(t)
(
µe(t)dt+ σe(t)
>dW (t)
)
(A.59)
where
µe(t) = µPF (t)− µPH (t)− σPH (t)>σe(t) (A.60)
σe(t) = σPF (t)− σPH (t). (A.61)
The stock price diﬀusion coeﬃcients can be derived as for the case with a repre-
sentative agent with appropriate change of the Malliavin derivatives. The optimal
portfolios are found by the approach of [Cox & Huang 1989], where the Malliavin
derivatives are in Appendix A.3.
A.3 Derivation of the Malliavin Derivatives
In this section I derive the Malliavin derivatives. The ﬁrst section considers the
Malliavin derivatives in the homogeneous agent economy. The second section only
deals with the Malliavin derivatives that are special for the heterogeneous agent
economy.
A.3.1 Malliavin Derivatives - Homogeneous Agent Econ-
omy
In this section I derive the expressions for the Malliavin derivatives used in the
equilibrium expression for the diﬀusion coeﬃcients. The Malliavin derivatives of
interest are DtµCi(u), DtCi(u), Dtsi(u), DtQi(u), DtZ(u), Dtξ(u) and Dte(u) for
u ≥ t and i ∈ {H,F}. Note that each Malliavin derivative is a vector, where
each element refers to the Malliavin derivative with respect to the ﬁrst and second
Brownian motion. The Malliavin derivative of the expected consumption growth,
µCi(t), is given by
DtµCi(t) = Dt
(
e−αiuµCi(0) + αiµCi
∫ u
0
eαi(s−u)ds+
∫ u
0
eαi(s−u)ν>i dB(s)
)
=
∫ u
t
Dte
αi(s−u)ν>i dB(s)
= eαi(t−u)ν>i . (A.62)
The Malliavin derivative of the consumption processes are given by
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DtCi(u) = Ci(u)Dt
(∫ u
0
(
µCi(s)−
1
2
σ>ciσci
)
ds+ σ>ciB(u)
)
= Ci(u)
(∫ u
t
DtµCi(s)ds+ σ
>
ci
)
= Ci(u)
(∫ u
t
eαi(t−s)ν>i ds+ σ
>
ci
)
= Ci(u)
(
ν>i
(
1− eαi(t−u)
αi
)
+ σ>ci
)
(A.63)
To compute the Malliavin derivatives of the surplus consumption ratios, ﬁrst note
that the surplus consumption ratios follows
dsi(t) = φi (si − si(t)) dt+ si(t)λ (si(t))σ>cidB(t) (A.64)
where si(0) = si with si ∈ (0, 1]. The ﬁrst variation process of the surplus consump-
tion ratios are given by
Yi(t) = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
(
φi +
1
2
σ>Yi(u)σYi(u)
)
du+
∫ t
0
σ>Yi(u)dB(u)
)
(A.65)
where
σYi(t) =
λ (si(t)) (1− 2λ (si(t)))
2(1− si(t)) σci . (A.66)
Using the relation between the ﬁrst variation process and the Malliavin derivatives
we get (see appendix A.4)
Dtsi(u) = si(t)λ (si(t))σciYi(u)Yi(t)
−1. (A.67)
Next I derive the Malliavin derivatives of Qi
DtQi(u) = Dt (Ci(u)si(u))
= Ci(u)Dtsi(u) + si(u)DtCi(u)
= Qi(u)
(
ν>i
(
1− eαi(t−u)
αi
)
+ σ>ci
)
+Ci(u)si(t)λ (si(t))σciYi(u)Yi(t)
−1. (A.68)
The Malliavin derivative of Z follows from the chain-rule
DtZ(u) =
∂Z(u)
∂Qi
DtQi(u)
= Z(u)sβ(u)Q
−1
H (u)DtQi(u). (A.69)
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The Malliavin derivative of the state price density is
Dtξ(u) = Dt
(
1
y
e−ρuZ(u)1−β−γQβ−1H (u)
)
=
1
y
e−ρtZ(u)1−β−γDtQH(u)
β−1
+
1
y
e−ρt
(
DtZ(u)
1−β−γ
)
QH(u)
β−1
= ξ(u) ((1− β − γ)Dt lnZ(u) + (β − 1)Dt lnQH(u)) (A.70)
where
Dt lnZ(u) =
DtZ(u)
Z(u)
(A.71)
Dt lnQH(u) =
DtQH(u)
QH(u)
. (A.72)
Finally, we have that the Malliavin derivative of e(u) is
Dte(u) = Dt
(
QH(u)
QF (u)
)1−β
= (1− β)
(
QH(u)
QF (u)
)−β (
DtQH(u)
QF (u)
− QH(u)DtQF (u)
QF (u)2
)
= e(u) (1− β) (Dt lnQH(u)−Dt lnQF (u)) . (A.73)
A.3.2 Malliavin Derivatives - Heterogeneous Agent
Economy
In this section I derive the Malliavin derivatives in the heterogeneous agent econ-
omy. The Malliavin derivatives of interest are DtQ
i
j(u), DtX
i
j(u) and DtC
i
j(u) for
i, j = H,F . The remaining Malliavin derivatives can be found by substituting the
corresponding values from the heterogeneous agent economy into the formulas for
the homogeneous agent economy. The Malliavin derivative of Qij(u) for t < u is
DtQ
i
j(u) = Dtg
i
j (QH(u), QF (u))
=
∂gij (QH(u), QF (u))
∂QH
DtQH(u)
+
∂gij (QH(u), QF (u))
∂QF
DtQF (u). (A.74)
To calculate the Malliavin derivative of Xij(u), note that
Xij(u) = ωiXj(u)
= ωiCj(u) (1− sj(u)) . (A.75)
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Using the expression in (A.75)
DtX
i
j(u) = Dt (ωiCj(u) (1− sj(u)))
= ωiDt (Cj(u) (1− sj(u)))
= ωi (DtCj(u)− sj(u)DtCj(u)− Cj(u)Dtsj(u)) . (A.76)
Finally, the Malliavin derivative of Cij(u) is
DtC
i
j(u) = Dt
(
Qij(u) +X
i
j(u)
)
= DtQ
i
j(u) +DtX
i
j(u). (A.77)
A.4 The ﬁrst variation process and Malliavin
derivatives
In this section I will brieﬂy discuss Malliavin calculus and the ﬁrst variation process.
Let Xx(t) be an Ito process given by
dXx(t) = µ(Xx(t))dt+ σ(Xx(t))>dB(t) (A.78)
Xx(0) = x (A.79)
where it is assumed that µ and σ are C1 and satisfy standard condition such that
there exists a unique strong solution to the SDE. Deﬁne the ﬁrst variation process,
Y (t) = ∂
∂x
Xx(t), as follows
dY (t) = µ
′
(Xx(t))Y (t)dt+ σ
′
(Xx(t))>Y (t)dB(t) (A.80)
i.e.
Y (t) = exp
( ∫ t
0
(
µ
′
(Xx(u))− 1
2
σ
′
(Xx(u))>σ
′
(Xx(u))
)
du
+
∫ t
0
σ
′
(Xx(u))>dB(u)
)
. (A.81)
Now consider the Malliavin derivative of Xx(t)
Z(t) := DsX
x(t) =
∫ t
s
µ
′
(Xx(u))DsX
x(u)du+
∫ t
s
σ
′
(Xx(u))>DsX
x(u)dB(u).
(A.82)
It then follows that
dZ(t) = µ
′
(Xx(t))Z(t)dt+ σ
′
(Xx(t))>Z(t)dB(t) (A.83)
Z(s) = σ(Xx(t))
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with the following solution
Z(t) = σ(Xx(s)) exp
( ∫ t
0
(
µ
′
(Xx(u))− 1
2
σ
′
(Xx(u))>σ
′
(Xx(u))
)
du
+
∫ t
0
σ
′
(Xx(u))>dB(u).
)
(A.84)
Comparing with Y (t) we see that
DsX(t) = σ(X
x(s))Y (t)Y (s)−1 (A.85)
for t ≥ s.
A.5 Computational Procedure
In this section I describe the numerical procedure to solve for the equilibrium quan-
tities. The model is solved using Monte-Carlo (MC) simulations. The state variables
are simulated forward using an Euler scheme with 20000 sample paths and 10000
time steps. I use antithetic sampling to reduce the variance. For each time step
I calculate the optimal allocation of the habit adjusted consumption between the
two agents by solving the system of ﬁrst order condition from the central planner
problem
f(QHH , Q
H
F , Q
F
H , Q
F
F ;QH , QF ) = 0 (A.86)
where
f(QHH , Q
H
F , Q
F
H , Q
F
F ;QH , QF ) =

a ∂uH
∂QH
H
− y1
a ∂uH
∂QF
H
− y2
(1− a) ∂uH
∂QH
F
− y1
(1− a) ∂uH
∂QF
F
− y2
QHH +Q
F
H −QH
QHF +Q
F
F −QF

(A.87)
where y1 and y2 are the Lagrange multipliers. The system is solved by Newton's
method. I iterate until
∥∥f(QHH , QHF , QFH , QFF ;QH , QF )∥∥ < 10−7. The derivatives of
the optimal allocations Qij for i, j = H,F are calculated using ﬁnite diﬀerences. The
time integrals are calculated by using the trapezoid rule with 10000 steps.
A.6 Change of Numeraire
In this section I discuss how changing the numeraire good impacts the equilibrium.
In the following I will work with the generic numerairs A and B. The numeraire
can be a single good or a basket of goods. The basket does not have to be a simple
linear combination of the goods, but can take more complicated forms.
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Proposition 25. The relation between the equilibrium Sharp Ratios under two dif-
ferent numeraires (A and B) is given by
θB(t) = θA(t)− σpA(t). (A.88)
Furthermore, the relation between the risk free rates is given by
rB(t) = rA(t)− µpA(t) + θTA(t)σpA(t). (A.89)
Stock price diﬀusion coeﬃcients under two numeraires relate via
σB(t) = σA(t)− σpA(t) (A.90)
where the subscript A (B) denotes the equilibrium quantities in the economy with A
(B) as numeraire.

Appendix B
Financial Market
Completeness in Multi-Good
Economies
B.1 Examples
In this appendix, we examine classes of utility functions that imply ﬁnancial market
incompleteness. For all examples that follow, we assume the parameters of the utility
functions to satisfy the standard restrictions.
B.1.1 Log Utility
This case is also discussed in [Cass & Pavlova 2004]. The utility function of the
representative agent takes the form of
u(c1, c2, ..., cn) =
n∑
i=1
ai log ci. (B.1)
The above utility function can, alternatively, be expressed as
u(c1, c2, ..., cn) = ϕ
(
n∏
i=1
caii
)
(B.2)
where ϕ(x) = log x. This implies that u ∈ U1IC and, thus, the ﬁnancial market is
incomplete.
B.1.2 Non-Separable Cobb-Douglas
For this case, the utility function is given by
u(c1, c2, ..., cn) = c
a1
1 c
a2
2 ...c
an
n . (B.3)
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Again, the above utility function can be expressed alternatively, as
u(c1, c2, ..., cn) = ϕ
(
n∏
i=1
caii
)
(B.4)
with ϕ(x) = x. Hence, the Cobb-Douglas utility function belongs to U1IC . Therefore,
the ﬁnancial market is again incomplete.
B.1.3 Generalized Non-Separable Cobb-Douglas
This utility function is given by
u(c1, c2, ..., cn) =
(ca11 c
a2
2 ...c
an
n )
1−ρ
1− ρ . (B.5)
Assume ϕ(x) = x
1−ρ
1−ρ from which we see that the generalized Cobb-Douglas will be
in U1IC and, thus, the ﬁnancial market is again incomplete.
B.1.4 Separation between Non-Traded and Traded
Goods as in [Serrat 2001]
[Serrat 2001] studies an economy with two countries. Each country has access to
two output processes where one good is traded while the second good is non-traded.
[Kollmann 2006], however, proves that the diﬀusion matrix in the [Serrat 2001] econ-
omy is non-invertible. We illustrate here that this result can be readily veriﬁed by
applying Proposition 13 (or Proposition 14). The utility function of the represen-
tative agent employed in [Serrat 2001] can be expressed as follows (with a slight
simpliﬁcation relative to the original utility function)
u(c1, c2, c3, cn) =
1
q
(cq1 + c
q
2)
(
acα3 + bδ
β
4
)
. (B.6)
This can also be expressed as follows
u(c1, c2, c3, cn) = ϕ ((c
q
1 + c
q
2) c
α
3 , (c
q
1 + c
q
2) c
α
4 ) (B.7)
with ϕ(x, y) = 1
q
(ax + by). This suggests that the utility function is in U2IC and,
thus, the ﬁnancial market is incomplete.
B.2 Malliavin Derivatives
In this appendix, we derive explicit expressions for the Malliavin derivatives in Sec-
tion 3.5. The Malliavin derivative of dividend process i = 1, ..., N is
Dtδi(s) = δi(s)λi. (B.8)
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The Malliavin derivative of the optimal consumption for agent j = 1, ..., J of good
i = 1, ..., N is
Dtc
j
i (s) =
N∑
k=1
(
∂cji (s)
∂δk
δk(s)λk
)
. (B.9)
Next, we calculate the Malliavin derivative of the state price density
Dtξ(s) = Dt
(
∂u (δ(s); a)
∂δ1
)
=
N∑
k=1
(
∂2u (δ(s); a)
∂δ1∂δk
δk(s)λk
)
. (B.10)
The Malliavin derivative of commodity price i = 1, ..., N is
DtPi(s) = Dt
(
∂u(δ(s);a)
∂δi
∂u(δ(s);a)
∂δ1
)
=
N∑
k=1
 ∂2u(δ(s);a)∂δi∂δk
∂u(δ(s);a)
∂δ1
−
∂u(δ(s);a)
∂δi
∂u(δ(s);a)
∂δ1
∂2u(δ(s);a)
∂δ1∂δk
∂u(δ(s);a)
∂δ1
 δk(s)λk
 . (B.11)
The Malliavin derivatives of the log consumption process, log state price density and
the log commodity prices are
Dt ln c
j
i (s) =
Dtc
j
i (s)
cji (s)
(B.12)
Dt ln ξ(s) =
Dtξ(s)
ξ(s)
(B.13)
Dt lnPi(s) =
DtPi(s)
Pi(s)
. (B.14)

Appendix C
Correlations
C.1 Propositions
The propositions for the economy in Section 4.2 are presented here. Before we state
the propositions, a brief summary of the optimization problem of the investors is
presented.
Investor j solves a static optimization problem (see [Cox & Huang 1989] and
[Karatzas et al. 1987])
Uj (C,X) s.t . E0
[∫ T
0
η(0, t)Cj(t)dt
]
≤ Yj (0) (C.1)
where Yj (0) is the wealth of investor j at t = 0, for j = 1, 2, and η denotes the
stochastic discount factor (state price density).
The constrained maximization can then be reformulated as an unconstrained op-
timization problem by employing a Lagrange multiplier, y. The ﬁrst order conditions
and market clearing lead to the following optimal consumption sharing rule(
C1(t)
X(t)
)
+
(
C1(t)
X(t)
) γ1
γ2
(
y1
y2
) 1
γ2
=
(
C(t)
X(t)
)
. (C.2)
Denote the solution of the above equation as
z1(t) = z1 (C1(t), X(t)) =
(
C1(t)
X(t)
)∗
(C.3)
parametrized with γ1, γ2, y1, and y2.
One can show (see [Cuoco & He 1994] and [Karatzas et al. 1990]) that the La-
grange multipliers in the sharing rule in Equation C.2 are equal to one over the
weight on investors in the utility of a representative investor. With two investors
this implies y1
y2
= 1−a
a
where a is the weight on investor 1. We employ this iden-
tity between Lagrange multipliers and weights on investors in our calibrations and
examples in order to set the wealth (Lagrange multiplier) of the investors at date
zero.
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For a few risk aversion combinations the sharing rule in Equation C.2 can be
solved for z1 in closed form, see Wang (1996). Alternatively, a numerical solution is
required. To compute equilibrium, we insert the (numerical) solution of the sharing
rule into the marginal utility of the reference investor, e.g. investor 1, and employ
the later to discount cash ﬂows.
Below superscripts denote derivatives of the utility function with respect to
one of its arguments. Using standard Martingale methods, it is easy to prove the
following propositions.
Proposition 1
When the economy is in equilibrium, the state price density, the risk-free rate,
and the Sharp Ratio, respectively, will be given by
η(0, t) = e−ρt
uC1 (C1(t), X(t))
uC1 (C1(0), X(0))
r(t) = ρ+ γ1µz1(t) + λw(t)−
1
2
γ1 (γ1 + 1)σz1(t)
>σz1(t)
θ(t) = γ1σz1(t) (C.4)
where
dz1(t) = z1(t)
(
µz1(t)dt+ σz1(t)
T dW (t)
)
(C.5)
with
µz1(t) =
zC1 (t)
z1(t)
µC(t) +
1
2
zCC1 (t)
z1(t)
C(t)2σC(t)
TσC(t) +
zX1 (t)
z1(t)
X(t)λω(t) (C.6)
and with
σz1(t) = z
C
1 (t)
(
C(t)
z1(t)
)
σC(t). (C.7)
Proposition 2
When the economy is in equilibrium, stock prices and the components of instan-
taneous stock price volatilities are given by
Si(t) =
1
η(0, t)
Et
[∫ T
t
η(0, s)δi(s)ds
]
σi(t) = θ(t) +
Et
[∫ T
t
Dt (η(0, s)δi(s)) ds
]
η(0, t)Si(t)
= θ(t) +
Et
[∫ T
t
(η(0, s)δi(s)h(t, s)) ds
]
η(0, t)Si(t)
+ σδi (C.8)
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where D denotes the Malliavin derivative1 and h is found at Appendix C.2.
Proposition 3
When the economy is in equilibrium, wealth allocations will be
Yj(t) =
1
η(0, t)
Et
[∫ T
t
η(0, s)Cj(s)ds
]
, (C.9)
portfolio policies are given by
pij(t) =
(
σ(t)>
)−1 [
θ(t)Yj(t) +
ψj(t)
η(0, t)
]
(C.10)
where
ψj(t) = Et
[∫ T
t
{η(0, s)Cj(s)h(t, s) + η(0, s)Hj(t, s)} ds
]
(C.11)
where H is found at Appendix C.2.
C.2 The Malliavin Derivatives
The Malliavin calculus is a generalization of the calculus of variations (see
[Nualart 1995b]). One useful result from Malliavin calculus concerns the Clark-
Ocone theorem (see [Detemple et al. 2003b], and the references therein), which al-
lows for the explicit identiﬁcation of the Ito integral in the martingale representation
theorem (see [Cox & Huang 1989]).
All the Malliavin derivatives used in the paper are standard. The Malliavin
derivatives are given by (for u > t with u, t ∈ [0, T ])
Dk,tδi(u) = δi(u)σδi,k (C.12)
or in vector notation
Dtδi(u) = δi(u)σδi (C.13)
and
DtX(u) = X(u)Dt logX(u)
= X(u)λ
∫ u
t
e−λ(t−v)Dtc(v)dv
= X(u)λ
∫ u
t
e−λ(t−v)sδ(v)
>σδ(v)dv (C.14)
1D denotes a vector operation, and Di denotes Malliavin derivatives with respect
to the i'th Brownian component.
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Dtη(0, u) = Dt
(
e−ρuz1 (C1(u), X(u))
−γ1 1
X(u)
)
= η(0, u)
[
−γ1
(
zC1
z1
N∑
i
δi(u)σδi
)]
−η(0, u)
[
λ
(
1 + γ1
zX1
z1
X(u)
)∫ u
t
e−λ(t−v)uδ(v)
>σδ(v)dv
]
= η(0, u)h(t, u) (C.15)
DtCj(u) =
∂Cj
∂C
N∑
i
δi(u)σδi +
∂Cj
∂X
X(u)λ
∫ u
t
e−λ(t−v)uδ(v)
>σδ(v)dv
= Hj(t, u) (C.16)
Dtsδi(u) = Dt
(
δi(u)
C(u)
)
=
Dtδi(u)
C(u)
− δi(u)DtC(u)
C(u)2
=
δi(u)
C(u)
σδi −
δi(u)C(u)σC(u)
C(u)2
=
δi(u)
C(u)
(σδi − σC(u))
= sδi(u)σsi(u) (C.17)
DtC(u) = Dt
N∑
i=1
δi(u)
=
N∑
i=1
Dtδi(u)
=
N∑
i=1
δi(u)σδi
= C(u)
N∑
i=1
sδi(u)σδi
= C(u)σC(u) (C.18)
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DtσC(u)
T = Dt
((
σTδ sδ(u)
)T)
= Dt
(
sδ(u)
Tσδ
)
= Dt
(
N∑
i=1
sδi(t)σ
T
δi
)
=
N∑
i=1
(Dtsδi(t))σ
T
δi
=
N∑
i=1
sδi(u)σsi(u)σ
T
δi (C.19)
Dt
(
C(u)σC(u)
T
)
= Dt
N∑
i=1
(
δi(u)σ
T
δi
)
=
N∑
i=1
(Dtδi(u))σ
T
δi
=
N∑
i=1
δi(u)σδiσ
T
δi
= C(u)
N∑
i=1
sδi(u)σδiσ
T
δi (C.20)
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DtHj(t, u)
T = Dt
(
∂Cj(u)
∂C
C(u)σC(u)
T
)
+Dt
(
∂Cj(u)
∂X
X(u)λ
∫ u
t
e−λ(t−v)σC(v)
T dv
)
=
(
∂2Cj(u)
∂C2
C(u)σC(u) +
∂2Cj(u)
∂C∂X
X(u)λ
∫ u
t
e−λ(t−v)σC(v)dv
)
C(s)σC(u)
T +
∂Cj(u)
∂C
C(u)
N∑
i=1
sδi(u)σδi(u)σ
T
δi
+
(
∂2Cj(u)
∂X∂C
C(u)σC(u)
)
X(u)λ
∫ u
t
e−λ(t−v)σC(v)
T dv
+
∂2Cj(u)
∂X2
X(u)2λ2
(∫ u
t
e−λ(t−v)σC(v)dv
)
(∫ u
t
e−λ(t−v)σC(v)
T dv
)
+
∂Cj(u)
∂X
X(u)λ2
(∫ u
t
e−λ(t−v)σC(v)dv
)
(∫ u
t
e−λ(t−v)σC(v)
T dv
)
+
∂Cj(u)
∂X
X(u)λ
∫ u
t
e−λ(t−v)
N∑
i=1
sδi(v)σsi(v)σ
T
δidv
= Gj(t, u). (C.21)
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Dth(t, u)
T = −γ1
(
Dt
(
zC1 (u)
z1(u)
)
C(u)σC(u)
T +
zC1 (u)
z1(u)
Dt
(
C(u)σC(u)
T
))
−λ
(
1 + γ1
zX1 (u)
z1(u)
X(u)
)∫ u
t
e−λ(t−v)DtσC(v)
T dv
−γ1λ
(
Dt
(
zX1 (u)
z1(u)
)
X(u) +
(
zX1 (u)
z1(u)
)
DtX(u)
)
∫ u
t
e−λ(t−v)σC(v)
T dv
= −γ1
(
zCC1 (u)C(u)σC(u)
z1(u)
)
C(u)σC(u)
T
−γ1λ
(
zCX1 (u)X(u)
∫ u
t
e−λ(t−v)σC(v)dv
z1(u)
)
C(u)σC(u)
T
+γ1
(
zC1 (u)
z1(u)2
)(
zC1 (u)C(u)σC(u)
)
C(u)σC(u)
T
+γ1λ
((
zX1 (u)
z1(u)2
)(
zC1 (u)X(u)
∫ u
t
e−λ(t−v)σC(v)dv
))
C(u)σC(u)
T − γ1 z
C
1 (u)
z1(u)
C(u)
N∑
i=1
sδi(u)σδiσ
T
δi
−λ
(
1 + γ1
zX1 (u)
z1(u)
X(u)
)∫ u
t
e−λ(t−v)
N∑
i=1
sδi(v)σsi(v)σ
T
δidv
−γ1λz
XC
1 (u)C(u)σC(u)
z1(u)
X(u)
∫ u
t
e−λ(t−v)σC(v)
T dv
−γ1λ2 z
XX
1 (u)
z1(u)
X(u)2
(∫ u
t
e−λ(t−v)σC(v)dv
)
(∫ u
t
e−λ(t−v)σC(v)
T dv
)
+γ1λ
(
zX1 (u)
z1(u)2
)(
zC1 (u)C(u)σC(u)
)
X(u)
∫ u
t
e−λ(t−v)σC(v)
T dv
+γ1λ
2
(
zX1 (u)
z1(u)2
)
zX1 (u)X(u)
2
(∫ u
t
e−λ(t−v)σC(v)dv
)
(∫ u
t
e−λ(t−v)σC(v)
T dv
)
−γ1λ2
(
zX1 (u)
z1(u)
)
X(u)
(∫ u
t
e−λ(t−v)σC(v)dv
)
(∫ u
t
e−λ(t−v)σC(v)
T dv
)
= g(t, u). (C.22)
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C.3 Quadratic Variation of Portfolio Policies
To calculate the diﬀusion coeﬃcient of pij(t) apply Ito's lemma on C.10. As we are
only interested in diﬀusion terms, that is σσ(t), σθ(t), σYj (t), σψj (t), and ση(t),
below we drop all drift terms.
The diﬀusion of the Sharpe ratio, σθ(t), is given by
σθ(t) = γ(t)σσC (t) + σC(t)σγ(t) (C.23)
where
dθ(t) = γ(t)dσC(t) + σC(t)dγ(t) + dγ(t)dσC(t). (C.24)
To obtain dσγ apply Ito's lemma on z1
d
(
∂z1(t)
∂C
)
=
∂2z1(t)
∂C2
C(t)
(
µC(t)dt+ σC(t)
T dW (t)
)
+
∂2z1(t)
∂C∂X
λω(t)X(t)dt+
∂3z1(t)
∂C3
C(t)2σC(t)
TσC(t)
=
(
∂2z1(t)
∂C2
C(t)µC(t) +
∂2z1(t)
∂C∂X
λω(t)X(t)
)
dt (C.25)
+
(
∂3z1(t)
∂C3
C(t)2σC(t)
TσC(t)
)
dt
+
∂2z1(t)
∂C2
C(t)σC(t)
T dW (t) (C.26)
we also have that
d
(
C(t)
z1(t)
)
=
(
C(t)
z1(t)
)(
µC(t)− µz1(t) + σz1(t)T (σz1(t)− σC(t))
)
dt
+
(
C(t)
z1(t)
)
(σz1(t)− σC(t))T dW (t) (C.27)
next we obtain
dσC(t) = d
(
σTδ sδ(t)
)
= σTδ dsδ(t)
= σTδ Isδ (t) (νs(t)dt+ σs(t)dW (t))
= µσC (t)dt+ σσC (t)dW (t) (C.28)
where
σσC (t) = σ
T
δ Isδ (t)σs(t) (C.29)
where
µσC (t) = σ
T
δ Isδ (t)νs(t) (C.30)
and where
dsδ(t) = Isδ (t) (νs(t)dt+ σs(t)dW (t)) (C.31)
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with
νs(t) =

µs1(t)− σs1(t)TσC(t)
.
.
µsN (t)− σsN (t)TσC(t)
 (C.32)
which is the compact form of Equations 4.7-4.8. Deﬁne an aggregate agent as
U(C,X) = a
z1−γ11
1− γ1 + (1− a)
z1−γ21
1− γ2 (C.33)
and to obtain dγC note that
γ(t) = γ1
∂z1(t)
∂C
(
C(t)
z1(t)
)
(C.34)
represents the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (induced by market clearing in
equilibrium) with dynamics
dγ(t) = [.] dt+ γ1
∂2z1(t)
∂C2
(
C(t)
z1(t)
)
C(t)σC(t)
T dW (t)
+γ1
∂z1(t)
∂C
(
1
z1(t)
)
C(t)σC(t)
T dW (t)− γ1
(
∂z1(t)
∂C
)2(
C(t)
z1(t)2
)
C(t)σC(t)
T dW (t)
= [.] dt+ γ1
(
∂2z1(t)
∂C2
(
C(t)
z1(t)
)
+
∂z1(t)
∂C
(
1
z1(t)
)
−
(
∂z1(t)
∂C
)2(
C(t)
z1(t)2
))
C(t)σC(t)
T dW (t)
= [.] dt+ σγ(t)
T dW (t). (C.35)
The stock price diﬀusion coeﬃcients, σσi(t), are derived below. First recall
Equation C.8 and denote
Qi1(t) = Et
[∫ T
t
η (0, s) δi(s)h(t, s)ds
]
(C.36)
which leads to
Qi1(t) = Et
[∫ T
0
η (0, s) δi(s)h(t, s)ds
]
−
∫ t
0
η (0, s) δi(s)h(t, s)ds
= QMi1 (t)−
∫ t
0
η (0, s) δi(s)h(t, s)ds (C.37)
where QMi1 stands for the martingale part of Qi1. By Clark-Ocone's theorem
dQMi1 (t) = σQi1(t)dW (t) (C.38)
120 Appendix C. Correlations
where
σQi1(t)
T = Et
[∫ T
0
Dt
(
η (0, s) δi(s)h(t, s)
T
)
ds
]
(C.39)
σQi1(t) is a N ×N matrix. Calculating the Malliavin derivative leads to
Dt
(
η (0, s) δi(s)h(t, s)
T
)
= δi(s)h(t, s)
TDtη (0, s) + η (0, s)h(t, s)
TDtδi(s) + η (0, s) δi(s)Dth(t, s)
T
= η (0, s) δi(s)h(t, s)h(t, s)
T + η (0, s) δi(s)σδih(t, s)
T + η (0, s) δi(s)g(t, s). (C.40)
Using the above expressions and the following relation
d (η (0, t)Si(t)) = η (0, t)Si(t) (σi(t)− θ(t))T dW (t) (C.41)
leads to
dσi(t) = [.] dt+ γ(t)dσC(t) + σC(t)dγ(t)
+
(
1
η (0, t)Si(t)
)
σQi1(t)dW (t) +
Qi1(t)
η (0, t)Si(t)
(θ(t)− σi(t))T dW (t)
= [.] dt+ γ(t)σσC (t) + σC(t)σγ(t)
T dW (t)
+
(
1
η (0, t)Si(t)
)(
σQi1(t) + (θ(t)− σi(t)) (θ(t)− σi(t))T
)
dW (t)
= [.] dt+
(
γ(t)σσC (t) + σC(t)σγ(t)
T + σQi1(t)
)
dW (t)
+
(
(θ(t)− σi(t)) (θ(t)− σi(t))T
)
dW (t)
= [.] dt+ σσi(t)dW (t). (C.42)
Hedging term diﬀusion coeﬃcients are derived next. Recall Equation C.11 and
apply Clark-Ocone's theorem to obtain
dψj(t) = [.] dt+ σψj (t)dW (t) (C.43)
where σψj (t) represents a N ×N matrix given by
σψj (t)
T = Et
[∫ T
t
Dt
{
η(0, s)Cj(s)h(t, s)
T + η(0, s)Hj(t, s)
T
}
ds
]
= Et
[∫ T
t
{
η(0, s)Cj(s)h(t, s)h(t, s)
T + η(0, s)Cj(s)gj(t, s)
}
ds
]
+Et
[∫ T
t
{
η(0, s)h(t, s)Hj(t, s)
T + η(0, s)Gj(t, s)
}
ds
]
. (C.44)
Finally, σYj (t) and ση(t) are easily obtained from Equations C.9 and C.4.
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C.3.1 Example
Deﬁne
A(t) =
(
σ(t)T
)−1
(C.45)
and
v(t) =
(
θ(t)Yj(t) +
ψj(t)
η(0, t)
)
(C.46)
and rewrite the optimal portfolio, Equation C.10, as follows
pij(t) = A(t)v(t) =
[
A11(t)v1(t) +A12(t)v2(t)
A21(t)v1(t) +A22(t)v2(t)
]
. (C.47)
A direct application of Ito's lemma (drift terms are disregarded) leads to
dpij(t) =
[
dpij1(t)
dpij2(t)
]
= d
[
A11(t)v1(t) +A12(t)v2(t)
A21(t)v1(t) +A22(t)v2(t)
]
=
[
A11(t)dv1(t) + dA11(t)v1(t) +A12(t)dv2(t) + dA12(t)v2(t)
A21(t)dv1(t) + dA21(t)v1(t) +A22(t)dv2(t) + dA22(t)v2(t)
]
=
[
A11(t)σv1(t) + v1(t)σA11(t) +A12(t)σv2(t) + v2(t)σA12(t)
A21(t)σv1(t) + v1(t)σA21(t) +A22(t)σv2(t) + v2(t)σA22(t)
] [
dW1(t)
dW2(t)
]
.(C.48)
We have that(
σ(t)T
)−1
=
([
σ11(t) σ12(t)
σ21(t) σ22(t)
]T)−1
=
1
|σ(t)|
[
σ22(t) −σ21(t)
−σ12(t) σ11(t)
]
(C.49)
with
|σ(t)| = σ22(t)σ11(t)− σ12(t)σ21(t). (C.50)
Using the fact that
dσij(t) = [.] dt+ σσij (t)
T dW (t) (C.51)
enables to obtain the following result
d |σ(t)| = [.] dt+
(
σ22(t)σσ11(t)
T + σ11(t)σσ22(t)
T
)
dW (t)
−
(
σ12(t)σσ21(t)
T + σ21(t)σσ12(t)
T
)
dW (t)
= [.] dt+ σ|σ(t)|(t)
T dW (t). (C.52)
Combining the above leads to
dA11(t) = [.] dt+
(
σσ22(t)− σ|σ(t)|(t)
)T
dW (t)
dA12(t) = [.] dt+
(−σσ21(t)− σ|σ(t)|(t))T dW (t)
dA21(t) = [.] dt+
(−σσ12(t)− σ|σ(t)|(t))T dW (t)
dA22(t) = [.] dt+
(
σσ11(t)− σ|σ(t)|(t)
)T
dW (t). (C.53)
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Turning to the dynamics of v(t), we have
dv(t) = d
(
θ(t)Yj(t) +
ψj(t)
η(0, t)
)
= θ(t)dYj(t) + Yj(t)dθ(t) +
1
η(0, t)
dψj(t) + ψj(t)d
(
1
η(0, t)
)
= [.] dt+ θ(t)Yj(t)σYj (t)
T dW (t) + Yj(t)σθ(t)dW (t)
+
(
1
η(0, t)
σψj (t)
T − ψj(t)
η(0, t)
θ(t)T
)
dW (t)
= [.] dt+ σv(t)dW (t). (C.54)
Finally, the quadratic variation of the portfolio policy, Equation 4.21, is thus given
by
QVj(t) = σpij (t)
Tσpij (t)dt (C.55)
C.4 Technical Details of Monte Carlo Simula-
tions
In this section I describe the numerical procedure to solve for the equilibrium quanti-
ties. The model is solved using Monte-Carlo (MC) simulations. The state variables
are simulated forward using an Euler scheme with 10000 sample paths and 1000
time steps. I use antithetic sampling to reduce the variance. For each time step
I calculate the optimal allocation of the habit adjusted consumption between the
two agents by solving the central planner problem. The sharing rule is solved by
Newton's method.The derivatives of of the optimal allocations are calculated using
ﬁnite diﬀerences. The time integrals are calculated by using the trapezoid rule with
1000 steps.
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